

**Six decades of instability**  
**Yemen ... politics conflict and proxy wars**



**special file**



مركز أبعاد للدراسات والبحوث  
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## Summary

Yemen has witnessed, in its contemporary history, and still witness many forms of conflict, depending on internal and external circumstances and reasons, which persisted and multiplied. If conflicts in Yemen stop for any reason, they would quickly return, and almost more violently. On the other hand, several forms of alliances, which often include more than one party to challenge one common opponent, emerged but quickly disappeared and faded as soon as the common danger disappeared, or even before it disappeared, as happened in the aftermath of the September revolution in 1962, as internal conflicts took place between the forces of the revolution while the revolution was subject to a fierce war waged by the royalist forces (Imamate), as well as the conflict that raged in southern Yemen after the October Revolution in 1963, between the two prominent forces that were involved in the revolution against the British colonialism, (the National Front and the Liberation Front).

Although these conflicts took different forms, the main roots often look similar, which made Yemen live in zero battles and confrontations as they result in the return of the country to the same situation, or maybe return the country to many years back, destroying what has been achieved and the accumulation of experiences of positive consensus, although these experiences are few and do not achieve hopes and aspirations that Yemenis seek since more than sixty years.

This study (Yemen...politics and proxy wars) tries to focus on the roots of political conflicts in Yemen and the external factors that fed them during six decades. In the period (1959-2019), we try to identify the most prominent conflicts that Yemen experienced, while dealing with the political and social roots of those conflicts, and the conditions and factors that contributed to igniting them, in addition to shedding the light on the most important forces and components that participated in the conflicts, with reference to the role of external factors and parties that interfered in those conflicts,

whether this intervention was in supporting an internal party, or to stop the conflict and push the conflicting parties towards reconciliation and dialogue. The study also deals with the most prominent alliances that arose in preparation for a round of conflict, or formed on the conflict's margins or was one of its results, as well as different forms of alliances and varying circumstances that contribute to whether strengthening those alliances or weakening them and then crumbling them. The latter is what happened to most of those alliances due to stormy conflicts and the waves of breakdown and falling into violence and counter-violence.

## **Research Methodology**

The researcher has adopted the methodology of analytical description in dealing with incidents and facts by describing them and analyzing their contents, factors and circumstances surrounding them, and also adopted a historical methodology in tracking the facts of history related to the subject in time and place, and monitoring the most important manifestations and the most influential forces.

In order to achieve the desired goals, the research was divided into three topics, started with a preface and ended with a conclusion. The preface deals with "Zaidiyya Imamate", idea and state, from the angle of its relationship with political conflicts since its wars to build its domination through its wars against its opponents, and ending with the war that the royal imamate forces fought against the September revolution and the republican system.

The first part, entitled (Revolution and Conflict of Identity), deals with the British colonialism and imamate rule, in terms of relationship between them and then their relationship with the national powers that decided to engage in political action in the face of foreign colonialism and imperial tyranny.

The second part deals with royal war, the republic state and interstate conflicts between forces of revolution in southern and northern Yemen. The third part is devoted to the conflicts that erupted on margins of the national unity in later stages of time. The conclusion shows the most important outcomes the researcher found out.

## The beginning of an era:

In this study, we assume that the year 1959 constitutes an appropriate beginning to trace the roots of the political conflict in Yemen, without breaking with the period that preceded it, because talking about the roots of any conflict must go back too far in the past, no matter how the manifestations of the conflict and its limbs appear to be truncated. The past is related to the present, which is also related to the future. There are factors and reasons that possibly started in 1959, including the fact that it witnessed two important transformations:

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**1959 witnessed two important transformations, the colonialism announced the formation of the Southern Union, and the popular rejection of the Imamate in northern Yemen expanded**  
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**First:** The beginning of the year 1959, the British authorities, which were occupying southern Yemen at the time, announced the formation of the Union of Southern Arab Emirates. The United Kingdom has been paving the way for this project for many years until it found - in the late fifties - that the time is right and that delay is not in their favor, especially with the escalation of the Arab nationalist trend following the July 1952 revolution in Egypt, and the expansion of national liberation movements in the face of colonial powers locally, regionally and internationally, let alone the decline of Britain's influence in the Middle East and Africa after the evacuation of its forces from Palestine, Iraq and Egypt. So it focused on the rest of its influence in the region, especially Aden.

Britain felt that this Union will strengthen its authority and give it a measure of influence and stability in the vicinity of the oil refinery that it established between 1952 and 1954.

The Union met with the acceptance of local forces who are loyal to the colonial powers, but it was rejected by the political forces and other streams affected by the Arab nationalist movement, including the leftist movements and the national opposition movement. The rejection of the British project and its resistance were linked to the revolutionary work and the national struggle for freedom and independence. The events went faster towards the revolution that seemed to have fulfilled its subjective and objective conditions.

**Second:** In the year 1959, the popular rejection of the monarchy (Imamate) system in northern Yemen expanded, and discontent reached its climax among tribes

and extended to areas that remained committed to the imam's obedience and absolute loyalty to him, after the vulnerability of Imam Ahmed bin Yahya Hamid al-Din and his regime was exposed. Especially after it was proven that the Imam's promises to improve the situation and reform the administration are nothing but a new form of tricks that he masters to entice his opponents and gain more time, and when the situation becomes in his favor, he does not hesitate to get rid of his opponents, as he did with the participants in the 1948 constitution revolution and 1955 movement, including his brothers. The rebellious movements broke out in 1959, including the uprising of major Yemeni tribes such as Hashid, Bakil, and Khawlan. Although the imam was able to put end to that revolution, the breakdown of relationship between the monarchy system and tribes contributed to creating broad popular sectors of the revolution whose indicators started to loom.

## introduction

### Zaidiyya Imamate and political conflicts:

It is not possible to talk about political conflicts in Yemen without mentioning the issue of the Imamate in the Zaydi School, (according to Imam Zayd bin Ali bin Al Hussein bin Ali bin Abi Talib), because a long history of conflict has been linked to thought and its application by imams of the Zaydi School since the founder of the state of (Zaydiyyah) Imams Yahya bin Al Hussein,<sup>1</sup> nicknamed Imam al-Hadi (who guides to the right), at the end of the third century AH / late ninth century AD. The influence of al-Hadi in the Zaydi doctrine and its values, the Zaydi doctrine has become described as (Al-Zaydi-Al-Hadawi) doctrine. With the known moderation of the Zaydi doctrine, compared to many of the Shiite groups known for militancy towards its opponents, the association of the authority of the Zaydi imams with the ongoing struggles over power,

influence of Jaroudia sect<sup>2</sup> and al-Hadawi on the associates of the Zaydi doctrine, made Yemen lives in continuous wars. One of thoughts of Al-Hadi is that he connects between the prophecy and the Imamate. He says that the recognition of the Imamate of Ali bin Abi Talib is a recognition of the prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings be upon him), contrary to the opinion of Imam (Zayd), the founder of the Zaydi School. Al-Hadi seems to be closer to the Imamate Shiites and the Jaroudia sect, especially in the belief that (Ali) deserves the Imamate as successor of the Prophet, and that Imam Ali and his followers, Hassan and Hussein, were fixed by the text.

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**The influence of Jaroudiya and al-Hadawiya on the associates of the Zaidiya doctrine made Yemen lives in continuous wars**  
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The views of Jaroudia overwhelmed the other views of Zaydi doctrine in Yemen, to the extent that the Yemeni scholar and historian (Nashwan Al-Himyari)<sup>3</sup> asserted that "There is no any Zaydi sect in Yemen except Jaroudia sect."<sup>4</sup>

Yemen was not allowed to live in peace and stability except in a few periods of time, because the Imamate system that constrained the right to rule to the sons of Hassan and Hussein<sup>5</sup> (the two men). So it possible for everyone who meets the conditions of belonging to the two men to declare himself as an imam over the country, but it sometimes happens that several people claim they are imams at the same time,

for example, one in Sana'a, one in Shahara, and a third one in Jiblah<sup>6</sup>. The internal conflict has emerged within families who contested over the imamate, mostly belong to the Imam Al-Hadi doctrine. Among those internal conflicts is what happened between the family of al-Hadi and the family of al-Ayani<sup>7</sup>. It happened also a fight between parents and sons as what happened in the fight between Imam al-Mutawakkil Yahya Sharaf Addin and his son al-Muthar in the fifties of the sixteenth century. The brothers also fought each other as what happened between Imam Ahmad bin Yahya Hamid al-Din<sup>8</sup> and his brothers Abdullah and Abbas in the fifties of last century.

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**the Imamate system that constrain  
the right to rule to the sons of Hassan  
and Hussein (the two men)**

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The Yemeni historian Hussein al-Omari says in his book (The History of Modern and Contemporary Yemen): The conflict has become a tradition that has stamped political and social life in Yemen by a season of division and fighting between the aspirants and the wrestlers from the imams of the ruling house, until society was exhausted and the central state lost control and the country was plagued with years of chaos.<sup>9</sup>

The bloody conflict that has become inherent in the state of imams, since it was founded in the year (284 AH / 897 AC) until it ended in the year (1382 AH / 1962 AC), took various forms, including:

-Conflict with the opposition and local resistance from tribal leaders such as Al al-Dahhak, Al al-Da'am, and Al al-Tarif, and others.

- Conflict with the Yemeni states that erupted in different regions of Yemen, Sulayhiyah (1047-1138), Al-Hatimiyya (1099-1173), Rasuliyah (1229-1454), and Al-Tahiriya (1454-1517), and others.

-Conflict with countries whose influence extended to Yemen such as the Ayyubids (1173-1229), the Mamaliks (1517-1538), the Ottomans in the first period (1538-1635) and in the second period (1872-1918). The Zaydi state also fought a fierce war against the Ismailis (947-903). Although the Zaydi and Ismaili factions follow the Shi'a School, the Hadawi-Zaydi state, during the reign of Imam al-Nasir bin al-Hadi, allied with the Ziyadia state (818-1012), led by Muhammad bin Ziyad and the state of Bani Ya`far (839-1003), led by As'ad bin Abi Ya`far al-Hawali, in order to eliminate the Ismaili state .<sup>10</sup> Even if the conflict with others is absent, an internal conflict arises<sup>11</sup>

So once an imam dies, the competitors begin to invite the tribes to take up arms and fight, incite them to kill their competitors and preach them to be in heaven. They push the tribes to fight each other in the name of Allah and the name of the Book of Allah and the sons of the Messenger of Allah.<sup>12</sup> The use of religion in political conflicts remained a prominent feature of the Zaydi imamate's thought and rhetoric, including that the Imam al-Hadi, when he established his state in Saada (north Yemen), he relied on his relatives and followers who came from Tabaristan. He made them governors, guards and fighters without Yemenis and called them (Immigrants),<sup>13</sup> in a clear analogy to

the companions of the Prophet Mohamed (peace be upon him), who left from Mecca to Medina at the beginning of the seventh century A.D. with companions, whom the prophet called (the immigrants). After Imam Ahmad overthrew the 1948 revolution and arrested his opponents, he used to bring detainees during Islamic events, and after Friday sermon, he orders their execution in front of people, and his supporters used to chant with every head falling: Allah is the Greatest, Allah preserves the Imam .<sup>14</sup>

In the current war, the Houthis call their members (Ansar Allah),<sup>15</sup> as they call their war to control the provinces and government institutions (The Quranic Process).



## The first topic

### Revolution and Identity Struggle

#### British colonialism and Imamate rule

After the end of the World War I (1914-1918) with the victory of Britain and its allies, the Ottoman Turks left areas they controlled in northern Yemen, and Imam Yahya bin Muhammad Hamid Addin (1869-1948) announced the founding of the (Yemeni Mutawakkil Kingdom),<sup>16</sup> as he announced his intention to achieve the unity of all Yemeni lands, rejecting the Anglo-Turkish agreements related to the demarcation of borders between northern and southern Yemen. The British seized the Tihama and Hodeidah (west of Yemen), and the Imam forces began moving south towards the areas under British occupation in Dhale and Lahj.

In 1924, the Imam forces controlled the areas of Dhale and Shuaib (north of Lahj), and the Al-Awadhel region in Abyan, east of Aden, to pressure the British to hand over Hodeidah. He used Italy and signed a friendship agreement with it in 1926. He also signed a friendship and cooperation treaty with the Soviet Union in 1928,<sup>17</sup> so the British reaction came quickly and it launched war in the same year after their attempts to negotiate with Imam Yahya failed. Britain used warplanes that dropped bombs of destruction that damaged the Imam's army,<sup>18</sup> and began its aerial bombardment on the adjacent areas of Dhale and Qataba. Then the bombing continued to include the cities of Taiz (southwest of Yemen), Ibb, Dhamar and Yarim (Central Yemen) and other regions.

imam and his supporters were practicing a policy of repression, collecting money and taking hostages<sup>19</sup> in the areas they control, the British authorities were able to present themselves as a protector of the population, princes, and sultans in those areas. So Imam Yahya's forces retreated to beyond former Turkish-British border, and the Imam's hopes in restoring the unification of the whole Yemen under his control were destroyed<sup>20</sup>. The Imam was forced to accept the negotiations that led to the signing of an agreement with the British authorities in 1934, in which the Imam agreed to withdraw his forces from Dhale, to release the hostages and open the trade route. The agreement stipulated the including of Bayda to Imam's areas, despite it is located in the southern part of the Anglo-Turkish agreement.<sup>21</sup> Britain took advantage of that treaty, which represented a recognition of its authority over the southern Yemen and a division of Yemen,

and began implementing a series of measures that aimed at consolidating its authority in the protectorates, especially since the treaty included the commitment of both parties "not to support any movement in the other party's territory as that can be consider as violation of the terms of the treaty",<sup>22</sup> and this reveals the imam's abandonment of his claim to work to liberate southern Yemen from foreign colonialism, especially since the Imam kingdom was surrounded in the first half of the thirties by several wars and rebellions in northern Yemen with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and in Tehama, in the west, as well as in the areas of al-Jawf in the northeast of the country.



The popular discontent began to appear due to the mismanagement of the country by the Imam and his staff, and the defeat of his forces in the Yemen-Saudi war that was followed by the signing of the Taif Agreement by the two sides.

The Yemenis considered the agreement between Britain and Imam Yahya as a concession from the Imam, because he recognized Britain's occupation of Aden and southern Yemen for forty years, and the Imam's administration "willingly wasted two-thirds of Yemen, surrendered the people to colonialism, let down the liberals, and disrespected princes and sultans, so they were compelled to subject to Britain. The Imamate regime did not prepare itself, its army, or its people to protect Yemen from dangers that it might face one day. On the contrary, it shattered the people, dismembered them, and imposed poverty, ignorance, prisons, and disease, until the people and the country became an easy target for colonialism." <sup>23</sup>

As a result of this growing discontent, opposition circles formed in many Yemeni regions such as Sana'a, Taiz, Dhamar and Ibb.<sup>24</sup>

The armed resistance that started in the Yemeni countryside during the period (1918-1934), led by the tribal sheikhs against the Imam's policy of collecting Zakat, the hostages system, and the obligatory recruitment, represented the first stage of the formation of the Yemeni opposition, while the second phase, known as the political opposition, came in the period (1935- 1943), with the opposition moving from the countryside to the city, led by scholars and intellectuals, and centered on literary and cultural activities of secret societies and public gatherings.<sup>25</sup>



Members of the opposition were influenced by the ideas of the Yemeni reformers and regenerators such as Muhammad bin Ibrahim al-Wazir, (1373-1436), al-Hussein Bin Ahmed al-Jalal (1604-1677), Muhammad Bin Ismail al-Amir (1688-1769), Salih Mahdi al-Muqbal (1720-1788), and Muhammad Bin Ali al-Shawkani (1760-1834),<sup>26</sup> and Arab thinkers such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1739-1897), Muhammad Abdo (1849-1905), Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi (1854-1902), Georgy Zidan (1861-1914) and Shakib Arslan (1869-1946) and others. Their demands in the face of tyranny and reforms they demanded were widely echoed among the first generation of the opposition, and these ideas formed the intellectual basis for the Yemeni opposition movement, and Muhammad al-Mahlawi (1865-1936) and Hassan al-Dais (1885-1948) were among the first Yemenis to be affected by reformist ideas, and the first to publicly criticize the fundamental principles of the Imam rule.<sup>27</sup>

In the year 1935, Ahmed Al-Mutaa (1907-1948) established the Struggle Committee in Sana'a, which was the first secret opposition organization with a system and specific goals. It lasted for several years, representing organized resistance against the rule of Imam Yahya.<sup>28</sup> As a result, secret organizations and literary and cultural unions were established in Yemeni cities<sup>29</sup> and the Reform Society in Ibb, led by Mohamed Ali al-Akwa (1903-1998), and Judge Abdul-Rahman al-Iryani.<sup>30</sup> The third stage of the Yemeni opposition appeared in the period (1944-1948), when the opposition took a distinct organizational character from the previous stages, after moving to Aden, where Mohamed Mahmoud al-Zubayri<sup>31</sup> and his companions Ahmad Mohamed Noaman<sup>32</sup> and Dr. Al-Mushki (1911-1948) and Ahmad al-Shami (1924-2005) founded "The Yemeni Liberal Party" in the year 1944. It issued the newspaper "Voice of Yemen",<sup>33</sup> then the "Great Yemeni Assembly" 1945.

During that time, the national opposition gained ideological thought of reform features in the theoretical document of the 1948 constitutional movement, known as the (Holy National Charter).<sup>34</sup>

The opposition began to expand at home and abroad, and some of its members began interacting with the Arab and international surroundings and the currents, parties, and forces, and were influenced by the ideas that were prevalent during that period. The Constitution revolution of 1948 came after the opposition was able to weave extensive relations outside Yemen with intellectual and political parties, including the Muslim Brotherhood, which was the most prominent supporter of the revolution, after several meetings brought together leaders in the opposition with the founder of the well-built Muslim Brotherhood.<sup>35</sup> The features of the struggle for power within the Imam's regime itself had begun to appear in

the second half of the thirties of the twentieth century, when the sons of Imam Yahya, called (Swords of Islam) - with support from their father, removed their allies and relatives from outside the family of (Hamid al-Din),<sup>36</sup> as the son of Imam Prince Ahmed succeeded to remove Ali al-Wazir from his position as Emir of Taiz and replaced him<sup>37</sup> . This led to the expansion of discontent and resentment against Imam Yahya to include personalities within the departments that were close to his sectarian and family,<sup>38</sup> as what happened with al-Wazir family, most of whom joined the opposition later.

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**The features of struggle over power within the Imam's regime began when the sons of Imam Yahya removed their allies and relatives from outside the family of (Hamid al-Din)**  
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Despite the failure of the revolution in 1948, it succeeded in expanding the base of opposition against the Imam rule. The travel of some Yemeni students to study abroad and the number of opposition leaders after the failure of the revolution, led to establishing relationship between the liberals of Yemen and the national movements abroad. In 1951, the activity of the Yemeni political opponents began, especially in Aden where Sheikh Abdullah al-Hakimi (1900-1953) located. The opposition ranks multiplied with the detainees whom Imam Ahmad released.

The Yemeni Union was established .<sup>39</sup> The revolution in 23 July, 1952, led by Jamal Abdel Nasser, contributed to strengthening relationship between parties of the Yemeni opposition abroad, most of them were living in Egypt. The Egyptian revolution expressed its support to the opposition in its fight against the British colonialism mainly, and then against the rule of Imam, because Imam Ahmad succeeded, at the beginning, in winning the position of Egypt to his side, but the deception of Imam against Egyptian leaders did not last for long.<sup>40</sup>

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## **In the face of the revolution**


The agreement between the colonial regime in the south and the Imamate rule in the north was also short-lived. In January 1954, Britain began to lay out its plan to establish the "Union of Southern Arab Emirates", which Imam Ahmad objected to and issued a memorandum in February of the same year to the Arab League, in which he indicated that creation of such a union is a breach to the agreements signed in 1934 and 1951, and that this union will lead to changing the status quo in the region. <sup>41</sup>

In 1937, the British authorities issued a royal decree to convert the Sultanate, Sheikhdoms, and Emirates of the South Yemen into two protectorates, eastern and western protectorates,<sup>42</sup> and when the events began to accelerate in favor of Arab nationalists and liberation movements after the Egyptian July revolution, Britain tried to preempt incidents by

"merging all the southern emirates into a federation or two federations" with close ties to the United Kingdom.<sup>43</sup> After more than a hundred years, the Britons applied the policy of "divide and rule" and made one geographical area a square for more than twenty Sultanates, emirates and sheikhdoms. Each emirate had its own system and status and rather some of them were called (a republic) such as (Dethina republic)<sup>44</sup> which follows the governorate of Abyan. The British project collided with the rejection of some princes and sultans loyal to colonialism, national parties in the south, the government of Yemen and the Arab League. This rejection confused the British authorities, so it retreated the idea of the unification of all the emirates, and satisfied with some emirates in the western protectorate where there was an opportunity to succeed by claiming Yemeni threats,<sup>45</sup>

especially after Yemen came out of its shell, and joined the Arab League in 1945, and the United Nations in 1947. And since the revolution of Egypt, the Yemeni-British dispute had evolved and transcended out of its territory borders. On the other hand, Yemen started diplomatic contacts with the international community to obtain the support of the third world countries, the socialist camp, and other countries that were hostile to Britain. It was necessary to defend the Yemeni demands participating in the Bandung Conference in 1955, and the Asia and Africa Peoples Conference that was held in Cairo in 1957. When Britain embarked on the use of aerial bombardment against Yemeni populated areas in Harib 1956, al-Bayda in 1957, and Qatabah in 1958, sparked outrage in international circles, and support was campaigned for Yemen against British colonial projects.<sup>46</sup>

The Imam's government began to conduct agreements with foreign countries, expanded commercial contacts, and foreign capital began arriving in Yemen with the aim of economic assistance and military actions. The government sent a larger number than before to study abroad, so all of this helped the emergence of new modern ideas.<sup>47</sup>



The struggle for power began within the home of Hamid al-Din, where the central was the guardianship of the throne that was the point of competition between two of Imam Ahmad's brothers, the two Emirs, Abdullah and Hassan, while the Imam was promising his son Mohamed, nicknamed (al-Badr),<sup>48</sup> that he will be his successor in reign. The 1955 coup movement was led by Abdullah and Abbas. A number of army leaders, led by Lt. Col. Ahmed al-Thulaya,<sup>49</sup> participated in the movement, and Imam Ahmad was able to suppress it with a trick, after which he executed the leaders of the coup beginning with his brothers. The most important thing that the opposition achieved in this movement is that it penetrated the family of Hamid al-Din and made a profound impact on the structure of the ruling family. The movement was the first action the army engaged in,

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**Although the imam was able to put end to the 1955 movement, it penetrated the family of Hamid al-Din and made a shift in the structure of the ruling family, and it would be the last attempt to replace imam with another one**  
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and it was the last attempt to change the internal situation by replacing the Imam with another one and maintain the monarchy rule.<sup>50</sup> The opposition was divided over the 1955 movement into supporters, who saw that the movement would undermine the Imam's house and system, and opponents who saw that the movement was "immature".<sup>51</sup>

The issue of eliminating the monarchy emerged among the opposition, and the search for new forms of the state system, while Imam Ahmed tended to concentrate more powers in the hands of his son al-Badr, who was officially appointed as crown prince, and he became Foreign Minister and commander-in-chief of the armed forces.<sup>52</sup>

The following are the most important political parties and powers that appeared in Yemen during the period (1950-1962). They fought politically and were able to influence popular bases in different Yemeni regions:

- **The Yemeni Union:** It was formed in the year 1950, and among the most important personalities that participated in its establishment: Abdel-Qader Alwan, Ali al-Ahmadi, Mahmoud Ashish, Ahmed Haji, Abdul-Rahman Abdul-Rab. In the year 1955, a group of Al al-Wazir family, including Ibrahim and Abbas al-Wazir, split from the union and formed a party, "the Shura," whose name later changed to

the "Union of Popular Forces" and still exists until today. The reason of the split was due to political disputes with the leaders of the union, especially the historical leaders of the opposition such as Mohamed Mahmoud al-Zubeiry and Ahmad Mohamed Noaman. The dissidents decided at that time to form a third party to be in the middle between the Imam Authority and the opposition, although the majority of them reconciled with Imam Ahmed and his crown prince.

- **The Sons of the Southern Association:** It was formed from a number of Yemeni students in Egypt and Sudan from the standpoint of uniting and liberating the occupied emirates of the south. Among the most prominent founders of the association were: Mohamed Ali al-Jafri, Rashid Hariri, Salem al-Safi, Ahmed Hamza, and Sheikhan al-Habashi. After the establishment of the association was formally announced in 1951, Qahtan al-Sha`bi\* and Abdullah Badib joined it,<sup>53</sup>

and later its name became, "The Association of Sons of the Arab South". It also witnessed defections of its most prominent members who joined other parties, including Qahtan al-Sha`bi and Abdullah Badib.



• **The Labor Conference:** It was established in 1956 with the aim of facing the measures of the British authorities that aimed at suppressing unions after their participation in protest activities against colonialism. The unions leaders decided to form a conference that includes unions and adopts workers' issues. Its most prominent leaders were: Abdullah al-Asanj, Khalil Salman, and Mohamed Maswat.

• **The Democratic Popular Union:** Founded in 1961 under the leadership of Abdullah Badib. It included those affected by Marxist ideas that spread in Aden in the mid-fifties by students who were studying abroad, and some union leaderships that Arab and international conferences gave them the opportunity to interact with Marxist leaders, as well as books, newspapers and party publications. The Communism, which was sent to Yemen regularly, represented a subject of internal party education. Among the first affected by Marxist thought, the first nucleus, was formed in southern Yemen, and it called itself "the vanguard of Marxists", and it included Abdullah Badib, Mahmoud Salem, Khaled Fadl Mansour and Omar al-Jawi. They did not appear publicly until 1961 when they founded the Popular Democratic Union Party. <sup>54</sup>

## •The Arab Nationalists Movement:

Its branch was established in Yemen in 1959 in Sheikh Othman region in Aden. The establishment of the movement branch coincided with spreading of the ideas of the Baath Party, and the rivalry began between them through the Labor Conference in Aden, the Labor Union in Taiz. The most prominent members of the movement were: Faisal al-Sha'bi, Qahtan al-Sha'bi,<sup>55</sup> Abd al-Karim al-Iryani, and Sultan Ahmed Omar.

The movement had wide influence after the September 1962 revolution due to Egyptian support during the harmony between Abdel Nasser and the central leadership of the Arab Nationalist Movement. The movement's ideas spread among the military officers in the al-Saeqah camp, Parachute Camp, and Artillery Forces. The movement had presented, since the issue of unity between north and south Yemen began,

the idea of unity in the battle against local tyranny and foreign colonialism. This gave the movement a wide influence in large sectors of intellectuals, military leaders and politicians in various regions of Yemen. In the year 1963, the branch of the movement announced the formation of the "National Front for the Liberation of Occupied Southern Yemen", which included, in addition to the branch of the Arab Nationalist Movement, several organizations, including: the revolutionary organization for occupied southern Yemen, the National Front, the Secret Formation of Free Officers and Soldiers, the Yafei Reform Front, and the Formation of Tribes, all of which met on one goal to kick out the British colonialism with armed struggle.<sup>56</sup> The National Front adopted the revolution of the 14th of October 1963, and the activity of the front expanded after the revolution, and it held its first conference in 1965.

In the beginning of the year 1966, a number of leaders of the National Front announced the unification of the front with the Occupied South Liberation Organization under the name (The Liberation Front). However, most of the leaderships and bases of the National Front rejected this integration, and considered it a forced and illegal integration. At the end of the same year, they announced the separation of the National Front from the Liberation Front. <sup>57</sup>

• **The Baath Party:** Its influence extended through the Yemeni students abroad, and its first branch was established in Yemen in 1956. It dominated the Labor Conference that leads the unions against the British colonialism in southern Yemen, but the influence of the Baath declined after Syria seceded from Egypt in 1961, and the differences within the Baath central leadership in both Iraq and Syria. So the Popular Vanguard Party split from the Baath Party and joined the National Front.

• **The Free Officers Organization:** It was formed in Sana'a in late 1961 according to an initiative from 15 army officers. And within a short period, the organization attracted dozens of young officers who graduated from the local military institutes that were established in the second half of the fifties in the framework of the Imam's desire to modernize the army. The political trend of the officers was hostile against the monarchy (imamate) regime and highly influenced by the Arab nationalist tide that arose in the wake of the Egyptian revolution 1952. Branches of the organization were established in the main cities in northern Yemen, and the organization became, during several months, an effective force in the armed forces, characterized by strict secret action and effective influence. It focused on the principles of the overthrow of the Imam regime, and the establishment of a republican system, and achieving a number of internal reforms similar to the experience of al-Nasiriyah in Egypt.

The goals included the liberation of southern Yemen and achieving national unity in the overall Arab Unity. <sup>60</sup>

It can be said that the Yemeni opposition in the 1940s strengthened its links with the Muslim Brotherhood,<sup>61</sup> and then solidified its thought with liberal thought. And in the 1950s it was influenced by the great events in Egypt and Syria when the idea of the national unity and the struggle against colonialism became the focus of political and intellectual life.

The intellectuals such as the Baath, nationalism, and socialism found their way to the Yemeni intellectuals. The intellectual and political contradictions reflected on members of the opposition, and in the late fifties and early sixties, the reality began to reveal new gatherings that had arisen among officers and intellectuals, and all these factions tried to find their way to a neighborhood.

A new political process began to operate throughout Yemen,

north and south. Although the army officers were at the forefront of those affected by the political currents, they were influenced by the Nasserites experience that was closer to their ideas, especially since in that period the Arab Nationalist Movement adopted the Nasserites approach as the final separation between the Movement and the Nasserites Party had not occurred yet and the Baath Party in Syria had not been separated from the Nasserites in Egypt. These events will cast shadow over the political life in Yemen later on.

It is noted that the conflict between the Yemeni political currents before the revolution was limited due to the surrounding circumstances, as they lived under the pressure of persecution, prevention and repression, except small parties that were in agreement with the colonial authorities, especially in its project (the Union of the Arab South).

But the conflict between the Imam's rule and the opposition moved inside late in the late fifties, after popular discontent increased among the major tribes. The tribal revolt began in 1959, the most prominent of which was the Hashid tribe uprising, led by its sheikh Hussein bin Nasser al-Ahmar, and his son Sheikh Hamid, and the Bakil tribe uprising, led by Abdul-Latif bin Qaid bin Rajeh, Saleh Saran and Faisal Ufan.<sup>62</sup> Although Imam Ahmad was able to abolish that uprising, the popular rejection remained, awaiting the opportunity to rise again. In the year 1961, the Imam Ahmed faced a new coup attempt carried out by three officers, Mohamed al-Olofi, Abdullah al-Laqiya and Mohsen al-Hindwana. They shot him with nine bullets. The Imam sustained serious wounds, but he did not die immediately. He continued to suffer from wounds until he died on September 19, 1962. <sup>63</sup>

With regard to differences that have

arisen between the political forces, and the cracks and splits, as what happened with the Yemeni Union, the Association of Sons of the South, and the Adeni Assembly, those differences have often been related to their attitudes towards the Imamate rule and the British colonialism, and the mechanism of dealing with them. Although the majority of powers and currents were compatible to confront the Imamate and colonialism, the visions and perceptions crystallized here and there under the banner of moderation and no haste and adventure. But those slogans were melting and fading quickly in front of the expanding and spreading national trends.



The national powers managed to override the parties and entities that accepted - in whole or in part - the projects of the British colonialism, and were not at the level of popular demands and the escalating nationalist discourse against colonialism and its projects. Therefore, the people shunned those entities and parties and turned to the parties and movements that chose to

confront the British colonialism. When the October Revolution started, the Arab Nationalists Movement was the most prominent and influential party, and its position in supporting the Nasserite experience and the Yemeni unity helped in the spread of its ideas widely.<sup>64</sup> Then the Baath Party also enjoyed a large popular presence, followed by the People's Democratic Union.<sup>65</sup>



## The Second Topic

### The Imamate war and rebel struggles

#### The Arab conflict in Yemen

In August 1962, the Saudi King Saud bin Abdulaziz and the King of Jordan Hussein bin Talal decided to coordinate in the military fields and to develop economic cooperation between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Jordan.<sup>66</sup> In November of the same year, the military alliance was announced between the two countries. In the same month, a joint defense agreement was signed between the Yemen Arab Republic and the United Arab Republic (Egypt),<sup>67</sup> according to which the Egyptian forces were present in Yemen to participate in the fighting, alongside the revolution, against the forces of

the deposed Imam Mohamed al-Badr, supported by Saudi Arabia. In the United States of America, a special committee was formed, headed by former intelligence officer Robert Couteer to dispatch foreign mercenaries to the Imam's camps in Yemen.<sup>68</sup>

Only a few days after the revolution, the Egyptian planes began landing in the airports of Sana'a and Taiz, carrying the Egyptian soldiers who were stationed in designated camps, so that the Egyptian and Yemeni revolution forces began a wide and long military confrontation with the Imam teams consisting of the Imam remnant forces and some tribesmen.<sup>69</sup>

When relations between Egypt and Saudi Arabia were tense, Saudi Arabia and Jordan signed an agreement in August 1962 on coordination in military, economic, and foreign policy fields. The agreement seemed to be against Egypt, which had adopted support for Arab liberation movements, including the Yemeni national movement and its nascent revolution that caused an internal conflict between the Republicans and the royalists (imamis). The revolution also resulted in the outbreak of the Arab cold war between Cairo and Riyadh after years of reconciliation. Following the Yemeni revolution and the declaration of the republican system, the Arab-Arab conflict had a qualitative dimension and a new political and ideological model.<sup>70</sup>

In addition to the Egyptian support for the Yemeni revolution, Syria provided material and military support that included some weapons and food. Syrian pilots participated in the war,

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**Agreement between Saudi and Jordan seemed to be against Egypt, which had adopted support for Arab liberation movements, including the Yemeni national movement, so the Arab-Arab conflict had a new dimension**  
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as well as Algeria's position was supportive of the revolution and the republican system. The Syrian and Algerian position had positive effects in the interest of the republican system internally and internationally.<sup>71</sup> On the international level, the assistance provided by the socialist system, led by the Soviet Union, had impact and role in weighting the republican revolutionaries. The Soviet assistance included military hardware, experts, jet fighters, in addition to fuel and food.<sup>72</sup>

As for the royalists (Imamis), they started establishing their leaderships in the caves and fortified places on the outskirts of the country after money and weapons flowed from Saudi Arabia. The deposed Imam Al-Badr stationed in the caves, southwest of Saada, while his uncle Al-Hassan settled in one of the caves east of Saada, and Abdullah bin Al-Hussein went to Al-Jouf. Mohamed bin Ismail to the tribe of Bakil, Abdullah bin al-Hassan to Khawlan, al-Hassan bin al-Hassan to Marib, and Ahmed al-Sayaghi to Huraib, and the actual leadership of the general royal camp located in Najran, led by Mohamed bin al-Hussein.<sup>73</sup> During the eight-year war (1962-1970), the American support for the royalists forces appeared through the US air force that stationed at a military base in southern Saudi Arabia at that time,<sup>74</sup> as well as supporting the British military forces in southern Yemen. The Yemeni government accused Britain of

"allowing military supplies, mercenaries and weapons to cross their borders freely and go to the monarchs, and ordering their forces in Bayhan to support the monarchs in Marib with weapons and ammunition."<sup>75</sup> It is not secret that the United States and Britain are keen on keeping their interests in the Middle East, and each of them tries to prevent what they used to agree on (the expansion of the Soviet influence) in the region, and that support was a critical and essential factor in the war prolong.<sup>76</sup>

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**The monarchs stationed in fortified places so the war prolonged for eight years after the flow of funds and weapons from Saudi and the US air force intervened to support the monarchs and the Britons allowed military supplied to pass through southern borders with the north**  
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## **Peace efforts in Yemen:**

Since the first months of the revolution, Arab and international efforts began to stop the Yemeni war. In late 1962, US President John Kennedy sent letters to the Yemeni President Abdullah al-Salal,<sup>77</sup> President Abdel Nasser, the Jordanian King Hussein Bin Talal, and Prince Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, in which he offered to present his endeavors in order to reach a peaceful settlement, proposing the withdrawal of Egyptian forces, stopping the Saudi and Jordanian support to the monarchs, and withdrawing the Saudi forces from the borders. President al-Salal welcomed the aspect related to stopping support to the monarchs, and President Abdel Nasser responded to Kennedy that Egypt's involvement in the fight was not intended to topple the Saudi and Jordanian thrones, but for the purpose of protecting the young Yemeni republic,

expressing his desire to withdraw his forces once Saudi and Jordanian aid to the monarchs is stopped. While King Hussein suggested that a United Nations team investigate the facts in Yemen, and Prince Faisal stated that the Yemeni issue should be settled through joint Arab Arbitration.<sup>78</sup>

In the United Nations, the seat of Yemen was still controlled by the royalists, and the revolution coincided with the 17th session of the General Assembly. The revolution government made strenuous efforts to obtain the seat through a delegation headed by Foreign Minister Mohsen al-Aini,<sup>79</sup> and the issue was resolved only in the closing session after the Credentials Committee approved the Republican delegation, a legitimate representative of Yemen, on December 19, 1962, after a large number of countries recognized the Republican system.<sup>80</sup>

In February 1963, the revolution government in Sana'a announced its agreement to mediation by the United Nations. In March of the same year, Ralph Bunche, Undersecretary General of the United Nations for Political Affairs, arrived in Yemen. He visited a number of Yemeni governorates and met with government officials in Sana'a, Taiz and Ma'rib. Then he visited Cairo and met with President Abdel Nasser, who assured him that Egypt would withdraw its forces if Saudi and British stopped their support to the monarchs in Yemen. Bunche did not continue his mission because Saudi Arabia refused to receive him under the pretext that his statements showed his bias to the republican system and the government of the revolution.<sup>81</sup> In his book (Yemen Revolution and War), the British writer (Edgar O'Balane)

summarized the United Nations intervention in Yemen, as "it was a bleak failure because of the little support that is at the mercy of more conflicting pressures, and led to more misunderstanding and hostility than creating the climate that leads to peace." He added: "The UN mission has been surrounded by internal conflicts, and viewed with deep suspicion on the part of all parties involved in conflict and war." <sup>82</sup>

The international position on the war in Yemen and the related Arab conflict seemed to coincide with a statement made by a White House adviser at the time to a group of Arab diplomats: "Let them bleed to death, the Egyptians are busy with their forces, the Saudis are spending, and the Yemenis are suffering, and when they are tired they will reach a solution." <sup>83</sup>

**An adviser in the White House talked to a group of Arab diplomats as saying: "Let them bleed to death, the Egyptians are busy with their forces, the Saudis are spending, and the Yemenis are suffering, and when they are tired they will reach a solution"**

In September 1964, during the Arab summit conference, Egypt and Saudi Arabia agreed to cooperate for peace in Yemen, and the agreement stipulated that direct dialogue between Republicans and monarchs should be held at a later stage,<sup>84</sup> which took place at the end of the same year at Arquette Conference in Sudan. The Republican delegation was headed by Mohamed Mahmoud al-Zubeiry and the monarchy delegation was headed by Ahmed Mohamed al-Shami. They agreed to stop hostilities, but the agreement was not implemented. The conflict between the two parties continued until 1970, after the two main players in the Yemeni conflict, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, reached an agreement. The agreement between Egypt and Saudi Arabia led to a national reconciliation as the monarchs recognized the republican system and a general amnesty for monarchs was issued in return, except the ruling family of Hamid al-Din.<sup>85</sup>

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**The agreement between Egypt and Saudi Arabia led to a national reconciliation as the monarchs recognized the republican system and a general amnesty for monarchs was issued in return, except the ruling family of Hamid al-Din**  
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## **October revolution and two fronts conflict**

A year after the September revolution, the October 14, 1963 revolution erupted against the British colonialism, and the masses in Aden and the rest of the southern regions sided with the option of the revolution that placed the country's liberation from colonialism at the forefront of its goals.

The revolution continued to expand to include all the occupied territories, and Britain's last attempt to contain the revolution and save (the Union of the Arab South)

project, was its invitation to the London conference in August 1965. In addition to Britons, traditional local leaders, representatives of the Aden government, the Sultanates of Hadramout, the leaders of the Socialist People's Party and the Southern Arab League, participated in the conference that aimed at the reconciliation between conflicting parties and groups and forming a national union government that will handle affairs in the south after Britain later on. But those efforts were unsuccessful,<sup>86</sup> and the participating parties gained more discontent of the angry street that was flared with revolutionary protests. The failure of London conference meant that the bet on the possibility of getting power from Britain fell. In the last months of the year 1967, the National Front took control of almost all the south, including the capital, Aden, while the Liberation Front lost rounds of bloody conflict with the National Front, especially in Aden and Lahj,

after the National Front managed to extend full control over various regions of the south. The withdrawal of Egyptian forces from northern Yemen, as a result of the Egyptian setback during war with Israel in June 1967,<sup>87</sup> had a negative impact on the Liberation Front, which was supported by the Egyptian leadership, and in return, the Egyptian withdrawal helped the National Front to achieve a political victory on the ground, and to present itself as a representative of the people against the British authorities. Thus, Britain engaged in negotiations with leadership of the National Front late in November of the same year. The negotiations resulted in ending the British occupation.

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**The withdrawal of the Egyptian forces from northern Yemen helped the National Front to achieve a political victory and to be representative of the people in negotiations that resulted in ending the British occupation**  
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The General Command of the National Front announced on November 30, 1967, the independence of southern Yemen and the establishment of (the People's Democratic Republic of South Yemen), and appointed Qahtan al-Shaabi as its president.<sup>88</sup>



### **Intra-revolutionary forces**

The causes of conflict between the political forces before the revolution were limited to each party's attempt to prove its existence and enhance its influence and to expand its spread.

As previously indicated that the survival of those parties and political forces under the pain of repression and accountability has limited the conflicts between them, but the conflicts of the forces themselves after the revolution took other dimensions, because they became in power and had the strength that make them capable of facing opponents and fighting in armed and violent battles with them. The ideological differences between those forces became clearer with the transfer of those political powers to decision-making positions, let alone other causes and factors, intellectual, political and social, in addition to the intervention of external factors and motives.

Hence, we note that the political struggle in Yemen moved - after the revolution, from anti-British colonialism and the rule of the Imamate to a struggle for power within the republican system in both parts of Yemen.<sup>89</sup>

The war with the royalists did not prevent the outbreak of conflicts in the republican ranks, despite the dangers surrounding the nascent revolution.

The differences between the revolutionary leaders started at the beginning of the revolution, and the most prominent points of disagreement related to the performance of the government, as well as the Egyptian role in Yemen, and a number of historical leaders of the opposition movement, such as Judge Abdul Rahman al-Iryani, Mohamed Mahmoud al-Zubayri and Ahmed Mohamed Noaman, revealed their opposition to some of the government's actions, including executions targeting men of the Imamate era, as they saw that "blood drags to blood," and that bloodshed can be a fuel for a counterrevolution, while the leadership justified the executions by saying that they are against "the enemies of the people." <sup>90</sup>

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**The differences between the revolutionary leaders started because of the government's performance and the Egyptian role in Yemen. In his memoirs, Judge AbdulRahman al-Iryani said: "Civil war would have been escaped, if we avoided executions without trial, and public hostility against Saudi Arabia**

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Ahmed Noaman was one of the most prominent opponents of the mistakes of the revolution and the Egyptian policy in Yemen. He began to call for calm and tolerance with tribes that had doubtful loyalty and conducting agreements with tribal leaders to withdraw them from the deposed Imam.<sup>91</sup> He was supported by Mohamed al-Zubayri and Judge Abdul Rahman al-Iryani, with the latter's reservations regarding the issue of dealing with tribes and their sheikhs.<sup>92</sup>

They all believed that the increasing and mutual hostility between Abdel Nasser and Saudi Arabia leads to the continuation of the Yemeni war,<sup>93</sup> and that the mistakes committed in the name of the revolution prolong the war with the royalists. In his memoirs, judge Abdul Rahman al-Iryani, who served as Minister of Justice in the first government after the revolution, wrote: "Civil war would have been avoided if we avoided two mistakes, executions without trial, and open hostility against Saudi Arabia, and making it feels that the (Yemeni) revolution was against it, and that the Egyptians had come to settle their account with it." <sup>94</sup>

In addition, the confidence that the Egyptians gave to Abd al-Rahman al-Baidani (1926-2012), at the expense of the first leaders of the revolution, negatively affected the performance of the government and the army, and exacerbated the differences at a time when the

revolution was in dire need to unite the revolutionaries to confront the ongoing attacks by supporters of Beit Hamid al-Din. Al-Baidani was appointed as Vice President and Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy, but he was not satisfied with that, so he added to himself the position of Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the army - although he was not military - and Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Yemeni leadership reluctantly accepted this, in order to satisfy the Egyptians, especially Anwar al-Sadat, who was in-charge of the Yemeni file at the Egyptian leadership and had affinity relationship with al-Baidani. According to the report by Major General Abdullah Guzailan,<sup>95</sup> one of the leaders of the revolution, it was Baidhani threatening officials in Sanaa that the Egyptian aid will not be sent to Yemen unless achieving its demands, which means that the rejection of his demands might lead to the relapse of the revolution.<sup>96</sup>

The points of disagreement between the Republican ranks after the revolution can be summarized as follows:

- Managing war with the royalists and taking revenge against supporters of the Imamate era.
- The Egyptian military leaders interfered in the affairs of the Yemeni administration, imposing people unrelated to the revolution and excluding the true revolutionaries, military, political, scholars and intellectuals, due to misinformation with the Egyptian leadership on some of the Yemeni political and military personalities, including that the Egyptians sought to exclude Mohamed Mahmoud al-Zubayri from the Presidency Council at the beginning of the year 1963.<sup>97</sup>
- Personal struggles over power and disposal of competitors, a few days after the revolution, President Abdullah Al-Sallal demanded the removal of the prominent military commander, Major General Hammoud al-Jaifi<sup>98</sup>



because he feared to be his rival for his position in the presidency of the state and the leadership of the armed forces,<sup>99</sup> and shortly afterwards he requested the removal of the commander, Major General Abdullah Guzailan.<sup>100</sup> President al-Sallal and his deputy al-Baidani sent a message to Cairo as saying: "We cannot work at the presence of Abdullah Guzailan. The nascent revolution began to shake under the hammers of personal disputes and self-catering, and conflict over positions.<sup>101</sup> As President al-Sallal did with al-Jaifi and two others, his deputy al-Baidani did with Ahmed Mohamed Noaman and Mohamed Ali Othman (1904-1973).

They were expelled according to al-Baidani's desire, who, according to Judge Abdul-Rahman al-Iryani, was seeking to lead the Shafi'i section of Yemen, the central and southern governorates, in exchange for the Zaydi Shiite section in northern Yemen.

Al-Baidani thought that the atmosphere will be clear to him after the removal of those social and cultural symbols under the banner "Assigning a Mission Abroad",<sup>102</sup> although those who were expelled, both military and civilian, were said to be, with the testimony of those who knew them very well, great loyalists to the revolution and the country. They had a long experience in prisons and the national action.<sup>103</sup> According to General al-Jaifi's comrades, he saw that the national interest required his leaving immediately after the revolution,

in order to cut off the opportunistic elements that want to fish in troubled waters," and he moved outside Sana'a to pursue the royal elements that al-Badr was leading to counter the revolution.<sup>104</sup> When Judge Abd al-Rahman al-Iryani objected to the deportation decision, President al-Sallal told him: "Judge, agree, and the day will come to deport you and me."<sup>105</sup> This statement revealed President al-Sallal's awareness of the inevitable outcome of the successive political struggle that does not stop and excludes no one, and indeed the day came when President al-Sallal was removed from power by his comrades in what was known as the November 5, 1967 movement, and Judge Abdul Rahman al-Iryani became President of the Republic, and then the day came when his comrades ousted him out of power and the country in the June 13, 1974 movement.

## **The Northern Authority fights "the leftwing"**

While the opposition included tribal sheikhs and Ba'athist leaderships, the Arab Nationalists Movement was supporting President al-Sallal and the Egyptian presence without any reservation. It organized pro-Salal demonstrations in Sana'a, Taiz and Aden. The dispute between President Abdel Nasser on the one hand, and the Baath in Syria and Iraq on the other, casted its shadow on the situation in Yemen, and another dispute arose between President Abdel Nasser and the Arab Nationalists Movement due to the situation in southern Yemen. The movement was supporting the position of its branch represented by the "NationalFront", while the Egyptian agencies were supporting the "Liberation Front".<sup>106</sup>

After the expansion of the opposition against President al-Sallal was summoned to Cairo.

A new government was formed and it included a number of opponents who were surprised by al-Sallal's return to Sana'a quickly, prompting members of the government to travel to Cairo to meet with President Abdel Nasser, but all were arrested<sup>107</sup> and continued in detention for one year.

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**After the expansion of opposition against President al-Sallal, Egyptian President Abdel Nasser summoned the new government to Cairo, where he detained them for one year**  
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After the return of the detainees to Yemen, they began preparing to topple President al-Sallal, especially since their return came after the June 1967 setback, which negatively affected Egypt and the Egyptian presence in Yemen. When President al-Sallal was on an official visit to Iraq and the Soviet Union, his opponents succeeded in carrying out the white coup against him and removed him from power permanently on the 5th of November 1967, in what was known as the "November 5 Movement", which the supporters of the movement considered as a correction of the revolution that created cohesion in the Republican ranks, while opponents, most of whom belonged to "the left movement," saw that it "extracted power from modern forces in favor of traditional forces."<sup>108</sup>

During this new division between the republican revolutionary ranks, the monarchs forces launched a violent attack on the capital, Sana'a, in the beginning

of December of the same year, in an attempt to take advantage of the decline in the Egyptian support to the revolution after the June setback in Egypt.

The monarchs cut off most of the roads leading to and from Sana'a and started artillery shelling from the nearby highlands and besieged Sana'a for seventy days. The blockade ended with the victory of the republicans after they met together and forgot their differences, but the rivalry returned soon after the end of the royal attack, and a bloody round of violent conflict emerged between two republican parties in what was then known as the "August 1968 events." The first party led by Hassan al-Amri,<sup>109</sup> Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, while the second party included a number of (leftist) military leaders whose role has emerged in the leadership of the military units during the period of the royal siege, most notably Abdel-Raqib<sup>110</sup> Abdel-Wahab, Chief of General Staff.

The dispute centered on the authorities of the General Staff that were raised after a new batch of weapons arrived through the port of Hodeidah. The confrontations began on August 23, 1968, when the leadership of the al-Saeqah Forces School detained a number of ministers and ambassadors who were mediating between the two parties.<sup>111</sup> The two conflicting parties used tanks and artillery for two days, before the government decided to deport the officers who occupy basic positions in the military units that participated in the battle to Algeria, after a number of them were arrested and others fled to Aden and some rural areas.<sup>112</sup> The reasons of bloody confrontations are summarized in the struggle for power as one

of the most prominent motives of the conflict in general, as well as the existence of a political and intellectual background that supports the conflict, and the political struggle between the Baath and tribal leaders and the Islamic trend on the one hand, and the leftist movement (Marxists and Nasserites) on the other hand. In addition to so far factors, the issue of dealing with the royalists began to enter the streak of the conflict. While the party in power saw the necessity of understanding and reconciliation with the remnants of the defeated monarchs, and reaching a peaceful solution that exclude the family of Hamid al-Din, the other party rejected this and considered it as a hostile act against the revolution and the total system.<sup>113</sup>

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**There was a political struggle between the Baath and tribal leaders and the Islamic trend on the one hand, and the leftist movement (Marxists and Nasserites) on the other hand. The conflict ended in favor of the Nasserites but then a conflict started between two wings in the ruling front, one was affiliated with the Chinese Communist trend and one was affiliated to the Soviet Communist trend**  
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## **The South Authority annihilates the "Right"**

In southern Yemen, disputes arose quickly within the National Front, which took over the government, and held its fourth conference at the beginning of the year 1968, in light of the ideological differences between the two main currents, the revolutionary democratic movement (leftist), led by Ali Salih Abbad (Mokbel), Abdullah al-Khamiri, and Abdulfattah Ismail,<sup>114</sup> and the National Movement, led by Qahtan al-Sha`bi and Mohamed Ali Haitham.<sup>115</sup> Although the conference revealed the control of the left movement, and "came out with decisions that confirmed its victory by declaring the conference's belief in scientific socialism and its adoption of the method adopted in the communist states by placing the armed forces under the supervision of the party."<sup>116</sup> However, the other current, led by President of the Republic, Qahtan al-Sha`bi, Prime Minister Faisal Abd al-Latif al-Sha`bi,

and Commander of the Federal Army, Brigadier Hussein Ashal, expressed their opposition to these steps, while the leftist movement demanded "to start a series of radical cleansing that begins with the army and police, and the administrative state apparatus ..."<sup>117</sup> "with the aim of excluding elements that do not support the general trend of the National Front".<sup>118</sup>

The armed conflict between the two groups erupted in May 1968, and ended with the control of Qahtan al-Sha`bi, but the leftists did not surrender. They continued to consolidate their positions within the front and state institutions, especially since the majority of the general leadership of the front were from the left wing,<sup>119</sup> until the June 1969 confrontations that ended in their favor. They began revenge against their opponents, and formed a Presidency Council that replaced President Qahtan al-Sha'bi, who was placed under house arrest until he died in 1981.<sup>120</sup>

The leftist movement resolved the conflict in its favor in that battle, which it called (the corrective June 22 movement). It controlled the rule unilaterally, but soon two conflicting currents appeared within the ruling front itself. The first current was led by President Salim Rubei Ali (Salmeen),<sup>121</sup> it followed the Chinese Communist Maoist line, and the other current is led by the Secretary-General of the National Front, Abdel Fattah Ismail, who was loyal to the Soviet Communist trend. Each party began to fight in an internal battle to gain positions of power, whether in the provinces or in bodies, including students, youth, women and syndicates that follow the National Front, as well as in the army and security apparatuses.<sup>122</sup>



## Differences and coups

Disagreements began in the north between President Abd al-Rahman al-Iryani and his allies, sheikhs and military leaders, in the early 1970s, especially after left-wing forces and parties emerged there with support from the regime in the south. The opponents of al-Iryani saw the weakness of the state and the spread of chaos as a justification for change that was accepted by military leaders like Colonel / Ibrahim al-Hamdi,<sup>123</sup> Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Colonel Ali Abu Luhum and tribal leaders who had political and social influence at the time, headed by Sheikh Abdullah bin Hussein al-Ahmar,<sup>124</sup> leader of Hashid tribes, and Speaker of the Shura Council, Sheikh Sinan Abu Luhum,<sup>125</sup> one of the most prominent Sheikhs of Bakil tribe, in addition to Sheikh Mujahid Abu Shawareb<sup>126</sup> who had a combined influence as one of the most prominent leaders from Hashid tribe, and military influence as dean in the army.<sup>127</sup>

President Abd al-Rahman al-Iryani submitted his resignation to Speaker of the Shura Council, Sheikh al-Ahmar, who transmitted it, along with his own resignation, to the armed forces in June 1974. A seven-member military council, headed by Colonel Ibrahim al-Hamdi, took over the power.<sup>128</sup> However, the coalition that gathered al-Hamdi and a number of tribal leaders, politicians, and military personnel, did not last long like many political alliances that were broken soon. Three months later, a dispute began between President Hamdi and Prime Minister Mohsen al-Aini.<sup>129</sup>



Soon after that, al-Hamdi disagreed with Sheikh Sinan Abu Luhum, Mujahid Abu Shawareb, in addition to military leaders from Beit Abu Luhum. This disagreement coincided with Saudi statements accusing al-Aini and some of his cabinet ministers of "working to offend relations between the two countries,"<sup>130</sup> and the leadership military council was divided into two teams: The first included President al-Hamdi and his deputy, Ahmed Al-Ghashmi,<sup>131</sup> and Abdullah Abdel-Alim, and the second included Prime Minister, Mujahid Abu Shawareb, Yahya al-Mutawakkil, and Dirhem Abu Luhum. Al-Hamdi won a number of sheikhs and military leaders to his side, in addition to Saudi support. The escalation of disputes between al-Hamdi and Mohsen al-Aini, and a number of ministers and some army and security leaders sacked the beginning of the year 1975, and in October 1975,

and then a dispute broke out between President al-Hamdi and Sheikh al-Ahmar, following al-Hamdi's "dissolution of the Shura Council",<sup>132</sup> and differences continued during the years 1976 and 1977, however, al-Hamdi succeeded in strengthening relations with the ruling regime in Aden, with the positive effects that he had on local development and his financial and administrative correction in the state institutions, and the involvement of community in local administration through the experience of the "Cooperative Councils. "

In October 1977, when President al-Hamdi was preparing to visit Aden to reach an understanding agreement with the Southern regime about the unity of north and south, his deputy Ahmed al-Ghashmi and a number of army officers staged a coup d'etat a day before traveling to Aden.



Al-Ghashmi invited him to a luncheon in his house, where al-Hamdi was killed along with his brother Abdullah al-Hamdi, commander of the Giant Forces Camp. Sana'a Radio broadcast a statement by the (Leadership Council), that "sinful hands assaulted the life of President Ibrahim al-Hamdi and his brother"<sup>133</sup>The assassination caused a political earthquake that shook the whole Yemen, north and south.

Eight months later, Lieutenant Colonel Ahmed al-Ghashmi was also assassinated, on June 24, 1978, with an explosive bag that was brought to him by an envoy from the ruling regime in Aden. This made a stir in the Arab League, which condemned what happened, and held the southern regime, led by President Salmin and Abdel-Fattah Ismail, leader of the ruling party, responsible for the assassination of al-Ghashmi.



The differences between the two governing teams in Aden reached their climax after the assassination of al-Ghashmi, an incident that President Salmin's opponents took advantage of to remove him permanently, as violent clashes erupted in Aden on June 26, 1978 and lasted two days, ending with the killing of Salmin and a number of his supporters. Abdel Fattah Ismail took the power in the south, while Lt. Col. Ali Abdullah Saleh, who was one of the most prominent leaders of the army opposing the left wing, succeeded al-Ghashmi. Saleh began his reign with open military confrontations with the leftist forces that control a number of border areas with support from the rulers of Aden, and supporters of former President Ibrahim al-Hamdi, who had an active presence in some army units and a number of areas in northern Yemen. But they failed in their attempted to do a coup against Saleh at the beginning of his rule. Tension and escalation between Aden and Sana'a

regimes returned after the south was satisfied that the situation had become in its favor and that it is able to confront the north that is divided between many forces and political currents. In February 1979, the leftist forces launched war against the Sana'a regime under the banner of (the National Front) with support from the Southern Army.

They took control of several areas in the North. Regional and international major countries intervened in support of the Sana'a regime.

The Arab League issued a decision to cease fire immediately, and Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Syria had a role in that decision. At the request of Saudi Arabia, the United States of America sent weapons and military equipment to the regime in the north in order to prevent its downfall, just as the leadership of the Soviet Union, leading the eastern camp, issued an ultimatum to the Aden regime on the necessity of a ceasefire, confirming the Soviet's unwillingness to topple the Sana'a regime.<sup>134</sup>

Immediately, the Soviets stopped supplying weapons to the South Army, and this had its effect on the course of the war because the Soviet Union was the only source for arming the South, and this led to the depletion of ammunition, especially artillery and aviation shells, the southern army's caches were empty. The war also affected other countries in the eastern camp, where China, Cuba and East Germany adhered to the Soviet position, so the southern regime declared its readiness for a ceasefire. The Arab League contacted the two parties and they agreed to hold talks in Kuwait. The talks resulted in "The Kuwait Agreement," which included the establishment of the Yemeni unity, and supporting reconciliation between the Sana'a regime and the leftist forces, represented in the National Front, and the end of armed actions.

Relations between the two parts of Yemen were affected in light of international competition and the Cold War, as the ruling regime in the south turned towards the socialist camp, led by the Soviet Union, adopted its political, economic and social philosophy, and depended on its ideological support, in exchange for the Soviets control of the sea, land and air facilities under the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed by the two parties in the year 1979, according to which the south urged political, economic, and military support from the socialist countries. While the political system in the north headed towards the western camp, maintaining balanced relations with the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia was a mediator in improving relationship between the north and the United States and Western countries.<sup>135</sup>

That round of conflict between the two Yemeni regimes showed that the Arab and international position was strong and decisive in their rejection of the war between the two parties or to overthrow any of them. It was not surprising that the Arab countries and America stood by the Sana'a regime as an ally in the face of the (socialist) camp, represented by the Aden regime, but it was interesting that the Soviets took a firm stand against their allies in the south of Yemen.

According to the leader of the ruling Socialist Party in Aden, Jarallah Omar (1942-2002), there was an understanding between the Soviet Union and the United States on ensuring the continuation of existing conditions in Yemen.<sup>136</sup> However, the US procrastination regarding the arms deal, funded by Saudi Arabia in that war, pushed the Sana'a government to go to the Soviet Union,

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**The ruling regime in the south turned towards the Soviet camp, while the political regime in the north turned towards the western camp. Saudi played mediation role to build relationship with the United States, but the US procrastination regarding the arms deal, funded by Saudi Arabia, pushed the Sana'a government to go to Moscow**  
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asking for its support with weapons and military equipment, the Soviets accepted that and found it an opportunity to restore their former positions in northern Yemen. They renewed military relations between Sana'a and Moscow, and provided Sana'a with large quantities of weapons including advanced Sukhoi bombers, MiG21 fighters, T55 helicopters and tanks, and surface-to-air missiles.<sup>137</sup>

When the regime in Aden felt it ended, albeit temporarily, its struggle with the Sanaa regime, a current within the party and the state's leadership appeared and started criticizing the performance of President Abdel Fattah Ismail to retain his influence and the external support. The wave of criticism was stronger, so he decided to submit his resignation in April 1980, at the behest of his opponents, and to close the door against any new struggle over power.

The successor in assuming the power in the south was Ali Nasser Mohamed,<sup>138</sup> the politician and the military personality who quickly pushed events to the fore since the beginning of the seventies. At the beginning of his rule, Ali Nasser succeeded in attracting strong allies, who occupy important positions in the army, security, and the ruling party, to his side. The National Front changed into the Vanguard Party, and then into the Yemeni Socialist Party.

but he also had strong opponents, led by his deputy, Brigadier Ali Antar,<sup>139</sup> one of the leaders of the October Revolution in 1963, who had a strong influence in the army and the party. The points of disagreement between Ali Nasser and Antar centered on running the authorities and power, and the lack of trust between the two men.

The ideological difference was also attended as the opposition of Ali Nasser rejected his policy of openness to the north and the Gulf States. They saw that this opens the way for the return of what they call the bourgeoisie, which, in their view, affects the purity of the revolution.<sup>140</sup>



The two groups continued to work on the polarization that seemed mostly related to factors and regional geographical motives rather than political thought, until all this exploded in a bloody war that flared up in January 1986, and ended in favor of the Antar team and his allies who took power until the unity between the South and North took place in May 1990. The conclusion is that there was a state of political conflict and prevarication that characterized the political life in the north and south between partners and parties alike. There were polarizations

internal and external (regional and international) that were imposed by the conditions of the stage of required regional equilibrium and equations that were borne by the Cold War entitlements.<sup>141</sup> There is no doubt that the conflict during that period between the revolution and the declaration of unity was affected, in one way or another, by regional and international changes, as it often seemed to be, especially in the seventies and mid-eighties of the last century, to be a direct and natural extension of the conflict at the top of the international system, and the regional polarizations.<sup>142</sup>



## The Third Topic

### Conflicts on the margins of national unity

#### Between Separation and Unity

The issue of the Yemeni unity was on the top of national issues, and it was related to the political forces opposed to colonialism and the Imamate, with the national struggle and revolutionary action against the Imam's rule in the north, and against foreign colonialism in the south.

The Yemeni forces continued to reject the reality of fragmentation and division imposed by the British colonialism to ensure its control over the occupied part in the south, the situation that the imamate system approved with inability, weakness and a desire for power, even if it was incomplete.

Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, the position towards the unity of Yemen was a standard of nationalism, integrity and affiliation for every political force that appeared in the north

and south.

All powers and organizations that did not adopt unity or stood against it have vanished.<sup>143</sup>

The British colonialism has tried hard to consolidate fragmentation with all its strength and potential, and some of the greedy powers had colluded with the colonialism to obtain symbolic powers and material privileges, but the rise of revolutionary forces and national liberation movements locally and in the Arab world in general, with their nationalist ideas and revolutionary tendency against foreign colonialism and its policy that is based on (divide and conquer).

With the emergence of the Yemeni revolution in the north in 1962 and in the south in 1963, the Unity was present strongly among most of the forces and components, but the outbreak of internal conflicts immediately after the revolution,

and the ideological contradiction between the ruling revolutionary forces imposed new challenges that resulted in the decline of work on achieving the Yemeni unity. However, the unity was not away from the agenda of rulers and political forces, so it was quickly attended in the early seventies after a military confrontation erupted on borders between the two parts of Yemen, which ended in a partial victory for the south. The Arab countries interfered to gather the north and the south, so negotiations in Cairo and then in Tripoli – Libya resulted in an agreement on a long truce and the establishment of the unity later on.

The south was more serious about the unity issue. The National Front that governs the south was calling for unity, but on condition that the front and its leftist allies take control on the north, and get out of what they called (backwards and followers of the past era).<sup>144</sup>

The Unity idea then was given a specific ideological content that made the achievement of the unity on pure national basis almost impossible. The revolutionaries in the south and in the north chose not to achieve unity unless they were strongly attended in the scene.<sup>145</sup> The rulers of Sana'a also called for unity, with reservation from some symbols of the Islamic and tribal currents regarding the agreement with the rulers of the south. The reservation that President Abdel-Rahman al-Iryani ended after signing the Cairo Agreement by saying to senior state officials in Sana'a: "The Yemeni unity is a historical goal and cannot be rejected. As for the agreements, they can be modified at any time"<sup>146</sup>



In the 1970s, the political-military struggle continued sometimes between the two regimes in the North and the South, and sometimes between the factions within the same system, while bilateral meetings continued between the two ruling parties that made agreements on achieving unity. The most prominent agreements were as follows:

- Cairo Agreement, October 1972
  - The Tripoli Statement, November 1972
  - Algeria Meeting, September 1973
  - Taiz-Hodeidah meeting, November 1973
  - The Qutaba meeting, February 1977
  - Kuwait Statement, March 1979
- The consensus was that "the international character of

each of the two states would melt into one international entity and the establishment of one Yemeni state," as stipulated in the Cairo Agreement.<sup>147</sup> However, each party continued to implement the unity according to its own vision. Each party began to support guerrilla warfare against the other side. The northerners supported the southerners who lost former confrontations with the National Front to launch a guerrilla war inside the southern regions but the regime was able to eliminate it quickly. The southerners also supported the northerners leftists to wage a guerrilla war in the northern provinces, and the north was more affected than the south, because the leftists tide and some of the rulers of the south were more experienced and organized, while the state institutions in the north, led by the army, were weak and infiltrated by opposition currents, most notably the left movement itself.



The left parties in the north appeared more organized in 1976 when they were formed in Aden with the aim of overthrowing the northern regime and achieving the Yemeni Unity. <sup>148</sup>

In the eighties, the meetings between the two leaderships continued after it was agreed to stop supporting hostile actions from both sides within each part. The North witnessed some stability while the conflicts continued within the wings of the ruling Socialist Party in the south,

until the agreement of November 30, 1989, followed by the final signature of the Unity agreement in its last form.

The two sides announced on May 22, 1990 the melting of the international personality of both countries, and the establishment of the Republic of Yemen. According to the declaration, a five-member presidency council was formed, and Ali Abdullah Saleh was chosen as chairman of the Presidency Council and Ali Salem al-Beidh as vice president.



## **The Unity Crisis and Conflict Return**

The agreed transitional period for two and a half years did not end soon, until the disputes began between the two parties of the unity agreement. They began to exchange accusations in the implementation of the terms of the agreement that the two parties had been very slow to implement during the specified time period. The political institutions of the two previous countries did not merge, although necessary structures for an inclusive system of governance were formed, the constitution, parliament, elections, and bureaucratic institutions, and the way was open for freedom of political expression, so parties and unions were established, conferences were held, and the media flourished. The two influence centers in the north and the south seemed to lack for good will and trust.<sup>149</sup> The differences between the two parties were exacerbated after the parliamentary elections held in April 1993, as it produced a new reality after

the Yemeni Islah party joined the government formation alongside with the two ruling parties (the General People's Congress Party and the Socialist Party), after the Islah secured (63 seats). While the People's Congress won 122 seats out of 301, it took the following positions: President of the Presidency Council, Member of the Presidency Council, First Deputy Prime Minister, and Deputy Speaker of the Parliament, in addition to 14 ministerial portfolios, and the Socialist won (56 seats), and its share became: Deputy and member of the Presidency Council, in addition to the Prime Minister and his deputy and Deputy Speaker of the Parliament, and seven ministerial portfolios. As for the Islah, it was a member of the Presidency Council, the Speaker of the Parliament, a deputy prime minister, and five ministerial portfolios. Some observers saw "the formation of the ruling tripartite coalition as a setback for the democratic experience, as the powerful moved to the government and the presidency."

All political parties had their own justifications that support their point of view and vision, so the situation between the two parties (the socialist party and GPC part) was escalated through media, while the Islah party held the stick from the middle at the beginning of the crisis, and looked forward to accomplishing what it failed to accomplish during the transitional period, which is the constitutional amendments for which the party joined its first political battle after declaring the unity and the political pluralism in what was then known as (the battle of constitution). It organized popular rallies in Sana'a and elsewhere announcing the rejection of Article Three, which stipulated that "the Islamic law is the main source of legislation", seeking to make the Islamic law the only source of legislation, but the escalation of the crisis at the time postponed all of this.

Then Ali Salim al-Beidh left in a long journey to the United States of America (June-August 1993),

and suddenly returned to Aden via Paris – Amman.

The presidency said at the time that this was done without its knowledge or coordination with it.<sup>150</sup> During the absence of al-Beidh in the United States, the three-party coalition agreed on a formula for the constitutional amendments, including those submitted by the Socialist Party, signed by the party's second man, Salem Saleh Mohamed, the Assistant Secretary-General of the Socialist Party. This step angered al-Beidh who announced his rejection of all what was agreed upon, declaring that the Socialist Party has 18 demands that must be implemented before his return to Sana'a to end the crisis,<sup>151</sup>



including financial and administrative reforms, the merging of armed forces, the prosecution of perpetrators of violence and political assassinations, and adherence to the state budget and not to be overcome or lost. He also demanded that the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance must be subject to the decisions of the Council of Ministers alone, not to be interfered by the state bodies and institutions, to correct the conditions of the General Prosecution and the Judiciary and ensuring their independence, the establishment of a consultative council that supervises the Judiciary, media and civil service, and carrying out an administrative change and establishing a local governance with financial and administrative powers.

Although these demands aim - from the viewpoint of observers - to "deprive Saleh from his powers and from spending the public budget, that reached



in some years up to the third", <sup>152</sup> the General People's Congress announced the approval of all demands. The GPC conference and the socialist began setting conditions and other new demands. When the 18 demands got approval and a popular rally, and in October 1993, the parliament formed a parliamentary committee to deal with the crisis, and after its meeting with al-Beidh in Aden, Sheikh Abdullah al-Ahmar, the Speaker of the Parliament returned to Sana'a and announced before Parliament that the constitutional amendments had reached a dead end, and that entering presidential elections has become inevitable.<sup>153</sup>

The political crisis led to a series of meetings and agreements that included all Yemeni political parties and forces, and resulted in the formation of the Political Forces Dialogue Committee, "with the aim of defusing the crisis and sparing the country bad consequences, and after several meetings, held by the committee in Sana'a and Aden, a document was produced to solve the crisis and address its causes."<sup>154</sup> The document was known as "The Document of Covenant and Agreement." It was signed by the Yemeni political parties in a ceremony held in the Jordanian capital, Amman, in February 1994, under the patronage of the Jordanian King Hussein Bin Talal,



and in the presence of the Secretary General of the Arab League.<sup>155</sup> Despite all efforts by the political forces, to end the political crisis in Yemen, with support from Arab and foreign countries, the voices of war were stronger than all peace efforts, and at that time it seemed that each side of the unity agreement was preparing itself for a decisive confrontation through the readiness of brigades and military units of each party. The two parties were preparing a retreat strategy and contingency plans in anticipation of a potential conflict. Each party sought to enhance its military capabilities, after each of them contributed to impeding the unification of the armed forces, and each party sought to secure external support for it. "Both parties had an implicit interest in impeding the development of independent political forces, tried to spoil attempts by the emerging civil society to engage in politics seriously,"<sup>156</sup>

Michael Hudson, professor of international relations at Georgetown University concluded that the emergence of a new player, the Yemeni Islah party,<sup>157</sup> precipitated in igniting the conflict between the General People's Congress, the Socialist Party. The all-out war erupted at the beginning of May 1994, between the armies of the two previous countries, and President Saleh was able to attract alongside many political and military forces and southern social components that were affected by the conflicts of the past period, the most important of which was the team of the former southern president, Ali Nasser Mohamed who lost the last round of armed conflict in the south before the unity, and Saleh included them within the army and security institutions, especially that al-Beidh took a hard line against them, before signing the unity agreement in 1990, al-Beidh asked for deporting supporters of Ali Nasser outside Yemen.<sup>158</sup> These conditions by al-Beidh provoked supporters

of Ali Nasser against al-Beidh and the Socialist Party itself. In general, with the exception of Ali Nasser, who left the country, and Mohamed Ali Ahmed, who later reconciled with al-Beidh, their position was supportive of Saleh in the war, and most of them were leaders of fronts and military units. One of the most prominent military leader, who were allies of Ali Saleh, was the military leader Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi,<sup>159</sup> who succeeded, during the political crisis, with a number of military leaders, to convince southern leaders, who were loyal to the Socialist Party, to turn to President Saleh. Some of them were leaders of battalions and military units in Sana'a, Dhamar, Ibb and Abyan, which made the latter appear, before the war, to be out of the control of the Socialist Party after most of its political and social leaders were aligned with Saleh, and in addition to this, Saleh was able to influence the international positions that were often supportive to him

after he presented himself as the representative of the constitutional legitimacy of the unified state that became the internationally recognized identity of Yemen since the declaration of unity in 1990. The declaration of secession by Ali Salim al-Beidh twenty days after the outbreak of the war confirmed accusations by his opponents, especially that his declaration came at the time that Saleh had announced the approval of the ceasefire, in response to an invitation made by the Saudi King Fahd bin Abdulaziz. Thus, Saleh resumed the fighting because he found that al-Beidh's declaration was a strong justification for the futility of the ceasefire.<sup>160</sup> Within two months, the war ended in favor of Saleh and his allies.

As a result of the war, the rules of the political alliance were changed as al-Beidh's wing that became out of the scene was defeated. Saleh relied on his war allies from southerners, who supported him,

and most of them were politicians and military personnel, who were forced by the bloody conflict to leave the south to Sana'a and stay there until the Yemeni unity achieved. <sup>161</sup>

## **The Political Scene (1990-2001)**

The map of the political scene in Yemen changed in the period (1990-2011), new powers and alliances appeared, and old forms of alliances were renewed, as a result of the political situation as the announcement of multi-partisanship coincided with the unity after it was prohibited in both the southern and northern parts. The constitution used to prohibit partisanship except for the ruling party that monopolized this right, the socialist in the south and the GPC in the north. More than forty parties emerged in the political arena. The most notable major parties were the GPC, the Socialist party and the Islah party,

in addition to new parties emerged that had no effect, but they allied, during the transitional period, with one of the major parties. In addition, other parties with ancient roots, date back to the sixties, came up again such as the Nasserites, who split into several factions, and the Baathists, who later divided into a faction that followed the Iraqi Baath party and another one that followed the Syrian Baath, and the Union of Sons of Yemen ( former Association of the Sons of South), the Union of Popular Forces, an old party led by Al-Wazir family and Al-Haqq party, led by the Al-Wazir family and others. During the pre-war political crisis,



the first opposition bloc was formed, including five parties: (the Nasserites party - the Association of Sons of Yemen - the Yemeni Unionist party - the Union of Popular Forces – Al-Haqq). <sup>162</sup>

After the war, the political scene was shaken and lost balance, and among the results was the excluding of the Socialist Party from power. A new partisan map was produced, which was the formation of a bilateral coalition that included the General People's Congress and the Islah Party. In 1995, the Supreme Coordination Council of the Opposition was established. It included eight parties, namely the Socialist Party, the Arab Socialist-Nationalist Baath Party, the Nasserite Unionist Organization, the Al-Haqq Party, the Yemeni Unionist party, the Union of Popular Forces, the Liberal Constitutional Party, the Union of National Forces. <sup>163</sup>

While the bloc saw that "The Document of Covenant and Agreement" as a common ground and called the ruling regime for the implementation of the document and the opening of dialogue with the rest of parties, the government encouraged the parties loyal to it to form a parallel bloc, known as the (National Council of the Opposition). It included seven parties, the Baath Party, loyal to the Syrian Baath, and the Nasserite faction, and its positions appeared in favor of the General People's Congress. As a result of differences

that began to appear between the ruling partners (the GPC and Islah), especially with regard to preparing for the parliamentary elections and implementing the financial and administrative reform program, the Islah opened a channel for dialogue with the Supreme Coordination Council for the Opposition, and in August 1996, the two parties signed the executive program of the joint meeting to ensure free and fair elections, which was the program that was the basic nucleus of the bloc, which was later called (the Joint Meeting Parties).



Initially, Saleh succeeded in mobilizing northern and southern political and social forces under the banner of defending the unity and legitimacy during the war with his opponents in the Socialist Party, but later failed to keep that entire crowd on his side. The Islah Party, with its large popular base, was the first to leave the alliance with Saleh after the 1997 parliamentary elections. Although Islah renewed the alliance with Saleh in the first direct presidential elections in late 1999, it strengthened its presence within the Joint Meeting Parties since 2001, as Islah had begun coordination with the Joint Meeting components before

it left the power. The Islah party was the largest party in the JMP that included the Socialist party, the Nasserite organization, the Arab National Socialist Baath Party, the Al-Haqq Party, and the Union of Popular Forces.

Regarding relationship between the regime and those with social influence in the Yemeni tribal structure during this period, some researchers see that there was a mutual containment between the leaders of the regime on one hand, and the tribal elders on the other, and a complex elite formed to weaken the state and the tribe, because the interest of the two elites (the leaders of the regime and tribal elders) required the weakening of the two institutions, but not to the degree that one of them becomes able to eliminate the other. The leaders of the regime worked to weaken the tribes by creating conditions of conflict and wars between them, and the tribal elders worked to create crises and conflicts and strain the state's relationship with civil society to ensure the continuation of their interests.<sup>164</sup>

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**Saleh succeeded in gathering powers under the placard of defending the unity to settle his accounts with the Socialist Party, but he failed in keeping that gathering, and the Islah Party was the first to leave**  
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## **The political scene in the period 2001-2011**

**This stage started with the elections of local councils of directorates and governorates (municipalities), which were held in February 2001, and were accompanied by a referendum on the constitutional amendments, proposed by the ruling Congress Party, which got a comfortable parliamentary majority in the 1997 parliamentary elections, when it won nearly 200 seats and a percentage exceeding 60%. while the Islah Party got 63 seats, about 21 percent, and the result of the referendum was in line with the desire of the GPC to approve the amendments, which included about 15 articles. And soon the result of the local elections came out. The GPC got 3807 seats in 6,283 directorates' councils, and won 284 of 417 seats in the provincial councils,**

**followed by the Islah party with 1,449 district seats, and 85 of the provincial councils.**

**The results of the elections enhanced convictions of the various components of the opposition that the regime is heading towards an absolute domination of the political scene, taking advantage of the imbalance. This trend by the GPC was manifested through the tightening of its grip on the army, security, public funds and public employment, and it worked to use all of this for achieving its own goals and gains amid decline of the democratic margin, the restrictions on public freedoms, the deterioration of living conditions and the decline in the level of basic services.**

**The meetings of the opposition parties, the Islah party and the parties of the Supreme Council of the Opposition, had continued until they formed the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP),**

after the opposition parties remained appalled by the fear that the Islah party may withdraw from JMP and return to the alliance with the regime. The communication between these parties had started since 1996 with a program that aimed at coordinating efforts for free and fair elections, but coordination had not reached the stage of forming the JMP until after 2000, specifically after local elections and referendum on constitutional amendments at the beginning of 2001.

So the year 2001 - according to observers- represented a shift in relations between the political forces after the political conflict between the GPC and the Islah party had reached to the public stage.<sup>165</sup> Since its inception, the Joint Meeting Parties sought to consolidate the democratic approach based on freedom, pluralism, the rule of law,

and the peaceful transfer of power. It achieved positive participation during the discussion of the electoral law, and entered into painstaking dialogues with the Supreme Elections Committee in order to ensure an acceptable presence in the election committees to guarantee balanced oversight. The JMP succeeded in its endeavor and maintained its coherence in spite of intrusion and intimidation. However, the results of the 2003 parliamentary elections came out with announcing the overwhelming victory of the People's Congress Party that got 242 seats out of 301 seats, 80%. The opposition considered the result as a clear decline in multi-pluralism and the democratic process in Yemen in light of the continued monopoly of the formation of the government, and full control over the state institutions by the GPC.<sup>166</sup>

In 2006, presidential and local elections were held and witnessed a competitive democratic process, achieving a significant development in terms of the democratic experience. The candidate of the People's Congress Party, Ali Abdullah Saleh, got 77 percent, while the candidate of the Joint Meeting Parties, Faisal bin Shamlan, got 21 percent of the votes. In the local councils elections, the GPC got more than 80 percent of the seats.<sup>167</sup>

In the years following the presidential elections, the grip of Saleh's regime over everything increased, so the ability of

the opposition parties to achieve any progress in favor of democracy and political pluralism had retreated. The security situation in a number of governorates witnessed a noticeable deterioration, especially after al-Qaeda adopted a number of attacks that targeted government centers, foreign embassies and European tourists, after the regime announced that more than 20 members of al-Qaeda escaped from prison,<sup>168</sup> most notably al-Qaeda attack on Spanish tourists with a car bomb at the beginning of July 2007 while visiting the Queen of Sheba Temple in Marib, killing eight tourists and two Yemeni drivers.

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**In the years following the presidential elections, the grip of Saleh's regime over everything increased, so the ability of the opposition parties to achieve any progress in favor of democracy and political pluralism had retreated, and the security situation witnessed a noticeable deterioration**

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During this period, Yemen's challenges were compounded by the political blockage and the closure of channels of dialogue and communication between political forces in the government and the opposition, except some shy attempts that reached a dead end.

In the south of the country, the tendency to secede and the demand to return to the situation before the Yemeni unity has grown, based on several manifestations linked to the 1994 war its repercussions and impacts. Hence, the unity has become the subject of unrelenting controversy between its supporter and rejecter, especially after the mistakes and negative practices against the southerners from Saleh's frequented governments had led to a growing sense of injustice and the desire to separate from the north. This southern trend that has been escalating during the post-war years, until the southern popular movement began in the beginning of 2007, due to the suffering of thousands of military,



security and civil servants from demobilization and deprivation from their material and moral rights.

Most of the Yemeni political elites who joined the National Dialogue Conference (held in the period of March 2013 through January 2014), unanimously agreed that the 1994 war and its aftermath events resulted in "the abolition of the political partnership in the south, and the curtailment of its position and presence in the political equation, with regard to some aspects of suffering and political problems date back to the period of independence and the establishment of the Republic of South Yemen in 1967, and the comprehensive and exclusion practices and non-recognition it suffered, and the cycles of violence, repression and exclusion."<sup>169</sup>

Accordingly, the components of the National Dialogue Conference agreed on excluding the remaining of Yemen as a unified state as it was in 1990, otherwise the situation can be returned to before the unity, a state in the south and another state in the north. The NDC had adopted a new formula based on a federal union that divides the country into six regions, two in the south and four in the north, based on defining the six regions on geographical and economic factors, in addition to social,<sup>170</sup> cultural and historical factors. But the war that erupted in late 2014 with the Houthi group that took control of the capital, Sanaa, and a number of governorates, revealed that the Houthis reject the regions option, along with some of supporters of former President Ali Saleh. In addition, a wide sector of the Southern Movement is still adhering to the demand for secession, and rejects the regions project that was approved at the National Dialogue Conference.

## The Houthis and the current war

It is difficult to say for sure that the conflict in Yemen is sectarian, even when one side follows a doctrine that the other does not believe in, because in the Yemeni conflicts that erupted since the fifties and sixties of last century, political factors related to power and influence were the most present and effective, although followers of the Imamate system are based in their claim of the exclusive right to rule and that they belong to the house of the Prophet, specifically his grandsons Hassan and Hussein, and call themselves (Al al-Beit-family of the Prophet), the presence of leading and active personalities of them in the forefront of the opposition and the revolution against the Imam's rule and follow the Zaydi doctrine and belong to Hashemite families deny that the conflict has a sectarian nature, and keeps it in the circle of political conflict.

In the Yemeni history, there are a lot of indications of conflicts and wars that occurred within the Zaydi sect itself, and in some cases between brothers from the same Hashemite family, as it was already mentioned so far in this research, there are Hashemites who were at the forefront of opposition against the Imam Yahya and among the participants in the 1948 revolution and the 1955 movement, and joined the (Free Officers Organization) that triggered the September 26, 1962 revolution and declared the republican system.<sup>171</sup>

The revolution led to the overthrow of the state of the Imamate, but the idea of the Imamate remained with the Imamate powers that gathered after the revolution and reunited their ranks. All the families that ruled Yemen, or those that were waiting for their role in ruling the country, reunited and launched war against the revolution and the republican system.<sup>172</sup> They worked to overthrow the fledgling republic and to restore the Imamate's regime,

but they failed and the revolution and the republic triumphed, and a national reconciliation was agreed upon in 1970, under which the Imami leaders, who left Yemen at the time of the revolution, returned home, except the Hamid al-Din family. The returnees recognized the republican system and some of them participated in the government, and turned the page of the Republic-Imamate war which lasted eight years. <sup>173</sup>

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**The revolution led to the overthrow of the Imamate state, but the idea of remained, so the families that ruled Yemen, or those that were waiting for their role in ruling the country, reunited their ranks and launched war against the revolution and the republican system**  
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The emergence of the Houthi movement - led by Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi -<sup>174</sup> in the political scene in 2004, revived the struggle between the Zaydi Imamate and the republican system to the forefront, as its leader Hussein al-Houthi was able to form an armed organization for confrontations, and took the Lebanese Hezbollah as an example of military preparedness, and imported the same slogan of Hezbollah "Death to America, Death to Israel".<sup>175</sup> The Houthis fought six wars against the government forces between 2004 and 2010, accusing the government and the (Sunni) Salafi currents of waging war against them in order to "eliminate the Zaydi faith school".<sup>176</sup> According to the Houthis' vision, Saudi Arabia circulated the Wahhabi-Salafi faith, established by Saudi scholar Mohammed bin Abdul Wahab in Najd in the late 18<sup>th</sup> century,

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**The emergence of the Houthi movement revived the struggle between the Zaydi Imamate and the republican system to the forefront, as its leader was able to form an armed organization for confrontations and took the Lebanese Hezbollah as example**  
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and in northern Yemen since the mid-eighties of the 20<sup>th</sup> century through the establishment of religious institutes and centers with the aim of expanding the area of the Salafi movement influence and containing the Zaydi thought.<sup>177</sup>

When the popular revolution broke out in 2011 against the regime, the Houthi movement members were among protesters in the peaceful protest squares, but it took advantage of the protests to expand its military influence by controlling more areas starting in Sa'ada governorate. The regional and international powers were able to impose their agenda and not to allow the fall of Saleh's regime. They imposed their vision on the Yemeni parties, and the transfer of power agreement, known as the "Gulf Initiative", was signed with support from Saudi Arabia and under the international sponsorship, but Iran, which was facing an international campaign against it because of its nuclear program, started to work on reshuffling the cards and supported the positions of those who reject the Gulf Initiative, on top of them were factions in the Southern Movement that approach with the Iranian positions, and the Houthis who opposed to the Gulf initiative from the first moment and considered it as an "American

Iran took advantage of the weakness of the central government's control in Sana'a to increase its support for the Houthis, and Yemen represented an easy and affordable opportunity for Iran to put pressure on its Saudi opponents, and to open a new field for the expansion of its political and economic interests.

The Lebanese Hezbollah - the regional ally of Iran - provided training and financial and political support to the Houthis, and played an important role in making links between Tehran and Sa'ada.<sup>179</sup> By making their own weapons, trained elements and Iranian support, the Houthis continued to expand at the expense of the state institutions and local tribal leaders, benefiting from relationship and alliance with the former President Ali Saleh,



their control on the northern governorates of the country, through a network of military and tribal loyalties, which he established during his reign (33 years) and remained loyal to him even after his removal from power.<sup>180</sup> In addition to the fact that the Houthis exploited the state of chaos and interstate struggles of other political forces,<sup>181</sup> so they were able to invade the capital, Sana'a, in late 2014. They carried a coup against the government and imposed de facto authority, but their attempt to expand south to complete control of Yemen in general had prompted the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to declare (the Decisive Storm)

and to form an Arab coalition to support the legitimacy in late March 2015, after Saudi saw that the Houthis control, backed by Iran, imposes a threat to the security and stability of the Arab Gulf states. After the Iranian support for the Houthis became clear, Iran considered the invasion of Sana'a as a victory for its policy in the area,<sup>182</sup> although the Houthis say that the Saudi intervention in Yemen came before the Iranian interference, and believe that the Saudi intervention paved the way for Iran to reconsider its accounts in Yemen, so that it can play more influential roles in the region in the future.<sup>183</sup>

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**When the popular revolution in 2011 broke out, the Houthi movement members were among protesters in the peaceful protest squares, but they took advantage of the conflict between the political forces and expanded their military influence until they invaded the capital Sana'a. But their attempt to expand in the south prompted Saudi to form an Arab coalition and announced (The Decisive Storm)**  
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Researchers believe that Iran used sectarian affiliation to obtain political loyalty and influence in Yemen on the one hand, and to balance with the Saudi employment of tribes as one of the tools of control and influence on the other hand. This pushed the Houthis to ally with Iran, which revived a conflict that was believed to be resolved fifty years ago.

The Salafi experience, represented by Dar Al-Hadith in Damaj region (Saada governorate), and the Zaydi experience, represented by the "Young Believers Forum" in Sa'ada and Sana'a, had attempted to monopolize the religion and tended to constrain their opponents and competitors from the same sect, such as the Salafi restriction against scholars of Sufism and Shafi'i, and the Houthis restriction against traditional Zaydi scholars and graduates of the Great Mosque of Sana'a, and this contributed to fueling the conflict and its continuity. <sup>185</sup>

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**Iran's exploitation of sectarian affiliation to get influence in Yemen and to balance with the Saudi employment of tribes for influence and control, had pushed the Houthis to ally with Iran, and they revived a conflict that was believed to be resolved fifty years ago**  
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## **Conflicts on the sidelines of the current war**

The year 2017 brought three major transformations that contributed to the course of the Yemeni war, as it included the most important war alliances, the first of which was the collapse of President Hadi's alliance with southern leaders who became loyal to the UAE, following disputes between Hadi and Abu Dhabi that had become clear publicly in the beginning of 2017 due to armed confrontations that broke out in Aden Airport after a rebellion by the loyalists to the Emirates against decisions from President Hadi.

The relationship deteriorated more and more after the dismissal of officials affiliated with Abu Dhabi in April 2017, most notably the governor of Aden, Major General Aidarous al-Zubaidi, and the Minister of State Hani bin Buraik, whose dismissal decision stipulated his referral to investigation. The Emirates escalated the situation by supporting its loyalists in the south to form the so-called "the Southern Transitional Council," headed by al-Zubaidi,

demanding the southern independence, and due to Emirati support, the transitional has become the striking force of Abu Dhabi in southern Yemen, and an entity parallel to the institutions of the legitimate government.<sup>186</sup>

The transitional council fought two rounds of armed confrontations against the legitimate government forces in Aden, the first was in late January 2018, when the conflict erupted between the forces of the transitional council and the presidential protection brigades, and it did stop after the intervention of Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The clashes seemed a clear indication of deep differences between the entities, and different strategies of Saudi Arabia and the Emirates in their war in Yemen. Then the situation entered a stage of maneuver between the two parties. They exchanged accusations and tensions developed into confrontations in Shabwa, Socotra and in other regions in the south between those supported by Abu Dhabi and the loyalists of President Hadi, who was supported by Riyadh.<sup>187</sup>

The second round of confrontations took place early in August 2019, when Vice-President of the Transitional Council, Hani bin Buraik, announced, while the President of the Council was in Abu Dhabi, the general alienation and marching to the presidential palace in Aden. The Yemeni government accused the UAE of carrying out a military coup in the south similar to the Houthi coup in Sana'a. The Transitional Council raised the slogan of cleansing the "legitimacy" from the south and accused it of loyalty and subject to the Islah party, in reference to government officials affiliated with the party. On the fourth day of confrontations, Saudi Arabia intervened and withdrew Interior Minister Ahmed al-Maisari, who was leading confrontations against the transitional council militias that recently controlled on Aden. <sup>188</sup>

In this round of confrontations, the situation deteriorated rapidly when the Emirates air force bombed the government army on the outskirts of Aden late in August,



prompting President Hadi to invite Saudi Arabia to "intervene to stop Emirati interference and support to the transitional council militias and the use of air strikes against the Yemeni armed forces."<sup>189</sup> However, the Kingdom succeeded in bringing the two sides together in an indirect dialogue, which ended with the signing of the "Riyadh Agreement" at the beginning of November 2019, according to which the conflict between the government and the transitional council would come to end.

The second transformation was the outbreak of the Gulf crisis, when the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain announced to cut their relations with Qatar at the beginning of June 2017.

The crisis resulted in exempting Qatar from participating in the Arab coalition in Yemen, although the government of President Hadi's announcement to cut its relationship with Qatar was consistent with the Saudi position. The accusation of (cooperation with Qatar) continues to chase anyone who criticizes the performance of the Arab coalition, or the practices of the UAE that leads the political and media campaign against Doha.

The third transformation was the collapse of the Houthi-Saleh alliance in December 2017, when Saleh announced the uprising against the Houthi authorities,

followed by violent clashes in the capital, Sana'a. Although Saleh's supporters declared their control in most areas when the battle began, the Houthis announced, on the fifth day of confrontation, that they killed Ali Saleh. They launched a wide campaign of arrests against Saleh's supporters along with the liquidation of military leaders.<sup>190</sup> The majority of Saleh's supporters surrendered, while some managed to escape to areas outside the control of the Houthis and formed anti-Houthis armed forces named (the guards of the Republic), led by Brigadier-General Tariq Mohammed Abdullah Saleh, nephew of former president Ali Saleh.

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**The differences between President Hadi and Abu Dhabi, the Gulf crisis due to cutting relations with Qatar, and the collapse of alliance between the Houthis and Saleh affected the war course in Yemen in favor of Iran that considered Yemen as an easy and low-cost opportunity to impose its presence nearby Saudi**  
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While Iran's support for the Houthis continues, the Arab coalition, led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, continues to support the internationally recognized government, which extends its control to almost half of the Yemeni governorates in the south and east of the country. The Houthis still control the capital, Sana'a, and other northern governorates, and all so far efforts and attempts by the United Nations to stop the war and achieve peace have failed, including the first and second Geneva negotiations (2015) through the Kuwait negotiations (2016),

and the Sweden negotiations (2018).

Although the parties of the conflict announce their desire to reach a political solution and a peaceful settlement, there are obstacles that still stand in the way of peace. These obstacles cause continued conflict that "caused human development to decline by twenty years and left devastating consequences, including the death of about 250,000 people, whether due directly to violence or lack of health care and food scarcity," according to a report issued by the United Nations Development Program.<sup>191</sup>



## **The Conclusion**

**The political and military conflict in Yemen, with its various causes, limbs and consequences, is still the most prominent feature of the scene contested by conflicting partners and disharmonious allies, brothers but enemies, who dispute for everything and anything, but they mostly agree on the conflict as a means to achieve their own goals. On the other hand, this leads to the destruction of all the human and material elements of the poor country, and the undermining of all attempts to stop the war and efforts to end the conflict, in an atmosphere that is full of hatred, incitement and hostility that spread out its toxins, and still expanding vertically and horizontally.**

**In the current scene, parties and powers that were hidden, have appeared as they have been waiting for the opportunity to return and re-emerge with projects and ideas that the Yemenis believe that they overcame sixty years ago and that the September and October revolutions brought down the curtains on them, as the first pioneers went on to study the features of the inspired Yemeni state. But the conflicting partners of the revolution continued to reproduce the conflict in a new shape, until some forces, in the midst of the conflict, found their way to announce themselves and reveal their ambitions to bring the time back. All this was not to happen, if the dreams of the Yemenis to build a new homeland and achieve the goals of September and October revolutions in 1962 and those of the last February revolution in 2011 did not collapse. Every time the principles of the revolution and its noble objectives that meet the ambitions of all Yemenis turn back, illegal projects and extinct powers appear again.**

**The situation that the Yemenis live in requires the concerned parties, internally and externally, to stand up to review the performance, and then curb the tendencies towards unilateral control, authoritarianism and tyranny for the benefit of one of the parties, at the expense of other parties and the whole Yemen, because no one can rule Yemen alone and exclude others and eliminate the opponents.**

**It is necessary here that all conflicting powers and those who support them from outside, that the experiences of monarchy and unilateral authority at all times failed and lost, from the stage of the first revolution and its aftermath, up to the reality today. No party, no matter how strong it is, can anymore impose a reality that it is rejected by the majority. The forces that think that they are able to impose themselves are wrong and delusional. Their delusions will only lead them to more conflicts and disputes that are useless and destructive. The past and present experiences were and are still extant.**

**The consensus experiences have proven to be the closest to achieving general goals, establishing democracy, and promoting its practice, based on the principle of the peaceful transfer of power, and not jumping over the will of the people under ideological slogans or racist tendencies, because the homeland accommodates all of its people. Therefore, all must be contained in the dialogue.**

**Indeed, the situation in Yemen is a call for all concerned parties and components, to meet on a common word and to uphold the interests of the country over all other interests, goals and agendas, because the country is for all Yemeni people. The conflicting parties are required to reconsider their actions, and stop the conflict that is a destruction tool and a machine of violence that will only result in tragedies, losses and more victims.**

The values of peaceful coexistence, dialogue and cooperation must prevail to serve the country, preserve it and protect the rights of its people. The people need to achieve their goals in reaching the inspired peaceful Yemen on the basis of popular participation and the promotion of the values of freedom, justice and equality, without any racial, regional or sectarian discrimination.



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## The Study References:

<sup>1</sup> Zaidiyyah is an Islamic religious sect, and it is the oldest group that came back from the Shiites, although Zaydis after Imam Zayd diversified and multiplied, but they are all attributed to Zaydis, despite their distance and their separation from the origins of Zaydis, with the assertion of specialized historians and researchers that Zayd bin Ali did not have a special doctrine with him, neither an ideological doctrine nor a doctrinal doctrine, but rather he had jurisprudential doctrine, and a vision in the Imamate that is inconsistent with the vision of the Shiites that arose in the following centuries. The affiliation to the Zaidiyyah comes from the fact that those groups believe in the Imam Zayd while the rest of the Shiite groups do not see or believe in its imam, because they found that he does not believe what they think of (the commandment) and (the reference) and (infallibility of imams). It had a presence in Najd, North Africa, and around the Caspian Sea. As for Hadawiya, it is in relation to Imam Al-Hadi Yahya bin Al-Hussein, which is the name for the only branch remaining inside the Zaidiyyah, which is located in Yemen.

For more information, see: Abdul-Rahman Abdul-Wahid al-Shujaa ', History of Yemen in Islam in the First Four Hijri Centuries, p. 8, (publishing house unknown, 2013), p. 130.

<sup>2</sup> One of the Zaidiyyah divisions, attributed to Abu Al-Jaroud Ziyad bin Al-Mundhir Al-Abdi, believes that the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him), stipulated the Imamate of Ali, and his two sons Al-Hassan and Al-Hussein after him, then the Imamate after that is a consultation between the virtuous sons of Al-Hassan and Al-Hussein, who deserves it is the one who uses his sword. The Jaroudiyyah followers are extremist in their views and they deviated from the views of Imam Zaid even though they recognize his imamate.

<sup>3</sup> Nashwan Al-Himiary: A judge, politician, linguist, historian and writer who approached in his thought the thought of Mu'tazila and wrote in religion, language and the history of Himiar kings. He is known for his objection to the limitation of the rule in the families of al-Hassan and al-Hussein and he held several debates with Zaidi imams during his era. (The exact date of his birth is not known, but most references suggest that he was born in the end of the fifth century AH / eleventh century A.D., and his death was in the year 573 AH corresponding to 1178 AD)

<sup>4</sup> Hassan Khudairi Ahmad, the Establishment of the Zaydi State in Yemen, 1st edition, (Cairo: Madbouly Library 1996), p.133.

<sup>5</sup> Ali Mohamed Zayd, the Mu'tazilah of Yemen, The State of the Al-Hadi and His Thought, 1st edition (Beirut: Dar Al-Awda, 1981), p. 37

<sup>6</sup> Mohsen Al-Aini, *Battles and Conspiracies Against the Yemen Issue*, 1st edition (Cairo: Dar Al-Shorouk, 1999), p. 80

<sup>7</sup> This was the end of the fourth century AH / tenth century AD, when al-Qasim al-Ayani fought the war against Imam al-Da'i Yusef ibn Yahya, one of the descendants of the founding al-Hadi.

<sup>8</sup> Ahmed bin Yahya Hamid al-Din (1891-1962) was the second king of the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen, ruling Yemen in the period (1948-1962) and took power after he managed to overthrow the constitution revolution that ended his father's rule and his life together in the year 1948, and before that his father depended on him In some of his wars to establish control over the country, and in 1937 he was appointed emir of the Taiz brigade when his father began to rely on his sons, who are called the swords of Islam.

<sup>9</sup> Abdul-Fattah Al-Batool, *Strings of Darkness, the era of Zaidi Imams in Yemen*, 1st edition (Sana'a: Nashwan Al-Himiari Center for Studies and Publishing 2007), p. 43.

<sup>10</sup> Abdul-Rahman Abdul-Wahid al-Shujaa', *History of Yemen in Islam*, previous reference, p. 152

<sup>11</sup> Al-Batool, previous reference, p. 44

<sup>12</sup> Mohsen Al-Aini, *Battles and Conspiracies Against the Yemen Issue*, previous reference, p. 80

<sup>13</sup> Ali Muhammad Zaid, *the Mu'tazilah of Yemen*, previous reference, p 71

<sup>14</sup> Mohsen Al-Aini, *Battles and Conspiracies ..*, previous reference, p. 77

<sup>15</sup> Al-Houthi is an armed political and religious movement that took its headquarters in northern Yemen, Saada, before it took control of the Yemeni capital, Sana'a. Its followers were known as the Houthis, according to the movement's founder, Hussein Badr Al-Din Al-Houthi

<sup>16</sup> He is the founder of the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen (North Yemen). He declared himself the imam of Yemen after the death of his father, Imam Al-Mansur Muhammad bin Yahya Hamid al-Din (1839-1904), and, as his father did, Imam Yahya fought several wars with the Ottomans until his intent was fulfilled by their final departure in the wake of the World War I. He announced the establishment of the Mutawakkil Kingdom, and officially assumed power from 1918 to 1948, when the constitution revolution took place, and he was shot dead by the revolutionaries in one of his trips south of Sanaa with a number of his companions on February 17, 1948. His sons are: Ahmed, Muhammad, Hassan, Al-Hussein and Al-Mohsen (killed with their father in the south of Sanaa during the revolution of 1948), Ali, al-Mutahar, Ibrahim (defected from his father and joined the opposition and participated in the revolution of 1948, and after its failure. he was taken to prison where he died, he was said to be poisoned), Abdullah and Abbas (their brother, Imam Ahmad, executed them after the failure of the revolutionary movement that they carried out against him in the year 1955), Ismail, Al-Qasim, Yahya, Abdul-Rahman.

<sup>17</sup> Fouad Al-Salahi and others, *The Yemeni Revolution, Background and Prospects*, 1st edition, (Doha: The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2012), p. 136

<sup>18</sup> The same source P. 137

<sup>19</sup> The hostages are people who are taken by the Imam's authorities. Often, the sons of tribal elders and local leaders are chosen to ensure their obedience, and not to rebel against the imam. Taking hostages was widely spread during the reign of Imam Yahya and his son Imam Ahmad.

<sup>20</sup> A Group of Soviet Authors, *Contemporary History of Yemen 1917-1982*, translated by Muhammad Al-Bahr, (Cairo: Madbouly Library, without publication date), p. 44.

<sup>21</sup> Saeed Al-Janahi, *The Yemeni National Movement from Revolution to Unity*, 1st floor (Aden: Al-Amal Center for Studies, 1992), p. 49

<sup>22</sup> A Group of Soviet Authors, *Contemporary History of Yemen*, previous reference, P. 47

<sup>23</sup> Mohsen Al-Aini, *Battles and Conspiracies ..*, previous reference, p. 57

<sup>24</sup> A Collection of Soviet Authors, previous reference, p. 54s

<sup>25</sup> Abdulaziz Al-Masoudi, *Milestones in the Contemporary History of Yemen - The Social Forces of the Yemeni Opposition Movement*, 1st edition (Sana'a: Al-Sanhani Library, 1992), Introduction, p. 4

<sup>26</sup> The same reference, P. 308

<sup>27</sup> See: A group of Soviet Authors, previous reference, p. 55

<sup>28</sup> Abdullah Al-Shamahi, *Yemen Human and Civilization*, 1st edition (Beirut: Dar Al Tanweer, 1985), p. 209

<sup>29</sup> A group of Soviet Authors, previous reference, p. 55

<sup>30</sup> Abdul-Rahman al-Iryani (1910-1998) was the second president of the Yemen Arab Republic after the revolution during the period (1967-1974), scholar, writer, and poet. The judiciary assumed a period of time during the era of Imami rule, then contributed with the free opponents of Imam Yahya's rule in the 1940s. Last century, he participated in the 1948 revolution. He was jailed in Hajja prison after the failure of the revolution for about seven years. He was appointed as Minister of Justice in the first government after the revolution of 1962, then a member of the Presidency Council and President of the Republican Council in the November 5 Movement that toppled his predecessor President, Abdullah Al-Sallal. In 1967, and in 1974, he submitted his resignation from the Presidency of the Republic to the Leadership Council, headed by Ibrahim Al-Hamdi.

<sup>31</sup> Muhammad Mahmoud al-Zubayri (1910-1965) is a writer, revolutionary, and politician. He went to Egypt in 1939 to complete his education, so he joined Dar Al Uloom, then returned to Yemen in 1941 and entered the prison because of his opposition activities to Imam Yahya. He was released from prison after about a year, and he went to Taiz and from there to Aden, where he established with his fellow opponents (the Liberal Party) in the year 1944, and after a while, his name changed to the (Great Yemeni Society), and he participated in the 1948 revolution of the constitution. After that, he remained in exile in Pakistan until the July revolution in Egypt, so he moved to Egypt and led the opposition again from his position as President of the Yemeni Union until the September 1962 revolution in which he was appointed a minister and then a member of the Presidency Council in 1963. He headed the Republican delegation to negotiations with monarchs in Arquette (Sudan Conference), which was held in 1964

<sup>32</sup> Ahmad Muhammad Numan (1909-1996) was a prominent politician and fighter. He joined the Yemeni opposition from an early age, and in 1944 he participated with his colleague Muhammad Mahmoud al-Zubayri in moving to Aden, where they announced the establishment of the first opposition party. He was one of the most prominent leaders of the constitutional revolution in 1948, and was appointed as Minister of Agriculture. After the failure of the revolution, he remained in prison for nearly seven years until after the revolution of September 1962 and the establishment of the republican system. He held a number of government positions, the most important of which is Prime Minister in 1965, and again in 1971. He also served as Yemen's Envoy to the Arab League, and a member of the Republican Council.

<sup>33</sup> Ali Muhammad Zaid, *Memoirs of Ahmad Muhammad Numan*, (Cairo: Madbouly Library 2003), p. 45.

(Interview that was conducted by researchers at the American University of Beirut in 1969, edited and translated by Ali Muhammad Zaid, and published by the French Institute of Archeology and Social Sciences in Sana'a, and the Center of Arab and Middle Eastern Studies in Beirut 2003).

<sup>34</sup> Al-Masoudi, previous reference, p. 5

<sup>35</sup> Al-Shamakhi, previous reference, P. 221

<sup>36</sup> The family of Hamid al-Din, to which the last rulers of the Imam Zaid state belonged to the Imam al-Hadi Yahya bin al-Hussein, as previously mentioned, and the first to be called (Hamid al-Din) from the ancestors of Imam Yahya is his third grandfather, Yahya bin Muhammad bin Ismail, and the family of Hamid al-Din is descended from a dynasty Imam al-Mansur al-Qasim bin Muhammad, (1559-1620), who assumed power in the period (1598-1620), and was the founder of the Qasimiya state that controlled the rule in Yemen over two periods, the first period was after the end of the first Ottoman presence that remained in Yemen for about a hundred years In the period (1538-1635), and the second period was after the end of the second Ottoman presence in the year 1918, and the declaration of the established of Al-Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen by Imam Yahya. The state of Beit Hamid al-Din, or the second Qasimiya state, lasted for nearly 44 years, ending in the September Revolution of 1962.

<sup>37</sup> See: Memoirs of Chief Judge Abd al-Rahman al-Iryani, Part One, First Edition (without mentioning the publisher and place of publication, 2013), p. 98

<sup>38</sup> Al-Wazir Family: Among the Hashemite families descended from the dynasty of Imam Al-Hadi Yahya bin Al-Hussein Al-Risi, the founder of the Zaidiyya state in Yemen, and due to the deterioration of relationship between the Al Hamid al-Din and the Al-Wazir family, Al al-Wazir joined the opposition and became part of it and leaders of the regime were chosen from them during the constitutional revolution in 1948. Abdullah bin Ahmed Al-Wazir (1885 - 1948) was declared a constitutional imam, Ali bin Abdullah Al-Wazir was Prime Minister, Muhammad bin Muhammad Al-Wazir, governor of Sana'a, Muhammad bin Ahmed Al-Wazir was governor of Amran (North Yemen), and Abdullah bin Ali al-Wazir was the director of advertising and publishing. After the failure of the revolution, the new imam, Ahmed, executed leaders of the revolution, on top of them were the leaders from Al al-Wazir.

<sup>39</sup> A group of Soviet Authors, previous reference, p. 90

<sup>40</sup> Mohsen Al-Aini, Battles and Conspiracies .., previous reference, p. 59

<sup>41</sup> A group of Soviet Authors, previous reference, p. 89

<sup>42</sup> Muhammad al-Habshi, South Yemen from 1937 until independence, 1st edition (Beirut: Dar al-Tale'ah 1968), p. 41

<sup>43</sup> The same reference, P. 50

<sup>44</sup> Dothina: The people called it a republic because its president was elected annually, and it also had a parliament, and because it was independent from the Sultanates surrounding it. It remained independent until it joined the Southern Arab Union in the early sixties, and it was bordered with the Sultanate of Al-Fadhli in the south, the Sultanate of Upper al-Awalik and Lower al-Awalik in the east , the Sultanate of Al-Uthali in the north, and the Sultanate of Al-Fadhli and the Lower Yafi in the west.

<sup>45</sup> Al-Habshi, South Yemen, previous reference, p. 54

<sup>46</sup> A group of Soviet Authors, previous reference, P. 99

<sup>47</sup> Al-Jinahy, previous reference, P. 168

<sup>48</sup> Imam Muhammad bin Ahmed Hamid al-Din called (al-Badr) (1926-1996), the last ruler of the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen. He was toppled by the revolution of September 26, 1962, only six days after he assumed power to succeed his father, Imam Ahmed, who passed away on September 19, 1962. He fled to Saudi Arabia and worked from there to restore power through a continuous war against the republican system until national reconciliation was conducted in 1970, after which he left for London and settled there until his death.

<sup>49</sup> Lt. Col. Ahmed Yahya Al-Thulaya (1916-1955) was a revolutionary military commander. He was born in the city of Sana'a in the year 1916, and was the commander of the army during the era of Imam Ahmad. He was the mastermind of the 1955 movement that overthrew the rule of Imam Ahmed, with participation of two brothers of the Imam, Abdullah and Al-Abbas, but it failed ten days after its outbreak. The movement's leaders, topped by Thulaya and brothers of the Imam, were executed in the city of Taiz.

<sup>50</sup> A group of Soviet Authors, previous reference, P. 54

<sup>51</sup> Ali Muhammad Zaid, Memoirs of Ahmad Muhammad Numan, previous reference, p. 57

<sup>52</sup> A group of Soviet Authors, previous reference, P. 54\* Qahtan al-Sha'bi (1923-1981) was the first president of southern Yemen after independence, between November 1967 and June 1969).

<sup>53</sup> Abdullah Bathib (1931-1976), a journalist and political thinker. He was considered one of the most prominent pioneers of the Left Marxists. He published the magazine of Al-Mustaqbal in 1949, after which he worked as an editor in the Al-Nahdha newspaper, and then as editor-in-chief. In 1958, he issued the Al-Talei newspaper from Taiz, published in it his ideas supporting the revolution and modernization and the unity of the national struggle in the face of tyranny and colonialism. In the beginning of the sixties, he established, with a number of his left-wing colleagues, (the Democratic Popular Union) that raised the slogan (a unified democratic Yemen). He served as Minister of Education in 1969, and Minister of Culture in 1972.

<sup>54</sup> Eyad Turkan Al-Dulaimi, Soviet activity towards the two halves of Yemen and the Arab position towards it, 1962-1979, (Master Thesis, Diyala University, 2006), pp. 33-35

<sup>55</sup> Faisal Al-Shaabi (1936-1970), the first prime minister in southern Yemen after independence (1967-1969), and one of the founders of the Arab Nationalist Movement in Yemen, and the National Front that led the revolution against the British colonialism until independence took place in 1967. The political struggles toppled him and he was imprisoned in the wake of what was known as the (Correct Movement of June 22, 1969). After about a year of detention, the authority announced that he had been killed while trying to escape from prison, which opposition sources questioned, accusing the authority of assassinating him.

<sup>56</sup> The Yemeni Encyclopedia, Al-Afif Cultural Foundation, Volume II, 2nd Edition (Sana'a: Al-Afif Cultural Foundation, 2003), p. 860

<sup>57</sup> The same reference, P. 858

<sup>58</sup> The Yemeni Encyclopedia, Al-Afif Cultural Foundation, Volume III, 2nd Edition (Sana'a: Al-Afif Cultural Foundation 2003), p. 1911

<sup>59</sup> A group of Soviet Authors, previous reference, P. 115

<sup>60</sup> The Yemeni Encyclopedia, third volume, previous reference, p. 1912

<sup>61</sup> A committee organized by the Free Officers, the secrets and documents of the Yemeni Revolution, 4th edition (Sana'a: Al-Afif Cultural Foundation 2002), p. 68

<sup>62</sup> The same reference, P. 21

<sup>63</sup> The same reference, P. 89

<sup>64</sup> See: Al-Jinahy, previous reference, P. 171

<sup>65</sup> Muhammad Jamal Barout, Summary of the Arab Nationalist Movement, Genesis - Development - Destinies, (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, 2007), P. 42

<sup>66</sup> Al-Hussein Bin Talal, My Profession as King (Royal Speeches, published in French: Fereydoun Sahib Jem, translated into Arabic by Ghazi Ghazil, (Amman: Al-Masry Distribution Foundation 1987), P. 186.

<sup>67</sup> Sultan Naji, The Military History of Yemen, 2nd edition (Beirut: Dar Al-Awda 1988), P. 221

<sup>68</sup> A group of Soviet Authors, previous reference, p. 132

<sup>69</sup> The same reference, P. 133

<sup>70</sup> Mohamed Jamal Baroot, previous reference, P. 42

<sup>71</sup> The Yemeni Encyclopedia, second volume, previous reference, p. 1111

<sup>72</sup> The same reference, P. 1112

<sup>73</sup> Sultan Naji, previous reference, P 221

<sup>74</sup> Edgar Oblance, Yemen... Revolution and War until 1970, translation / Abd al-Khaliq Lashid, 2nd edition (Cairo: Madbouly Library 1990), p. 19

<sup>75</sup> Sultan Naji, previous reference, P 222

<sup>76</sup> Edgar Oblance, previous reference, P. 18-19

<sup>77</sup> Abdullah Al-Sallal (1917-1994) was the first president of the Yemen Arab Republic in the period (1962 - 1967). He attended the Orphans School in Sana'a in 1929, and after completing his high school, he traveled to Iraq in 1936 on a military mission sent by Imam Yahya Hamid al-Din, and entered the Military College Iraqi to graduate as a second lieutenant in the year 1939, and in the year 1948 he participated in the constitutional revolution that subsequently failed, and was imprisoned after that until the year 1955, and he was appointed by Crown Prince Muhammad al-Badr as his chief guard, without knowing that he was a member of the Free Officers Organization that led the September revolution 1962, one week after the death of Imam Ahmad and his son received al-Bad Governance, baskets and became the first president of the Yemen Arab Republic, before being ousted by the movement of November 5, 1967

<sup>78</sup> Edgar Oblance, previous reference, P. 162

<sup>79</sup> Mohsen Al-Aini (1932- ..), Prime Minister of the Yemen Arab Republic - North Yemen for five times after the revolution, a prominent politician and diplomat. He held the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs in the revolution government in late 1962, and the Yemeni representative in the United Nations, where Yemen took over a seat after the UN's recognition of the republican system. He served as Yemen's ambassador to Washington more than once, and joined the opposition in the 1950s, while studying in Cairo.

<sup>80</sup> Mohsen Al-Aini, Fifty Years in Quicksand, 1st floor (Beirut: Al-Nahar Publishing House, 1999), p. 60

<sup>81</sup> The same reference, P. 66

<sup>82</sup> Edgar Oblance, previous reference, P. 173

<sup>83</sup> Mohsen al-Aini, previous reference, P.

<sup>84</sup> Edgar Oblance, previous reference, P. 152

<sup>85</sup> Fouad al-Salahi, previous reference, P. 140

<sup>86</sup> Al-Habshi, previous reference, P. 577

<sup>87</sup> The defeat of the Egyptian army in the war with Israel at the beginning of June 1967, led to the occupation of Israel new Arab regions and territories, and Egypt - under the impact of defeat - was forced to withdraw its forces that were in northern Yemen to support the revolution in the face of the royalists backed by Saudi Arabia, and Egypt was supporting the revolutionaries in Southern Yemen against the British occupation through the Liberation Front, whose directions were closer to the Nasserite ones, unlike the National Front, which came close to the socialist internationalist tendencies.

<sup>88</sup> Al-Jinahy, previous reference, P. 454

<sup>89</sup> Ali Muhammad al-Amiri, The Impact of External Factors on the Yemeni Political Life, Journal of (International Studies, No. (49), issued by the Center for International Studies, University of Baghdad (year of publication unknown), p. 132

<sup>90</sup> Memoirs of Chief Judge / Abdul Rahman Al-Iryani, Part Two, previous reference, p. 22

<sup>91</sup> Edgar Oblance, previous reference, P. 156

<sup>92</sup> Memoirs of Judge / Abdul Rahman Al-Iryani, Part Two, previous reference, p. 22

<sup>93</sup> Edgar Oblance, previous reference, P. 197

<sup>94</sup> Memoirs of Judge / Abdul Rahman Al-Iryani, Part Two, previous reference, p. 23

<sup>95</sup> Abdullah Jozailan (1936-2010) was a military officer, graduated from the Military Academy in Cairo in 1955, then returned to Yemen in 1956, and joined the Military College, where he was appointed Staff of War, then director of the Weapons School, and participated in training the first vanguards of the Yemeni army And he had a prominent role in the September revolution, and after that he held a number of positions, the most important of which was the Vice-President of the Revolutionary Command Council and the Minister of War, then Vice President of the Republic.

<sup>96</sup> Abdullah Jozailan, The Secret History of the Yemeni Revolution, 3rd edition (Beirut: Modern Age Publications, 1987), p. 237

<sup>97</sup> Memoirs of Judge / Abdul-Rahman Al-Iryani, P. 77

<sup>98</sup> Major General Hammoud Al-Jaifi (1918-1985) a military and diplomatic officer, graduated from the Military College in Baghdad with the rank of a second lieutenant in the year 1940. Imam Ahmad imprisoned him for seven years for his participation in the 1948 revolution. After his release, he was appointed as Director of Security in the port of Hodeidah with the rank of Dean, then director of the College of War in Sana'a in 1959, where he established a school for training on light, medium, and

heavy weapons,

He was appointed as Minister of War in the first government after the September Revolution of 1962, and a member of the Revolutionary Command Council. He was then appointed ambassador to Egypt in 1963, then Prime Minister in 1964, and Minister of Treasury and Economy, and Chairman of the National Defense Council in 1965, then Minister of War again in 1966. He was appointed as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in 1968. The last positions were as ambassador to Libya in 1974 and then to Saudi Arabia in 1976.

<sup>99</sup> Jozailan, previous reference, P. 227

<sup>100</sup> The same reference, P. 239

<sup>101</sup> Memoirs of Judge / Abdul-Rahman Al-Iryani, P. 31

<sup>102</sup> The same reference, P. 36

<sup>103</sup> The same reference, 35

<sup>104</sup> Jozailan, previous reference, P. 226-227

<sup>105</sup> Memoirs of Judge / Abdul-Rahman Al-Iryani, P. 31

<sup>106</sup> Lisa Wadin, Jarallah Omar's diaries, the website "Bdayat" magazine, published in 2016, was viewed on (1 November 2019), at the link: <https://www.bidayatmag.com/node/767>

<sup>107</sup> Memoirs of Judge AbdulRahman al-Iryani, second part, previous reference, P. 528

<sup>108</sup> Liza Wadin, previous reference

<sup>109</sup> Hassan al-Amri (1920-1989). He was military and political leader. He held the position of Prime Minister in northern Yemen before the unity. He was one of studies whom Imam sent to Iraq in the 40s to study. After his return, he joined the opposition and participated in the constitution revolution in 1948. After the failure of the revolution, he was imprisoned for seven years. He was one of prominent leaders in the 1962 revolution.

<sup>110</sup>

<sup>111</sup> Mohsen Al-Aini, fifty years in quicksand, previous reference, P. 133

<sup>112</sup> Liza Wadin, previous reference

<sup>113</sup> The same reference

<sup>114</sup> AbdulFattah Ismael Ali (1939-1986). He was president of the People's Supreme and President of Southern Yemen (1978-1980). He was political and intellectual. He participated in establishing the National Front and struggle against the British colonialism. He was elected the General Secretary of the National Front that ruled the south after independence. He is the founder and leader of the Yemeni Socialist Party that ruled the south until the establishment of the Yemeni Unity. He was killed in the bloody fighting that broke out between different wings in the ruling party in Aden in January 1986.

<sup>115</sup> Mohamed Ali Haitham (1940-1990). He was prime minister of the Yemeni Democratic People's Republic in 1969. He was one of prominent personalities in the south after independence. He resigned from his position and left the country in ambiguous conditions in 1971 after a dispute with the Marxist wing in the National Front. Then he established (The Developed Union Front), a political movement against socialism in the south. He lived in exile until the establishment of the unity between south and north in 1990. He was appointed as Minister of Social Affairs and Labour in 1993.

<sup>116</sup> Eyad al-Dulaimi, previous reference, P. 80

<sup>117</sup> Naif Hawatimah, Crisis of Revolution in Southern Yemen, first edition (Beirut: Dar al-Taliah, 1968). P. 97

<sup>118</sup> A group of Soviet Authors, previous reference, P. 214

<sup>119</sup> Ali al-Saraf, Southern Yemen...From Colonialism to Unity, first edition (London: Riyadh al-Rais, 1992) P. 232

<sup>120</sup> Yemeni Encyclopedia, third volume, previous reference, P. 1731

<sup>121</sup> Salim Rubei Ali (Salmin) (1935- 1978), was the second president of southern Yemen after independence for ten years (1969-1978). He was a leader in the National Front and he led the 22 June Movement that toppled president Qahtan al-Sha'bi in 1969. Then he became president of the southern Yemen until events of June 1978 following the assassination of Ahmed al-Ghashmi, president of the northern Yemen. The opponents of Salmin won the conflict and executed him in what was known as "Salmin events."

<sup>122</sup> Al-Saraf, previous reference, P. 269

<sup>123</sup> Ibrahim Al-Hamdi (1943-1977), a military and political leader, and the third president of the Yemen Arab Republic, took power in the period (1974-1977), and after the revolution he assumed leadership of the Thunderbolt Force, and rose to leadership and security positions until he became Commander of the General Reserve Forces And storm forces, and in 1971 he was appointed deputy prime minister for internal affairs, then deputy commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and during his reign the country witnessed a remarkable improvement in the developmental aspects and the development of basic services, and worked with the southern president, Salem Rabie, to solve problems between the north and south and both accelerated steps to achieve the unity.

<sup>124</sup> Abdullah bin Hussein bin Nasser al-Ahmar (1933-2007), Sheikh of Hashid tribes, and one of the most prominent tribal leaders. He took over the Ministry of Interior after the revolution, Speaker of the Parliament (National Council 1969, Shura Council 1971), and he presided the elected parliament after the Yemeni unity between the North and south.

The first term (1993-1997), the second term (1997-2003), and the third term (2003 until his death in 2007). He headed the Yemeni Reform Party (Islah party), the second largest Yemeni party after the ruling People's Congress Party during the period of Ali Abdullah Saleh's rule.

<sup>125</sup> Sinan bin Abdullah bin Saleh Abu Lahm (1922-) was one of the most prominent Sheikhs of the Bakil tribes, and among the most prominent tribal leaders in the contemporary history of Yemen, and he played his role in the September 26 revolution. After the revolution, he assumed a number of official positions, including the governor of Al Hudaydah governorate, and he also had a role in political events such as achieving Yemeni unity 1990, and the dialogue of political forces in the 1993 crisis.

<sup>126</sup> Sheikh Mujahid Abu Shawareb (1938-2004) was one of the elders of the Hashid tribe, a military officer, and a politician. He was considered as one of the most prominent Yemeni personalities who contributed to supporting the September 1962 revolution, during the war with the monarchists (1962-1970). He led the fronts of the revolution in several provinces in the north of the country to confront the royalist forces, and after the victory of the revolution, he served as governor of Hajjah. In 1974, he was appointed as a member of the Leadership Council, and he finally served as an adviser to the President of the Republic until his death.

<sup>127</sup> Memoirs of Sheikh Abdullah bin Hussein al-Ahmar, 2nd edition (Sana'a: Al-Afaq for Printing and Publishing, 2008), p. 215.

<sup>128</sup> Adel Al-Sharjabi and others, The Palace and Diwan The Political Role of the Tribe in Yemen, (Sana'a: Yemeni Observatory for Human Rights 2009), P. 42

<sup>129</sup> Mohsen al-Aini, fifty years..., previous reference, P. 291

<sup>130</sup> The same reference, P. 301

<sup>131</sup> Lt. Col. Ahmed Hussein Al-Ghashami (1941-1978), President of the Yemen Arab Republic from (1977-1978), joined the armed forces after the revolution of September 26, and assumed military command and duties as Chief of Staff of the War Regiment, and Commander of the Western and Eastern Axis, and the 1st Armored Brigade. After the overthrow of President Abdul-Rahman al-Iryani, and Ibrahim al-Hamdi took the power in 1974, al-Ghashmi assumed the position of chief of staff and then deputy head of the Leadership Council. In October 1977, he assumed power, but he did not complete it for one year until he was killed by a bomb bag explosion that was carried with a man from Aden's regime.

<sup>132</sup> Memoirs of Sheikh al-Ahmar, previous reference, P. 227

<sup>133</sup> The news of the assassination of President Ibrahim Al-Hamdi from Sanaa Radio, an audio recording on Youtube, (seen on November 30, 2019), at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EQGSNCGUkf4>.

<sup>134</sup> Liza Wadin, previous reference

<sup>135</sup> Ali al-Amiri, previous reference, P, 143

<sup>136</sup> Liza Wadin, previous reference

<sup>137</sup> Eyad al-Dulaimi, previous reference, P. 94

<sup>138</sup> Ali Nasser Muhammad (1939-), President of the Republic of South Yemen in the period (1980-1986), a leader of the National Front that revolted against the British colonialism in Aden. He took power since 1967, and was appointed Prime Minister in 1971. After assuming power in the year 1980, he worked on solving the outstanding problems with North Yemen and began launching meetings between the Aden and Sanaa regimes, but his differences with his opponents in the leadership of the ruling Socialist Party at the time led to the outbreak of January 1986 confrontations that resulted in his exit with his supporters after the victory of his opponents and their seizure of power until the declaration of unity. He moved with his supporters to Sanaa, and from there to the Syrian capital, where he established (the Arab Center for Strategic Studies). As for his supporters, they allied with President Saleh to confront their opponents from the rulers of the south, led by Ali Salem al-Baidh, and they had a role in the 1994 war, and during the war and after that they assumed important political and military positions.

<sup>139</sup> Ali Ahmed Nasser Antar (1937-1986), a former vice president of South Yemen, one of the leaders of the armed struggle against British colonialism, until the declaration of independence. Until armed confrontations broke out between the two parties in what was known as (January 1986 events), in which Ali Antar was killed while attending a meeting of the leadership of the Socialist Party in the building of the Central Committee.

<sup>140</sup> Liza Wadin, previous reference

<sup>141</sup> Ali al-Amri, previous reference, P. 141

<sup>142</sup> The same reference, P. 142

<sup>143</sup> Fouad al-Salahi and others, previous reference, P. 195

<sup>144</sup> Memoirs of Ahmed Numan, previous reference, P. 214

<sup>145</sup> Al-Saraf, previous reference, P. 245

<sup>146</sup> Memoirs of Sheikh al-Ahmar, previous reference, P. 212

<sup>147</sup> The Yemeni Encyclopedia, Al-Afif Cultural Foundation, fourth volume, 2nd edition (Sana'a: Al-Afif Cultural Foundation, 2003), p. 3141

<sup>148</sup> Jamal Al-Suwaidi and others, The Yemen War 1994 Reasons and Results, (Abu Dhabi: Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 1995), P. 21

<sup>149</sup> Jihad Abdel-Rahman Ahmed Saleh, *Yemeni opposition parties and their role in political and democratic development*, (London: East Future Center for Studies 2016), p. 8

<sup>150</sup> Mohsen Al-Aini, *Fifty Years in Quicksand*, previous reference, pp. 352-353, and Al-Aini was then the Yemeni ambassador to Washington.

<sup>151</sup> Abd al-Wali al-Shamiri, *The Yemeni Unity Saga, Thousands of War Hours, Part One*, 3rd Edition (Sana'a: Al-Yusr Library, 1995), p. 222

<sup>152</sup> Nasser Muhammad Nasser, *The Yemeni Political Crisis 1990-1994, Causes and Results*, (Sana'a: Al-Hodeidah University), p. 119.

<sup>153</sup> The same reference, P. 256

<sup>154</sup> The Yemeni Encyclopedia, Volume Four, previous reference, p. 3122

<sup>155</sup> The same reference, P. 3124

<sup>156</sup> Jamal al-Suwaidi and others, previous reference, P. 21-22

<sup>157</sup> The same reference, P. 22

<sup>158</sup> In December 2019, activist and political writer Shafi'a Al-Abd raised the issue of these requirements attributed to al-Bayd and his team during the agreement to declare unity, including that they requested the departure of their southern opponents residing in Sana'a, Ali Nasser and the leaders loyal to him and belonging to the governorates of Abyan and Shabwa, known as (Al-Zumra ), Which was confirmed by most of them in written testimonies that Shafi'a documented in his personal Facebook account, and their content that the party's leadership stipulated the removal of its opponents from Sana'a and Yemen in general as a prerequisite for signing the unit, and President Ali Nasser Muhammad said that he left Yemen in January 1990, after The deal between Ali Saleh and AR Salem Al-Baid had me, and the same thing was confirmed by Muhammad Ali Ahmed, Ahmad Musaed Hussain, and Ahmed Abdullah Al-Hassani, while socialist leaders denied that this decision was discussed within the framework of the party's institutions, which means that they are requirements that Al-Baidh presented only in his meetings with Saleh

<sup>159</sup> Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi (1945-) Second President of the Republic of Yemen (United Yemen), from 2012 until today. Before the unit, he was one of the most prominent supporters of the former southern president, Ali Nasser Muhammad, and he left the south with him after the January 1986 clashes to the capital, Sana'a, and after the achievement of the unit he allied with President Saleh against the Al-Bayadh team that took over the rule of the south in the period (1986-1990), and had a role Prominent in the 1994 war led by President Saleh, who assigned him the duties of the Minister of Defense during the war, and then appointed him as Vice President of the Republic since 1994,

a position he held until his election as President of the Republic according to the transfer of power agreement known as the (Gulf Initiative) that followed the popular revolution in the year 2011

<sup>160</sup> Nasir Muhammad Nasir, previous reference, P. 147

<sup>161</sup> These personalities include:

- Muhammad Salem Basandawa - one of the southern politicians who left to the north after independence, when the National Front seized control of the government and excluded its opponents. He occupied the foreign minister position during the 1994 war, then an ambassador and then prime minister in the first government after the 2011 revolution.
- Ahmed Al-Hassani - Commander of the Navy in South Yemen before January 1986, a position he assumed after the 1994 war. After 2001, he served as Yemen's ambassador to Syria until 2005.
- Ahmed Musaed Hussein. He belongs to the governor of Shabwa and worked as a governor in the seventies and then head of the State Security Agency. He left Aden with all supporters of Ali Nasser Muhammad to Sanaa after the January 1986 conflict, and after 1994, he held several government positions, the last of which was minister of expatriates between 2008 and 2011..
- Abdullah Ali Elewa (1947- ..), belongs to Shabwa Governorate, and he is one of the prominent military leaders. He served as Chief of Staff after the 1994 war, as Minister of Defense in 2001, and then as a consultant to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces in 2006. He joined the popular revolution in 2011 and became the commander of pro-revolution army. Before the events of January 1986, he was the commander of Al-Wahda Brigades.
- Muhammad Nasser Ahmad al-Hassani (1950-...), belongs to Abyan Governorate, former Minister of Defense from 2006 until late 2014. He was director of the Supply Department of the Ministry of Defense in the government of Ali Nasser Muhammad, and after the 1994 war, he held the position Minister of Defense in the United Yemen.
- Hussein Muhammad bin Arab (1947- ..) belongs to the Directorate of Mudiyya of Abyan Governorate. He was appointed as Deputy Minister of Interior (1994-1995), then Minister of Interior until 2001. The he was appointed a member of the Shura Council. He served as the Minister of Interior for the second time, and Deputy Prime Minister In the period (2015-2016).

<sup>162</sup> Jihad Abdul-Rahman, Opposition Parties, previous reference, p. 9

<sup>163</sup> The same reference, P. 11-12

<sup>164</sup> Adel Al-Sharjabi and others, The Palace and the Diwan, previous reference, P. 45-46.

<sup>165</sup> Jihad Abdul-Rahman, opposition parties, previous reference, p. 20

<sup>166</sup> The same reference, P. 22

<sup>167</sup> The same reference, P. 23

<sup>168</sup> On the morning of February 3, 2006, 23 Al-Qaeda operatives escaped from their cell in a prison of the Political Security Agency in the capital, Sana'a, through a small tunnel that they dug into the bathrooms of the Awqaf mosque, and from there they took to the street.

<sup>169</sup> Documentation of the Comprehensive National Dialogue Conference, The Southern Cause, p. 6

<sup>170</sup> The same reference, P. 22

<sup>171</sup> Abdul-Fattah Al-Batool, previous reference, P. 18

<sup>172</sup> The same reference, P. 349

<sup>173</sup> Mohsen Al-Aini, Fifty Years in Quicksand, previous reference, P. 150

<sup>174</sup> Hussein Badr Al-Din Al-Houthi (1959-2004), the leader of the Zaidiyyah School, and leader of the Houthi movement that has fought six wars against the Yemeni government since 2004. He was one of the founders of the Al-Haq party in the year 1990, but he left the party and devoted to the movement (the believing youth) that aims to promote Zaidi thought. He was killed in confrontations with government forces in mid-2004, after which his brother Abdul-Malik took over the leadership of the group that became known as the Houthi group, calling itself "Ansarullah".

<sup>175</sup> Abdul-Fattah Al-Batool, previous reference, P. 375

<sup>176</sup> Fouad al-Salahi and others; previous reference; P. 142

<sup>177</sup> The same reference, P. 141

<sup>178</sup> The same reference, P. 161

<sup>179</sup> Majid al-Madhaji and others, Roles of Active Regional Players in Yemen, report by Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies, (Sana'a, June 2015), P. 3

<sup>180</sup> The Decisive Storm in its fourth year, a report issued by the Abaad Center for Studies and Research, (Sana'a, March 2018), P. 6

<sup>181</sup> Yemen after the Storm, a report issued by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, (Doha: April 2015), p. 4

<sup>182</sup> The same reference, P. 8

<sup>183</sup> Fouad Al-Salahi and others, previous reference, p. 151

<sup>184</sup> Yemen after the Storm, previous reference, P. 6-7

<sup>185</sup> The same reference, P. 7

<sup>186</sup> Ahmad Naji, Is there an Emirati-Saudi conflict? A report published by the Carnegie Middle East Center in August 2019, on its website, (seen on November 25, 2019), <https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/79708>

<sup>187</sup> The same reference

<sup>188</sup> The same reference

<sup>189</sup> The Yemeni government faces the UAE after dozens of government army were killed by Emirati air strikes, posted on Qantara website, on August 30, 2019 (seen on 26 November 2019) at <https://bit.ly/34iNcuu>

<sup>190</sup> The Decisive Storm in its fourth year, previous reference, pp. 8-9

<sup>191</sup> “The conflict in Yemen erases the gains of more than two decades of human development,” a report issued by the United Nations Development Program, and published by the United Nations News site in April 2019, (seen on November 30, 2019), at the link: <https://news.un.org/ar/story/2019/04/1031541>