



Abaad Observatory for Early Warning and Strategic Indicators

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April 2026

Political Stalemate and Security Fragility: April's Early-Warning Assessment

Monitoring and analysis of political, economic, social, military, security, rights and humanitarian indicators in Yemen

Strategic reading for decision-makers

Between settlement stalemate, security fragility and escalating humanitarian warning



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Issued by

Abaad Studies & Research Center

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91

Total items

35

Political

34

Military/Security

19

Humanitarian

3

Economic

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Methodology and Analytical Approach

Abaad Observatory for Early Warning and Strategic Indicators adopts a multi-stage monitoring and analysis methodology designed to transform raw materials, news items, reports and dispersed data into indicators that can be understood, measured and assessed. The aim is to help decision-makers, researchers and relevant stakeholders read ongoing developments in Yemen and anticipate their possible trajectories.

The methodology begins with collecting monitored materials from media sources, official statements, local and international reports, organizational outputs and available field indicators. These materials are then classified into key tracks: political, economic, social, military, security, rights and humanitarian indicators.

After classification, the materials are analyzed across four main levels: event intensity, indicator direction, level of impact and early-warning significance. The Observatory does not treat news items as isolated incidents, but rather as signals that may reveal broader trends, rising risks or exploitable opportunities.

Abaad Observatory also uses artificial intelligence tools to support the processing of raw information, sorting of materials, detection of recurring patterns, classification of indicators and generation of initial readings. AI is not used as a substitute for human judgment or editorial responsibility; all outputs are subject to human review, consistency checks, editorial refinement and strategic interpretation before publication.

Fixed Editorial Note

This report is not intended to provide a monthly news archive or to simply restate all developments in chronological order. Rather, it seeks to produce an analytical reading directed at decision-makers. Accordingly, issues are arranged according to their level of impact and strategic significance, not merely according to the date on which they occurred.

Some events that may appear limited in media volume may receive greater analytical weight if they are connected to the future of the state, the monopoly of force, unified security command, the settlement track, or the rights and humanitarian situation.

Executive Summary

April 2026 was primarily a political and security month. The Observatory monitored 91 items: 35 political items, 34 military and security items, 19 humanitarian items and only 3 economic items. This distribution reflects the continued dominance of the settlement and security questions in the Yemeni scene, alongside a pressing humanitarian file and weak economic representation in monthly monitoring.

The central theme of the month is that Yemen is moving between political stalemate and security fragility, while the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab continue to gain weight in regional and international calculations. UN and international engagement continued, but without a decisive breakthrough. The Yemeni government maintained that any settlement must be based on restoring state institutions, monopolizing arms and ending armed rebellion.

Security-wise, the assassination of Abdulrahman Al-Shaer in Aden became a direct test of the authorities' ability to identify perpetrators and prevent impunity. The restructuring and integration of military and security formations also remained a key gateway to restoring the state's monopoly of force.

Maritime-wise, Yemen remained at the center of the international navigation equation. The Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab emerged as files that go beyond Yemen's domestic context and affect international trade, energy and supply chains, with references to the European Operation Aspides and its role in securing the passage of around 1,800 commercial vessels.

Humanitarian-wise, the monitoring showed continued deterioration driven by funding shortages, more than 22 million Yemenis needing assistance, more than 18 million facing severe hunger, and the ongoing files of detainees, journalists, humanitarian workers and access restrictions.

Economically, weak quantitative presence does not mean a weak crisis. Revenue control, salaries, teachers' demands and public services all show that the economy is a direct factor in state legitimacy and stability in liberated areas.

General Risk Indicator

Overall risk level in April: Red / High.

The indicator is high because politics and security together represented more than three-quarters of monitored materials, reflecting continued political blockage and the advance of security concerns over economic and service-stability files.

The first risk is political stalemate. Continued UN and international activity without a decisive breakthrough means that the crisis remains in a management phase rather than a resolution phase, and any negotiation track not tied to clear security arrangements will remain fragile.

The second risk is internal security fragility, especially in Aden, where assassination is not merely an isolated incident but an indicator of weak security and judicial deterrence, and of the possible return of violence as a tool for shaping political and social balances.

The third risk is the rising centrality of the Red Sea. The more Yemen is linked to international navigation security, the greater the need for Yemeni institutional capacity, rather than international approaches that bypass the state.

The fourth risk is humanitarian: the combination of funding shortages, hunger, detention of humanitarian workers, and the files of journalists and detainees shows that the humanitarian crisis has become a crisis of protection, access and financing, not merely a crisis of need.

Key Transformations in April

First, a political transformation toward crisis management rather than resolution. UN engagement, European support and international contacts continued, but the government and local actors kept demanding clearer conflict framing and linking any settlement to state restoration and arms control. The political track exists, but it is not yet capable of changing the structure of the conflict.

Second, an internal security transformation was reflected in the assassination of Abdulrahman Al-Shaer and its consequences. The case showed that Aden remains a test of the state's monopoly over security, and that any delay in investigation and accountability may allow assassinations to return as a tool of political and social conflict.

Third, a maritime and strategic transformation continued through the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab. Yemen is no longer read only as a domestic war theatre, but also as a maritime node in trade, energy and supply-chain security. This creates an opportunity for the government, but also tests whether it can be a partner rather than merely an object of intervention.

Fourth, an incomplete economic transformation. Economic items were few, but the issues that appeared - revenues, salaries, teachers' demands and public services - confirm that the economy is the daily legitimacy test for the government. The absence of regular economic indicators weakens the ability to assess the crisis and its direction.

Fifth, a humanitarian transformation from a crisis of needs to a crisis of protection. Detainees, detained UN and humanitarian staff, journalists, health decline and food insecurity make the humanitarian file part of politics, negotiation and legitimacy, not a separate relief file.

What April's Indicators Mean for Decision-Makers

April's indicators mean that Yemen has not left the zone of complexity. It is moving within three simultaneous circles: a political track without breakthrough, a fragile security track, and a deteriorating humanitarian track. The economy remains present as a pressure factor even when it is weakly represented in monitoring.

They also mean that any political settlement not connected to clear security arrangements will remain vulnerable to failure. Arms, assassinations, armed formations and the absence of the state's monopoly of force can dismantle any political agreement before it becomes reality.

They further mean that the government needs to transform the Red Sea file from an international concern into a matter of sovereignty and partnership. If maritime security remains outside state capacity, Yemen may become a file managed externally rather than a state that co-manages it.

Humanitarian indicators also show that detainees, journalists, humanitarian workers and hunger are no longer secondary issues. They have become part of how parties gain or lose legitimacy.

Rising Risks

First risk: the continuation of political stalemate and its transformation into long-term crisis management instead of producing an implementable settlement.

Second risk: the return of assassinations in Aden and liberated areas as political and security pressure tools, weakening public confidence in the state.

Third risk: the internationalization of Red Sea security in a way that bypasses Yemeni institutions if the government does not present a clear vision and capabilities.

Fourth risk: declining social stability due to salaries, services and weak economic performance, especially amid the absence of regular economic monitoring.

Fifth risk: worsening humanitarian conditions amid funding shortages, access restrictions, and the detention of humanitarian workers and journalists.

Available Opportunities

First opportunity: using international attention to the Red Sea to build practical partnerships that support the Yemeni Coast Guard, ports and maritime intelligence.

Second opportunity: turning the assassination file into a serious test of transparency and accountability, thereby restoring trust in security and judicial institutions.

Third opportunity: making the restructuring of military and security formations a genuine entry point to restore the state's monopoly of force, not merely an administrative measure.

Fourth opportunity: developing a monthly economic indicator for salaries, prices, revenues, fuel and services, linking monitoring to social stability.

Fifth opportunity: making detainees, humanitarian workers and journalists a fixed priority in any negotiation or diplomatic track.

Possible Scenarios

Scenario One: Controlled stalemate. Probability: High. UN and international contacts continue without a comprehensive agreement, while the political file remains open but without decisive breakthrough.

Scenario Two: Limited partial understandings. Probability: Medium. Understandings may emerge on detainees, de-escalation or humanitarian arrangements, but they will not amount to a comprehensive political settlement.

Scenario Three: Internal security escalation. Probability: Medium. Lack of clear results in assassination and disorder cases may generate further tension in Aden and liberated areas.

Scenario Four: Accelerated humanitarian deterioration. Probability: Medium to High. Funding shortages, access restrictions and growing hunger may push the humanitarian situation into a more dangerous phase in the coming months.

Recommendations for Decision-Makers

1. Turn monthly monitoring into a practical early-warning tool, not merely a record of what happened, by linking every indicator to a risk level and an executable recommendation.

2. Unify the political message toward the UN track, combining openness to settlement with adherence to state references and arms control.
3. Treat assassinations as an internal national-security issue, accelerate investigations and publish transparent results to prevent impunity.
4. Build a specialized Yemeni unit for Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab security, linking the government with the Coast Guard, ports, intelligence and international partners.
5. Accelerate the integration and restructuring of military and security formations under the Ministries of Defense and Interior.
6. Develop a monthly economic indicator covering salaries, prices, fuel, revenues, services and livelihood-related protests.
7. Make detainees, journalists and humanitarian workers a fixed political and humanitarian priority in any negotiation track.
8. Increase coordination with international organizations to document restrictions and violations, and link assistance to access and protection guarantees.

Concluding Situation Assessment

April 2026 indicates that Yemen is entering a more complex phase, not because of one single event, but because several tracks are accumulating at the same time: a political track without clear breakthrough, a fragile security track, a deteriorating humanitarian track and an economic track that is under-monitored despite its seriousness.

Although UN and international activity shows continued attention to Yemen, lack of trust among the parties, disagreement over how to describe the Houthis, the multiplicity of local actors and the state's weak monopoly of force all mean that any future settlement will require a more comprehensive approach.

The bottom line for decision-makers is clear: political settlement will not succeed without security; security will not stabilize without an economy; the economy will not recover without institutions; and institutions will not regain legitimacy without serious humanitarian and rights action.

Early-Warning and Strategic Impact Matrix

Indicator	Risk level	Trend	Meaning	Suggested response
Political track	High	Persistent	Crisis management without decisive breakthrough	Unify government position and clarify settlement conditions
Red Sea security	High	Rising	Yemen is central to trade and energy security	Build a Yemeni-international maritime strategy
Al-Shaer assassination	High	Rising	A test of state security authority	Transparent investigation and accountability
Force restructuring	Med-High	Persistent	Opportunity to restore monopoly of force	Accelerate integration under defense and interior
Humanitarian crisis	High	Rising	Funding shortages and restrictions deepen the crisis	Increase funding and guarantee access
Detainees and journalists	High	Persistent	Pressure file on any settlement	Make it an urgent negotiation priority
Weak economic monitoring	Medium	Persistent	Data gaps weaken crisis assessment	Create a monthly economic indicator

The matrix shows that the most influential issues are not necessarily the most numerous, but those most closely connected to the future of the state, maritime security, government legitimacy and the condition of civilians and detainees.