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Situation Assessment

One Month into Operation Dawn of Yemen:
Military Developments, the Limits of External Support, and the Course of the War

olitical Analysis Unit

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Executive Summary

Operation Dawn of Yemen halted the Houthis' advance towards establishing full control over Bab al-Mandab. It also prevented Houthis to fully seize Taiz city and contained the threat to the roads leading to Aden. These are significant defensive achievements, but they leave the government and its allies facing the more difficult task of consolidating gains and restoring the state's capacity to govern. As of 5 November 2026, access routes to Taiz remained restricted, control of the area around the strait was incomplete. Houthis also continued to launch attacks inside Yemen and against Saudi Arabia, despite the intensity of the military strikes against them.

The operation led to uneven results, with advances in Al-Jawf and Marib but slow progress along the coast and in the highlands surrounding Taiz and Lahj. This disparity exposed the effects of terrain and weak coordination among government formations. The government needs an effective command structure capable of coordinating resources together in a plan implemented simultaneously across the fronts. The Houthis, meanwhile, benefit from centralized decision-making and the ability to shift pressure from one front to another. Taiz remains the most urgent test: its continued siege drains both residents and forces even while the city remains in government hands.

Saudi Arabia expanded its support network through the participation of Pakistan and Türkiye and closer coordination with Egypt and its Western partners. Defensive and intelligence support, however, did not develop into a broad Western offensive intervention. Iran, meanwhile, combined support for Houthi escalation with offers of mediation, while the group's own interests within Yemen remain an important driver of conflict to continue even if the regional confrontation subsides. Taken together, these factors point to prolonged attrition. The government can limit it by unifying military decision-making, lifting the siege, improving services and salary payments, and addressing differences within its own camp and with its allies.

I. The Operation's Context and Objectives

Dawn of Yemen was launched after the collapse of the de-escalation arrangements rooted in the April 2022 truce. The US and Israeli confrontation with Iran, which had continued since late February 2026, also push Tehran to use its regional influence to ease the pressure on itself. Yemen's position at Bab al-Mandab enabled the Houthis to intensify pressure on maritime traffic and energy flows. They also link their front to the confrontation around the Strait of Hormuz[1].

The Houthis resumed maritime and missile attacks in July and August. On 3 September, they launched a large-scale ground offensive. They exploited the confusion surrounding the reorganization of southern and coastal forces earlier in the year, following the UAE's removal from Yemen, as well as communications jamming and the transmission of false withdrawal orders supervised by Iranian and Hezbollah experts[2]. Between 3 and 11 September, the group captured Hays and Al-Khawkhah, followed by Mawza, Al-Wazi'iyah, Mocha, Dhubab, and Al-Umari Camp, and reached Mayyun Island. At the same time, Houthi forces made gains in southern and western rural Taiz and cut the road to Aden. As a result, threat to maritime traffic and the siege of Taiz became a part a single crisis.

The government and Saudi Arabia initially responded with intensive airstrikes. Between 11 and 25 September, they targeted Mocha, Jabal al-Nar, and the western coast. Their aim was to disrupt Houthi reinforcements and prevent the fortification of newly captured positions in what became known as a "kill box"[3]. On 26 September, Presidential Leadership Council Chairman Rashad al-Alimi announced a general mobilization involving around 100,000 fighters. He offered amnesty to Houthis who laid down their arms. At the same time, Saudi Arabia held meetings with Egypt, the UAE, and the United States to secure political, intelligence, and logistical support.

On the evening of 4 October, al-Alimi announced the operation's launch, with strikes beginning at dawn the following day. The leadership set two main objectives: restoring state institutions and ending the Houthi coup. Defense Minister Taher al-Aqili announced a six-phase plan. The first phase focused on degrading military capabilities, securing Bab al-Mandab and the coast, and lifting the siege of Taiz. One hundred fighter aircraft participated in the opening phase, and the coalition command announced the destruction of 324 military targets in the first hours[4].

The scale of these objectives created major challenges for implementation from the outset. Protecting the strait and halting the advance toward Aden required an immediate response, while lifting the siege of Taiz and retaking mountainous areas required longer operations. The campaign's success thus depended on its ability to connect these tasks while preparing for Houthi attacks deep inside Saudi Arabia and against the internationally recognized government's rear-area camps.

II. Battlefield Results

By 5 November, one month after the announcement of Dawn of Yemen, the Yemeni army announced that it had conducted more than 40,000 targeting operations. It also reported that more than 20,000 Houthi personnel had been killed, wounded, or captured. These figures reflect the scale and sustained intensity of the firepower employed[5].

The total includes several forms of military engagement. These range from fighter aircraft and reconnaissance and attack drone strikes to field artillery and multiple-launch rocket fire. It also includes ground raids, as well as airstrikes and strategic missile strikes deep inside Houthi-held territory.

The parties to the conflict have reported different figures. The Houthi spokesperson put the number of raids, airstrikes, and missile strikes deep inside Houthi-held areas at 3,939. Yemen's Ministry of Defense, meanwhile, estimated that more than 5,000 vehicles, launch platforms, and military and production sites had been disabled. These estimates came amid continued funerals and recruitment drives in areas under Houthi control[6].

The campaign inflicted losses on the Houthis. However, their continued long-range attacks and fighting on multiple fronts show that they retain significant military capabilities. By 5 November, the battlefield results had yet to match the declared scale of the targeting operations. The ability to consolidate control and maintain supply lines remains a more reliable measure of the strikes' impact than the cumulative daily figures.

The Western Coast and Bab al-Mandab

Between 5 and 9 October, the Giants Brigades and the Nation's Shield Forces advanced from Kahbub. They recaptured part of the Bab al-Mandab coastline and Dhubab Airport. Saudi airstrikes and naval bombardment supported the advance. The strikes targeted storage sites for explosive-laden boats and mines, as well as naval bases in Hodeida. These operations reduced Houthi control over the entrance to the strait, but did not secure the entire area[7].

The northward advance stalled south of Dhubab and around Al-Umari Camp in the face of fortifications, mines, snipers, and attack drones, while force concentration areas in Ras al-Arah came under bombardment. Houthi pockets remained at Al-Urdi and Shi'b al-Jinn camps and on Mayyun as of 5 November, receiving supplies by boat and drone. The coastal gains therefore remained vulnerable to attrition as long as the group retained positions and supply routes around the strait.

Al-Jawf and Marib

Al-Jawf witnessed the government's most significant ground advance toward the end of the reporting period. On 3 and 4 November, the newly trained First and Third Emergency Divisions, alongside army units and supported by drones, fighter aircraft, and helicopters, captured the Al-Duhayda mountains and nearby positions and approached the southeastern outskirts of Al-Hazm. The advance brought Houthi supply routes within firing range. In Marib, government forces captured the Thamad, Al-Qaymah, and Al-Muqaylat mountains and advanced towards Umm Rish. They also made further advances in Wadi Halhalan on 4 and 5 November. Fighting continued in Sirwah, Madghal, and Raghwan. However, progress towards Mas Camp, one of the largest Yemeni military camps in the northeast, remained slow. Al-Labnat Camp in Al-Jawf, parts of which are held by government forces, is another major camp in this area.

Al-Jawf's connections with Saada, Sanaa, and Marib give these gains a significance beyond the positions recaptured. They nevertheless require consolidation and resupply sufficient to sustain the advance toward Al-Hazm. A field account[8] indicates that two of the city's defensive lines have been breached, while a third remains intact. It also reports that the Houthis have used delays in the advance to build alternative defensive positions. The value of this breakthrough will therefore depend on the government's ability to hold its positions and build on these gains before the Houthis recover their balance.

Lahj and the Roads to Aden

The Lahj axis became one of the most dangerous fronts after the Houthis completed their capture of Al-Turbah on 6 October and then advanced toward Al-Maqatirah and Hayjat al-Abd. This threatened the Taiz–Aden road and increased pressure on the interim capital while the government's main effort was focused on Bab al-Mandab.

The government sent reinforcements from the Giants Brigades, Nation's Shield Forces, National Resistance, and Al-Subayhah fighters. On 3 and 4 November, they recaptured parts of Jabal Irf and Al-Sab' Ruqud before repelling flanking attempts in Al-Muhawalah and Al-Barhanah in Al-Mudarabah wa Ras al-Arah district. They also prevented a breakthrough at Kahbub, which overlooks the coastal road and the strait[9]. Yemeni army operations along the front stretching from Al-Maqatirah to Al-Mudarabah and Kahbub helped check the Houthi advance. However, securing the routes between Taiz and Aden still depends on the outcome of battles in the highlands of Al-Maqatirah and surrounding areas. These operations also extend into Al-Shamayatayn district, where Al-Turbah, the main town of Al-Hujariyah, is located.

Taiz and the Continuing Siege

Taiz connects the central highlands with the western coast and the south, while its mountains and adjacent high ground command the roads to Lahj and Aden[10]. The Houthis therefore concentrated their offensive on its southern and western rural areas, seeking to isolate the city, consolidate their coastal gains, and threaten southern Yemen, particularly Aden, the seat of the internationally recognized government's interim capital.

Fighting intensified west of the city around Jabal Han, the old airport, and Wadi al-Dabab, extending to Al-Wazi'iyah, Maqbanah, Al-Kadhaha, and Jabal Habashi. Government forces recaptured high ground in Al-Wazi'iyah and Jabal Habashi, but these gains were insufficient to open the Taiz road or secure an advance toward the city's strategic port. They also used ambushes and surprise attacks to disrupt Houthi supplies. To the south and east, they continue to fight in Al-Misrakh, Sabir al-Mawadim, and Hayfan districts, preventing the Houthis from consolidating some gains and tightening the cordon around Taiz city. Local resistance groups have also mounted ambushes in Al-Turbah, Sami', Qadas, and Bani Yusuf.

As of 5 November, the city remained in government hands, but its connections with surrounding areas were neither normal nor stable. Shortages of food, water, fuel, and health care placed residents under mounting pressure. The Houthis benefit from a continued siege that consumes their opponents' resources even without storming the city. The government, meanwhile, needs to open roads and sustain supplies and services if Taiz's resistance is to become a lasting gain. Humanitarian access and civilian protection remain urgent obligations regardless of battlefield outcomes.

Other Fronts and Rear-Area Camps

Front lines remained relatively stable in Bayhan in Shabwa and Murays in Al-Dhalea, while the Houthis shifted strikes toward training camps and troop assembly areas. Attacks on Al-Alam Camp and a training center in Ataq on 19 October killed 73 recruits and wounded more than 200. A further 11 soldiers were killed and 60 wounded in Qa'tabah on 4 November[11]. Drone attacks also targeted Aden Airport, the area around Al-Maashiq, and Al-Rayyan Airport. Meanwhile, security agencies reported possible coordination between Al-Qaeda members and the Houthis to carry out sabotage operations in Shabwa[12].

In Saada, Hajjah, and Al-Bayda, government and coalition activity focused on striking stores and fortifications, while notables in Al-Bayda announced mobilization in support of the government. The Hajjah and Al-Bayda fronts saw limited movement at the beginning of Operation[13] Dawn of Yemen but were subsequently suspended, with sporadic clashes continuing.

III. Command and Cohesion within the Government Camp

The operation brings together several forces: the National Army, Giants Brigades, Nation's Shield Forces, National Resistance, and Emergency Forces. Each has a different organizational history and political affiliation. The Presidential Leadership Council and the National Defense Council hold the highest decision-making authority. The Ministry of Defense and General Staff are responsible for overall military planning, while Mahmoud al-Subaihi helps coordinate operations across the fronts. Despite this command structure, operations lacked the level of coordination expected given the forces and air support available. Nevertheless, the use of air power and drones, combined with field coordination with ground forces, brought significant changes to most front lines.

Units accustomed to plains, however, encountered difficulties in the mountains of Taiz, Al-Wazi'iyah, Al-Maqatirah, Al-Mudarabah, and Kahbub. Military appointments in Taiz and Lahj in early November responded to these setbacks; their effect will depend on the authority they confer and the improvements in coordination and supply they deliver. A cabinet reshuffle also affected the ministries of information, civil service, and local administration. The new ministers took their oaths of office on 4 November. The government now needs to turn these changes into better services and more effective institutions capable of functioning during wartime.

The Houthis, by contrast, benefit from centralized command under Abdulmalik al-Houthi and an operations room led by Yusuf al-Madani. According to the Yemeni government, 21 experts from Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Hezbollah are involved in managing military operations, communications, missiles, and drones. This group reportedly includes 14 Iranians and seven Lebanese deployed across six areas. The government also links their role to Iranian supervision by Abdolreza Shahlai and Ali Mohammad Rezaei. This technical support strengthens the Houthis' ability to withstand strikes and redeploy their forces. However, the extent of the group's internal cohesion and its actual losses remains unclear[14].

This centralization allows Houthis to deal with their opponents' fronts in succession. The cost to the government increases whenever agreement on priorities is delayed or supply and communications remain subject to separate arrangements. Unity in execution is therefore a prerequisite for making effective use of available forces and easing pressure on Taiz and the coast.

IV. Regional Alliances and the Limits of Their Impact

Saudi Arabia and the Cost of Defending Its Territory

Saudi Arabia bears the largest share of the burden of supporting the government through air cover and naval, financial, and logistical assistance. The Houthis seek to raise the cost of this support by attacking Saudi airports, energy facilities, and cities. From mid-July to late October, their attacks targeted at least six airports, two vessels, and oil facilities, with most occurring after the launch of Dawn of Yemen[15]. Targets included Riyadh, Dammam, Abha, Jazan, Najran, and Sharurah, the Rabigh refinery, and Aramco's headquarters in Dhahran. Attacks subsequently extended toward Mecca, Medina, Yanbu, and the Eastern Province.

The escalation peaked with the 10 October attack on King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh, which killed 13 people, including an American, and wounded more than 300. The attacks disrupted aviation and economic, political, and sporting events. Although Western estimates put Saudi Arabia's interception rate above 90 percent[16], the combined use of drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles maintained the possibility of penetrating defenses and placed pressure on interceptor stocks. Limited cross-border ground raids in Asir, Jazan, and Najran coincided with these attacks.

The substantial cost did not lead Riyadh to announce a retreat from the operation. On 5 November, the Saudi Foreign Ministry denied entering negotiations over Houthi demands for $51 billion in return for halting attacks.[17] The continuation of this position means that sustaining air defenses and support for Yemen will remain a factor shaping the war's duration and scope.

The Mecca Pact and Arab and Maritime Support

The Mecca mutual defense agreement signed by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Türkiye on 7 August provided Riyadh with a framework for expanding support. Its political and defense committee met on 5 October, coinciding with the operation's launch[18]. Pakistan supplied Aden with air defense systems, light artillery, drones, counter-drone systems, and technical advisers, and deployed air defense units inside Saudi Arabia.[19] Türkiye's parliament ratified the agreement on 4 November, while Ankara strengthened cooperation with Riyadh by supplying Akinci drones and training Saudi crews. Support under the mutual defense agreement helps meet some Saudi requirements but leaves Yemeni forces bearing the burden of ground combat.

Among Arab states, Egypt's House of Representatives voted on 26 October to authorize the president to take measures in support of Saudi Arabia. These measures could include the deployment of troops following coordination between the two countries[20]. This reflects the connection between Egypt's security and that of the Red Sea and the passage leading to the Suez Canal, although the authorization alone does not establish that a military deployment has been completed.

At sea, Saudi Arabia announced that 14 countries had completed the procedures for joining the multinational maritime defense coalition[21]. It also said that personnel were being integrated into command, operations, and intelligence functions, with Pakistan assigned the deputy commander's post[22]. By the end of the period, announcements of capability deployments and the start of missions remained a subsequent step. The value of these arrangements lies in the protection they will provide for shipping and their ability to curtail Houthi resupply. Their effect will depend on the nature of their missions, mandates, and allocated resources.

Managing Differences within the Gulf

The UAE did not participate directly in military operations during Dawn of Yemen, unlike its role in the 2015 and 2018 campaigns. This followed the southern crisis between December 2025 and January 2026, the demand for the withdrawal of Emirati forces, subsequent government military control, Aidarous al-Zubaidi's removal from the Presidential Leadership Council, and the announcement that the Southern Transitional Council's structures had been dissolved. The transfer of sponsorship of southern and coastal formations to Saudi Arabia redistributed influence within the government camp without ending differences among southern actors over how to resolve the southern question.

A meeting between Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed in late September created room to contain these differences days before Dawn of Yemen began[23]. Al-Zubaidi's appearance on 13 October, however, calling for recognition of secession and a southern state while also urging confrontation with the Houthis, showed that political differences persisted. Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman's visit to Abu Dhabi on 18 October also kept coordination channels open, without producing an evident comprehensive settlement on Yemen[24].

Nevertheless, protecting shipping and vital infrastructure gives both parties a shared interest in containing the Houthis. Turning that interest into stable support for the government requires agreement on southern representation, institutions, and resource distribution. Continued competition through local formations and networks makes unified decision-making more difficult and gives the Houthis an opportunity to exploit divisions.

Qatar and Oman retain roles in providing channels for communication and mediation. The Saudi statement issued during the Tehran visit explicitly expressed support for Qatari and Pakistani de-escalation efforts[25], while Muscat remained involved in the UN envoy's contacts. These channels become useful when they can convey specific positions and develop verifiable arrangements. Successful mediation on a regional track, however, does not automatically establish the existence of an agreement on Yemen or a Houthi willingness to make domestic concessions.

The Limits of US and European Support

The United States, Britain, and France provided defensive, intelligence, and logistical support to the Yemeni government and Saudi Arabia. However, they avoided direct offensive strikes against the Houthis inside Yemen during the first month of the operation. Washington maintained this position despite the death of an American in the attack on Riyadh airport and Saudi calls for joint strikes against Houthi missile capabilities.

This restraint is linked to the pressure the war with Iran places on US capabilities, the desire to preserve the ceasefire understanding reached with the Houthis through Omani mediation in May 2025. It is also seeking to avoid a wider regional conflict. Nevertheless, the United States accelerated ammunition deliveries and provided advisers and targeting support, while reducing nonessential embassy personnel and issuing travel warnings on 23 October. This role allows support to continue while keeping the decision on direct intervention subject to broader regional calculations.

On 20 October, Britain announced that the mission of its Typhoon aircraft was to protect Saudi cities and infrastructure. Its support also included transport, military advice, and refuelling[26]. The EU, in its statement of 2 November, condemned Houthi escalation and reaffirmed its support for the Yemeni government, Yemen's sovereignty and unity, and the UN-led process[27]. At the same time, the EU continued to call on member states to send additional warships to the Red Sea under Operation Aspides, which retains its defensive role in protecting navigation.

France also reinforced Saudi defenses with radars and equipment whose deployment began on 13 October, including systems near facilities in Yanbu[28]. Paris announced its readiness to help rehabilitate damaged facilities, while its chief of defense staff referred to some 2,000 French military personnel in the Gulf without specifying how many were deployed in Saudi Arabia[29]. The French navy continued to intercept threats to navigation under Aspides, while the possible use of Rafale aircraft was raised in line with defensive requirements.

On 22 October, the European Parliament called for the Houthis to be listed as a terrorist organization and for their financing and arms supplies to be disrupted[30]. This call increases political pressure on the group, but its practical effect depends on the adoption and implementation of binding decisions. Overall, Western support helps protect allies and sustain the campaign without committing to achieving its military objectives inside Yemen.

Iran and Mediation Efforts

Tehran combined the use of Houthi escalation to pressure Saudi Arabia with initiatives to end the war. Revolutionary Guard circles portrayed the confrontation as a means of wearing down Iran's adversaries and promoted strategies for targeting airports, oil infrastructure, and cities while keeping Aden and the south under pressure. At the same time, the Iranian Foreign Ministry denied the presence of military experts in Yemen or incitement of Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia. In contacts with Riyadh and Cairo during October, Abbas Araghchi sought to present Iran as a participant in de-escalation.

These denials conflict with the government's allegations concerning experts and military supplies. Iran benefits from the Houthis' ability to threaten Saudi Arabia and international navigation, but the group also retains its own interests in power, resources, and expansion inside Yemen. Reducing tensions between states is therefore insufficient to end the Yemeni war or guarantee that Bab al-Mandab will cease to be used as an instrument of pressure.

The four-party Tehran meeting on 26 October, involving Iran, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan, kept regional consultations open. The Saudi statement affirmed support for de-escalation and Qatari and Pakistani efforts, while Oman continued contacts linked to the UN-led process. Public announcements contained no agreement on territorial control in Yemen or its internal arrangements. The UN envoy's visit to Moscow on 28 October likewise showed that the search for international support continued, while the effect of mediation remained contingent on an implementable agreement observed by Yemeni parties and their backers.

V. The Course of the War over the Next Three Months

The course of the war will depend on several factors. These include the cohesion of the government leadership, the sustainability of military supplies, and the missile and defensive capabilities of both sides. The confrontation with Iran and the population's ability to bear the costs of war will also play important roles. Based on these factors and the results of the first month, five possible trajectories can be identified. Continued attrition remains the most likely scenario.

Continued Attrition

Under this scenario, the government and coalition retain air superiority and make limited territorial gains, while terrain, fortifications, and weak coordination impede their expansion in Taiz and along the coast. The Houthis offset some losses through recruitment and continue striking Saudi Arabia and Yemeni camps to keep the cost of war high. Continued US restraint, persistent government divisions, and Iran's desire to maintain an active front of pressure reinforce this trajectory. Signs that it is taking hold include stable front lines around Mocha and Al-Maqatirah and repeated long-range attacks without lasting changes in territorial control.

Gradual Government Advances

This trajectory assumes that the government succeeds in consolidating gains in Al-Jawf and expanding control along the coast, alongside improved access to Taiz and a decline in the Houthis' capacity to replace losses and replenish supplies. A more cohesive command, tangible results from military changes, and increasing pressure on the group's resources would support it. Tribal protests and resentment over recruitment and levies could help weaken the Houthis, but their emergence as a decisive factor remains conditional. Sustained control and reopened roads would offer stronger evidence of this trajectory than the intensity of bombardment or announcements that individual positions have been retaken.

A Houthi Breakthrough in Taiz or Lahj

A deterioration in supplies and public services, combined with weak coordination within the government camp, could allow the Houthis to tighten their siege of Taiz or expand their threat in Lahj. The loss of additional positions and the severing of roads could trigger displacement and a crisis of confidence disproportionate to the military gain. Indicators include prolonged service disruptions, rising displacement, and loss of access. Improved supplies, the recapture of commanding positions, and a reduction in disputes obstructing decision-making would weaken this trajectory.

A Wider Regional Confrontation

A large-scale attack causing substantial casualties or prolonged disruption to energy and export facilities could change US and allied calculations and prompt direct offensive intervention. The likelihood increases as the war with Iran escalates, potentially met by expanded attacks on ships or the mining of Bab al-Mandab. This would place shipping in both straits under simultaneous pressure and raise the cost of war for Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and international trade. It is a high-impact possibility that extends beyond the current scope of the fighting in Yemen.

Conditional De-escalation

Under this trajectory, accumulated costs and pressure from international powers lead to an interim agreement, brokered by Oman and the UN with regional facilitation. It would involve a Houthi withdrawal from the gains made in September and an end to cross-border attacks in return for a halt to offensive strikes and the resumption of negotiations. The difficulty lies in persuading the group to relinquish gains it paid heavily to secure while it seeks recognition of its authority and Saudi compensation. Even if an agreement is reached, its stability will remain dependent on addressing weapons, political authority, and guarantees of implementation.

VI. Priorities for the Next Phase

The government and its allies need to close the gap between available resources and battlefield results. They must also protect the population from the costs of delays. The first month's results point to four interconnected priorities.

The first priority is to unify effective command of operations, communications, and supply under the Ministry of Defense and the joint operations room. This includes addressing weak coordination among formations and adapting training and equipment to mountainous fronts so that military decisions produce cooperation measurable on the ground.

The second priority is to set clear objectives based on their impact on stability and civilian protection. Lifting the siege of Taiz and securing the road to Aden come first, alongside completing the effort to secure the coast and Mayyun and consolidating gains in Al-Jawf. Clear interim objectives would help prevent the dispersal of forces across too many fronts. They would also make it easier to measure progress through sustained territorial control and freedom of movement.

The third priority is to strengthen the protection of cities, rear-area camps, and supply facilities against missile and drone attacks. The strikes in Shabwa and Al-Dhalea exposed the risks of leaving troop concentrations vulnerable. Stronger fortifications, improved defensive capabilities, and effective counter-drone systems are therefore needed. The more careful use of costly interceptor missiles would also help sustain air defence capabilities and reduce losses.

The fourth priority is to combine diplomatic efforts with accountability measures and action to restrict external military supplies. This requires documenting the role of foreign experts, supply networks, and violations. The evidence should then be used in sanctions and accountability processes, while maritime coordination is strengthened within approved mandates. Civilian protection, humanitarian access, and the continued functioning of state institutions must also remain central priorities. Restoring the state's ability to govern is ultimately what gives military gains their value.

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