

The brutalization of terrorism in Yemen (2)

The Houthi Movement

The Seeds of Annihilation



Special File

Strategy Unit

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**Note: The researchers' reports do not necessarily reflect the point of view of
Abaad Studies and Researches Center**

Abstract

The brutalization of terrorism.. The Houthi Movement - The Seeds of Annihilation (2) is the second section of the Abaad Studies and Researches Center's release, which monitors groups of violence and weapons in Yemen and focuses on the Houthi movement, which suddenly emerged in 2004 and with arms it has reached to power only within a decade. The first section dealt with al-Qaeda, Daesh (IS) and the fragile war on terrorism.

Al-Houthi movement is based on a dual force that combines the historical legacy of the parallel regime of the republic known as «the political Hashemite» with the revolutionary Houthi movement whose ideology and methodology are derived from the Iranian Shiite ideology, and it is being supervised and trained by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards.

This file is divided into two parts: the first is a political and military study of the Houthi group and its ability to adapt in light of the current situation, and factors of its steadfastness and its ability to mobilize and coordinate the military action as well as the links of the movement regionally and its effects in the regional and international policies. This study presents the path of violence of the armed group and the cost of the coup.

The second part focuses on ideological aspects and the doctrinal and sectarian methodology, which were a means of control and governance under several crossing projects between a group that dreams of regaining the Imamate rule before 1962, by what is known as the political Hashemite, and an armed Houthi revolutionary movement, which is floated by Iran, and is working on the establishment of a permanent geographical scope that threatens the Gulf neighborhood.

The first part (Cost of the coup.. Postponed Reprisal) talks about the price that the Yemenis pay due to the coup and the daily bloodshed. The study examines the civilian casualties killed by Houthi in 2017 and held a comparison with the victims of 2016, bringing to an approximate number of the total civilian deaths that were killed since the coup on 21 September 2014 until the end of 2017.

The file concludes that the bloodshed targeted the social fabric and is expected to generate strife and revenge. It addresses the scenarios of either the defeat of the Houthi movement as a result of a coalition against it or the continuation of chaos and bloodshed while the movement remains in control of areas in the north making them a state that extends from south of the capital Sana'a to Saada, on the Yemeni - Saudi border.

The second chapter deals with the paths of the Houthi movement from the social, ideological, and military aspects under the title «The Paths of the Houthi Movement, the Seeds of Collapse.» The study argues that the emergence of the group with its ideology and bloody pathways that targeted Yemen and its social and political structures, its crude violations, its adoption of the idea of Imamate, the exploitation of the Peaceful Youth Revolution and the failure of attempts to urbanize the movement will bring it to its inevitable end.

The file also talks about Iran that intervened in Yemen as a strategic player through the Houthi movement and formed a smart strategy based on plans to break up and penetrate into the Yemeni society, weaken the

morale of the military forces and penetrate them, gradually expand on the ground in each war, and possess the military arms and soldiers to form an organized militia. The paper presents four scenarios for the end of the Houthi movement and its possible annihilation.

The third chapter (Stations of Houthi violence ... Houthi on the way to the end) tries to list the stages of the emergence of the Houthi movement and its relationship with Iran in its beginnings, in addition to the association of the armed group with the outdated heritage of the political Hashemite that believes in the limitation of the rule to the offspring of Hassan and Hussein.

The file talks about the group's reliance on violence against the state and the beginning of the insurgency and how Houthis based on it.

The paper also refers to the six wars fought by the group and the paths it chose after the Popular Youth Revolution, and how it reached from the rugged Maran Mountains to the capital Sana'a, and how Houthis invaded the capital. The paper monitors the relationship between the Houthis and the regime of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh.

The study goes on to discuss the paths chosen by the Houthi group during the military operations after March 2015 and so far, to monitor, at the end of the paper, the scenarios of the group on the way to its end. The fourth chapter (Terror of Iranian weapons.. power threatens the Gulf security) deals with the Iranian weapon, a threat to the security of the Gulf. It provides accurate monitoring of the Houthis' weapons, its ability to target the national security of the Arabian Peninsula, and the Gulf states that stand alongside the internationally recognized government within the Arab Coalition.

The study also links the missile and naval forces of the armed group to the quality of Iranian weapons and provides an approach to those weapons through the form, range, target, launch method and size. It finds out that there is a big similarity between these weapons and the group's missile force and booby-trapped boats. The study talks about the future of the Houthi missile force and how it reached their hands. Can Iran really be able to smuggle ballistic missiles? As the opponents of the group say, or is it already the development of local industry?!

The fifth study is titled (The killing of Saleh.. Neutralizing Russia and lifting the cover of the Houthis .. America seeks to defeat Iran in Yemen). It focuses on the international transformations towards the Houthis from the beginning of the war until the killing of the former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, and the key factors behind the transformations: the increasing humanitarian crisis in the country, targeting Saudi Arabia with missiles that reached in Riyadh, the state of discontent with Iran, and the brutal killing of the former Yemeni president (according to the American expression).

The paper focuses on the shift in the American and Russian politics, where US policy has undergone a dramatic shift since the new administration came to the White House. Yemen was the scene of the US shift in the Middle East. In 2017, Washington committed itself to supporting its allies and restoring relations that were affected during Obama's administration. The visit of James Mattis (US Secretary of Defense) to Riyadh in April 2017 and the US evidence of Iran's involvement in arming the Houthis in a military base outside Washington (December 2017) highlighted the above-mentioned shifts against Iran and the Houthis.

The United States has failed to convince the group of its plan, and the killing of former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh has affected Russia as well so it transferred its mission to Riyadh, which means less restriction on US efforts in supporting its orientation in Yemen.

According to the study, President Trump wants to achieve his electoral program through Yemen: Stopping Iranian tools, fighting al-Qaeda, restoring stability in the Middle East, stopping the deterioration of the humanitarian situation; restoring old allies' confidence including the Gulf countries after being affected; these gains will not cost America so much.

The second part of the file focuses on the intellectual and doctrinal aspects. The chapter 6 of the study (Hadawiya and Houthiya, Imamate in the offspring of Hassan and Hussein - Al-Batnin) focuses upon the heritage of the Houthi movement and asserts that it is a revival of the «brutal» practices of the imams during their rule in Yemen for centuries before the fall of the Imamate in September 1962. The study reviews the historical vision and reads the events associated with Zaidiya and the doctrine of Imam Zaid and its differences with the political Hashemite.

The study details the Hadawiya imamate in Yemen and its connection with the theory that imams should be from the offspring of Imam Ali bin Abi Talib, and how this affected the methodology of the Houthi movement and its development and paths.

Chapter Seven (The Parallel Entities of the State, the illusions of sectarian Emirates in Yemen), which concludes that any future political settlement that ensures the survival of any Houthi parallel military and administrative entity within the future Yemeni state will bear the seeds of its failure and restore the state of war in any crisis.

It also concludes that the restoration of lasting peace in Yemen necessitates the compelling of the Houthi movement to integrate into the political society and to abandon its ideological fascism, the project of imposing sectarian militarism on the society by force and the illusion of building sectarian states and parallel entities. It goes on to point out that the survival of any sectarian entity, parallel to the state, in any part of Yemen, will stimulate other emirates and doctrinal entities in other regions and that will impose threats against the internal, regional and international security. Previewing the historical background of the Zaidi- Salafi conflict in Saada, the study proves the absence of the fundamental relationship between the old conflict between imams and Wahhabiya and the new conflict.

Chapter 8 (The Revolutionary Houthi movement and the political Hashemite.. Alliance of Governance and Struggle for Survival) tries to analyze the relationship that linked the armed Houthi group in Yemen and the political Hashemite to take power after the end of the Imamate regime that ruled the northern governorates of Yemen for centuries until the establishment of the republican regime in 1962, and how the group relied on this legacy to get supporters and keep the idea that encourages the group to stay and continue in power, and the association of that with the beginnings of the group and its probable fall, and who will throw the other from board of the ship for survival.

Cost of the Coup .. Postponed Retaliation

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Introduction

The Houthi militias are taking a costly and dangerous route as they continue to commit crimes against Yemenis, and increasingly targeting civilians as long as they hold the power and the state institutions with arms.

Since September 2014, when the Houthis invaded the capital Sana'a, they deprived the Yemenites from any means of opinion expression, pursued their opponents, abolished the political and civil action, and suspended the government's responsibilities and services towards the citizens. Those opponents of Houthis, who were not killed by the militias, were placed in secret prisons under torture or in military camps prisons as human shields to be killed by the Arab Coalition aircrafts. Those who survived are suffering in another way. They are displaced or live in a severe hunger and poverty, especially after the suspension of the salaries of the government employees.

In this chapter, we try to focus on the huge humanitarian cost that resulted from the coup of the Houthi militias against the state institutions. The report, monitored by researchers of the Abaad Center for Studies and Researches, is based on field information, summarized by the Daily Monitoring Unit.

As the Abaad Center is not specialized in human rights, it will leave the access to victims for local and international human rights bodies. However, through the field information, the figures that the Abaad Center has got, might help to establish clear indicators of the current situation in Yemen and the future events.

The study of these figures and comparing them to previous ones in recent years is a reading of the future of the coup, in which the Houthi movement put its ideology and leaders in a position of reprisal by the Yemenis, including its allies, who lost their sons in wars for controlling the power by violence, chaos and arms.

This report focuses on killings, injuries and kidnappings. Although there are thousands of other abuses, but these are the most significant violations against the Yemeni society as they target the social fabric.

Houthis plant seeds of annihilation in areas under their control:

The Houthi armed group has committed thousands of violations in Yemen in 2017. According to the Daily Monitoring Unit in the Abaad Center, the Houthis killed 3110 civilians during the year, most of them in the provinces of Taiz (southwest), Ibb (center), Sanaa and Hajjah (northwest), Amran (north), al-Bayda (center) and the capital Sana'a. it is clear that these provinces are either fully under the control of the Houthis or Houthis control some of their areas.


In 2017, the Houthis killed 972 civilians and injured 706 in Taiz by missiles, rockets and sniper bullets. But the most prominent development was in the capital Sana'a, where 159 civilians were killed

and 209 wounded, most of them in December 2017. About 84 civilians were killed in the clashes between the armed group and forces loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, which ended with Saleh's death. During the year 2017, the Houthis arrested more than 1,706 citizens, most of them in cases related to the critical opinion against the Houthi actions. Most of those arrests were in the capital Sana'a, 415 civilians. The number of arrests increased in December up to 205 cases, including senior leaders in the party of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh. Although the Houthi group later released a number of those leaders because of pressure from their tribes, they are still under a house arrest in Sana'a, according to some leaders in the party.

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**Houthis killed 3110
 civilians, wounded
 1882 and kidnapped
 2721 in 2017**
 »

Table of number of civilians that Houthis killed in 2017


Governorate	Number of victims
Taiz	972
Ibb	352
Sana'a governorate	221
Hajjah	219
Amran	215
Al-Bayda	200
Capital Secretariat	159
Mareb	128
Hodeidah	126
Thamar	93
Mahweet	93
Al-Jawf	88
Shabwa	82
Lahj	82
Al-Dale	80
Total	3110



• The table includes civilians killed by land mines that Houthis planted

Injuries in 2017:

Governorate	Number of injuries
Taiz	706
Ibb	95
Sana'a	209
Hajjah	96
Amran	102
Al-Bayda	118
Capital Sana'a	236
Mareb	71
Hodeida	80
Thamar	68
Mahweet	58
Al-Jawf	43
Total	1882




- The table includes injuries with Houthi mines
- Lahj, al-Dale and Shabwa are not included because there are not cases

Kidnappings:

The kidnapped are political activists, or journalists, or government officials, or tribal sheikhs, or their sons, or even workers who are mostly from tribes, especially in the northern governorates, the center of the Houthis' influence. The kidnappings, murder and house bombings deepen fears of social fragmentation and the emergence of the phenomenon of blind revenge and the return of tribal tensions. Some areas may witness cleansing and genocide crimes due to the absence of the state.

The statistics, collected in 2017 only, show 2721 cases of kidnappings in 15 governorates, most of them in the capital Sana'a, Taiz, Ibb, Hajja, Sanaa, Shabwa, Thamar and Amran, where the tribal areas as the following table indicates:

Governorate	Number of Kidnappings
Capital Sanaa	433
Taiz	343
Ibb	295
Hajjah	274
Sana'a	195
Shabwa	170
Thamar	153
Amran	145
Al-Jawf	136
Mahweet	116
Hodeida	112
Al-Bayda	109
Lahj	98
Mareb	98
Al-Dale	44
Total	2721



There is no real data on the number of people that the Houthis abducted. Official reports indicate that the number is more than 8,000 abductees, while a study by Abaad Center in 2016 indicates that the number of abductees reached more than 12,000.

While almost 115 to 120 abductees were killed under torture, other dozens were killed when the Houthis placed them as human shields in military camps exposed to the bombing by the Arab Coalition aircrafts.

Increasing number of people killed by Houthis indicate that the number of their opponents in areas under their control is increasing or that the Houthis kill their opponents to remain alone in power

Summary:

The data show several things related to the track of the Houthi movement:

- 1 - There is an increase in the number of deaths in the provinces under the Houthis control, if we exclude the city of Taiz and some villages of the province of al-Dale and al-Bayda, which represent clashes areas or revenge by the Houthis against the population who support the popular resistance. This indicates the increasing number of the opponents of Houthis and sometimes armed conflicts in areas under the Houthis control. Especially


the defeat of Saleh, the Houthis ally in the coup, and his death on 4 December 2017, contributed to the rise in the rate of Houthi crimes as a natural result of their attempts to crush any rebellion by members of the People's Congress Party against their rule.

- 2 - The lack of Houthis popular incubator in the northern regions, considering that the deaths of thousands in cold blood will cause the loss of supporters and the increase of revengers, and the tribes which are loyal to the Houthis began to feel hostility against the Houthis as a result of the loss of their sons in wars that did not fulfill the promises of the Houthi to those tribes.
- 3 - Most of the resistance against the Houthis comes from the central regions. These regions have remained a major factor of balance throughout the previous regimes and supporting them may lead to fixing a regime or overthrowing it.
- 4 - Houthis turned against agreements with tribal leaders not to interfere in their powers in return for allowing the Houthi fighters to cross their lands. This matter repeated in al-Bayda and Ibb, and led to a vacuum in the power of the tribe, which used to be an influential factor in the state, so the revenge against the Houthis is expected.

Rates of murder since the beginning of the coup:

The death toll rises every day while Houthi militias still dominate the country. The number of victims increased in 2017, compared to 2016. The number of civilian deaths in 2016 reached about 2,466 people, while the number increased up to 3110 in 2017, which means that the Houthi movement has expanded the cycle of retaliation against it.


Increasing the number of victims in 2017 compared to 2016	
2016	2017
2466	3110



The price of the coup between 2014 - 2016

If we consider the statistics of the Monitoring Unit of the Abaad Center between 2014 and 2016 for comparison, the number of deaths reached 11,244 civilians, while the number of wounded reached 34620 civilians.

Governorate	Killed	Injuries
Capital Sana'a	257	464
Sana'a province	323	318
Amran	712	896
Taiz	2709	17388
Ibb	374	380
Al-Dale	608	1473
Aden	1317	3214
Lahj	866	1165
Abyan	357	821
Shabwa	344	380
Hodeida	328	347
Thamar	102	107
Hajjah	595	1230
Saada	178	182
Al-Jawf	431	736
Al-Bayda	431	754
Mareb	1312	4765
Totals	11244	34620



Cost of the coup since 2014 to 2017

If we add all these figures and statistics between 2014 and 2016 to the figures in 2017, the total number of civilians killed by the Houthis militias is up to 14350 Yemenis, and the number of wounded is about 36502 Yemenis. Almost half of those deaths killed in the first year of the coup.

Year	Killed	Injuries
2014-2016	11244	34620
2017	3110	1882
Total	14354	36502

Summary:

This huge human cost lost by Yemen as a result of the coup of the Houthi militias against the state will inevitably lead to social and humanitarian repercussions in the long term. Many civilians were killed by the Houthi militias, while more were killed as a natural result of recruiting sons of tribes. The tribes loyal to the Houthis lost the majority of their sons in this war. These tribes and most of Yemenis feel desire of revenge against the Houthis who led the coup and put the country in a state of political and economic collapse and social fragmentation. All this may entail future risks that may delay the security and suspend the dream of safe power transfer in the country. Stopping this war after this bloodshed has become an impossible task. Thus, the future of the Yemeni situation has two scenarios.

First Scenario: An internal community alliance with the legitimacy to defeat the coup

Second Scenario: The disintegration of Yemen and the continued control of the Houthi movement on the regions of the north and the establishment of a state that extends from the south of Sanaa to Saada, on the Yemeni-Saudi border.

The scenario of peace and reaching a political agreement with a violent bloody movement that killed thousands of Yemenis is unlikely with expectation of the return of cases of rebellion and revenge in conjunction with the remaining of chaos and violence as the Houthi model of rule and control.



Houthi Movement Paths

Seeds of annihilation

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Introduction

Within a decade, the Houthi movement was able to turn from an armed gang that led a rebellion against the Yemeni government in the Maran Mountains in 2004 to an armed militia trying to run the state. The Houthi movement is based on social, developmental, political and intellectual roots that made it return to the rule of the Yemenis after it extended from Saada mountains in the north until it took control of the capital of the Republic of Yemen on 21 September 2014. The group was able to fully control the state but the killing of their former ally Ali Abdullah Saleh (4 December 2017) proves their illusion of sole rule and domination. The Houthis hope to subjugate the densely populated northern governorates of Yemen at gunpoint. Thus, the indicators of the collapse of the Houthis military capabilities began to appear after the absence of the political and social cover, represented by Saleh and his party, the General People's Congress.

During the nineties of the last century, the Houthi movement began its activity gradually starting with demands related to the Hashimite class, accusing the authority of excluding them, in addition to regional demands for the people of Saada. Then the demands increased to become political as the movement demanded the rule of the region of Sana'a governorate, Amran, the capital Sana'a and Dhamar, including also the oil governorate of Al-Jawf in the east and Hajjah in the west with its sea port of Midi, until they demanded their right to restore the state of imams and may dream of building an empire, not only in Yemen but in the region. The Houthis justified their movements with arguments and grievances, for which the group fought six wars against the state between 2004 and 2010. When the Peaceful Youth Revolution broke out in 2011, it contained the Houthi group, in an attempt to turn it from an armed struggle into a peaceful struggle. But this did not happen, as the movement exploited the Peaceful Youth Revolution, the transitional period and the weakness of the state institutions to attack the Yemeni state and overthrow the capital as well as to impose threats against the neighboring countries and the region, which caused the intervention of the Decisive Storm, led by Saudi Arabia on 26 March 2015.

Transitional Regime Overthrow

The Peaceful Youth Revolution succeeded partially in modernizing the tribal society, while it failed in this trend with the Houthi armed movement. This is why the tribal areas fell in hands of the Houthis, along with various factors including the support from some traditional forces that are angry with the power transition, particularly the tribal and political leaders who benefited from the former regime including former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, his son and some powerful military leaders; in an attempt to benefit from the regional fears from the Arab Spring revolutions. This enabled the Houthis to obtain a sufficient logistical support to overthrow the transitional regime in Yemen militarily.

This was the real front that the Houthi movement based on in its movements, but at the same time the Houthi movement exploited real grievances that have roots in the Yemeni society (northern provinces), including:

1- Social and developmental: such as the authority's neglect of the development in the northern regions and devoting of the influence in the hands of certain political and tribal groups, prompting the Houthis to establish an entity that demands legitimate human rights of equal citizenship, distribution of wealth and paying attention to the basics of bread, health and education.

2- Political: The Houthi group is overwhelmed by the idea of the divine right of the political Hashimiyya to return to the rule of Yemen since they lost it on September 26, 1962. The Houthis used this idea in the mobilization of families

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Houthis moved under alleged justifications and grievances because of which the Houthis fought six wars against the state between 2004 and 2010. The Peaceful Youth Revolution in 2011 tried to contain the Houthi movement to change its armed struggle into a peaceful struggle but that did not happen. The Houthis exploited the peaceful revolution, the transition period and the weakness of the state's institutions to take over the Yemeni state
»

belonging to the Hashemite, which says that it is from the descendants of the sons of Ali bin Abi Talib, husband of Fatimah, daughter of Prophet Mohamed. Because of the actions of the former regime that monopolized the positions in pro-Saleh tribal areas. So many Yemenis rallied behind this

project against the state.

The citizens, in the southern and northern governorates alike, suffered from the former regime but the Houthi movement was more penetrating in the northern areas of the North where they have a solid mass of «Hashemites» who still dream of the return of the extinct imamate.

3 - Ideological: Since the revolution of September 1962, the ideological idea had two wings operating in the state. Political one that was operating deeply within the state, and an intellectual one that was concerned with the intellectual aspects through Zaidi religious schools. The Houthi idea was founded in 2004, the year in which the group became an armed movement, and began to engage ideologically with Iran and under the supervision of Hezbollah.

So all the wings of the group worked to enable the Houthi movement to control the government and transform the Republic of Yemen into a system

similar to the regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran.⁽¹⁾

Expansion in space and aborting change process

Some people who are interested in Yemen and some regional and international political decision makers believe that the situation of the Houthis in Yemen can be described as a leap and the peaceful revolution of change against the regime of Ali Abdullah Saleh in 2011 contributed to turning it into a phenomenon, an inaccurate analysis. In retaliation against his opponents who came to power, Saleh helped the armed group to control the state. Over the course of more than a decade of establishing the group and turning it into an armed group, the group managed to build a militia force based on ideological factors. The democratic openness and the absence of a governmental and regional deterrent machine contributed to the expansion of its spread. The government institutions during the



transition and before the fall were divided equally between the peaceful revolution power and pro-Ali Abdullah Saleh. Despite the economic successes of the consensus government (after the revolution), it failed to confront the Houthis by the paralyzed half of the government that was run by Saleh, who continued to control the army that remained loyal to him until his death on December 4, 2017, but after handing over arms stores to the Houthis and opening the doors for recruiting the Houthi militia following the Decisive Storm on 26 March 2015. When former President Ali Abdullah Saleh decided, after the summer war of 94, to monopolize the rule,

he went to establish a parallel army of the Yemeni National Army through what is known as the Republican Guards, whose task was to preserve only the legacy of his family. The evidence of that is the appointment of his son Ahmed to be commander of the Republican Guards, who demolished the National Army, and has monopolized the qualitative training and advanced weapons since 1997.⁽²⁾

Despite the fact that the commander of the Republican Guard held the grip on the arsenal strategic weapons of the country, especially long-range missiles, and the movement of aviation, security and intelligence and some special army units, but in a decade and a half, the regime of his father was not able to achieve the goal of establishing a full parallel army in an integrated manner. So, in 2010, Saleh began what was known as the term «reset the governance counter» to ensure continuity and the completion of building the (family) army and to succeed in handing over the power to his son.⁽³⁾

While Saleh has invested regional and international support in training and arming the new army units that he established taking advantage of the international community's concerns over terrorism. He excluded anyone suspected to be supporter of military, political or tribal leaders who reject power inheritance. The Houthis exploited this point to make a small hole through which they received a flow of money and expertise. Moreover, they penetrated into the armed forces and began to organize themselves in combat groups.

As soon as the last parliamentary elections in 2003

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As former president Ali Saleh invested the regional and international support to train his own new army, he excluded all those suspected to be supporters for military or political or tribal leaders who oppose the power inheritance
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finished with bringing one of brothers of the founder of the Houthi movement, Yahya al-Houthi, to the Parliament with a comfortable majority sought by Saleh's party, the Houthi movement began to rebel against the state.⁽⁴⁾

Thirteen years passed since the first war that was launched by the National Army, with simple capacities, against the armed Houthi movement, that began its rebellion in 2004. The first war could eliminate the nucleus of this movement as its founder Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi was at the time.

But in 2005, the great concern of Saleh was to achieve his strategic goal of inheriting the rule. Saleh saw that the continuation of war with the Houthis, will enable him to achieve that goal through eliminating two obstacles against the power inheritance. The first obstacle is the National Army. The second obstacle is the Joint Meeting Parties that includes Islah Party, Yemeni Socialist Party, the Nasserite Unionist Party and the Union of Popular Forces Party. ⁽⁵⁾

Saleh believed that dragging the first Armored Division, led by Major General Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar, and the Camp of Giant Forces, led by Major General Ali Al-Jaifee, as the largest military formations in the National Army, as well as the Islamic Islah Party into a sectarian war with the Houthis is enough to dislocate the National Army and the opposition in order to be able to fully control the rule and inherit the power. Wikileaks documents proved that «Saleh» tried to get rid of Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar in an air strike. ⁽⁶⁾

The State Swallow

Saleh launched a non-serious war with the Houthis, leaving the National Army smashed and collapsed in fighting with organized militias with obsolete and outdated weapons and ammunition. The Republican Guard, run by his son, Ahmed, remained in contact with the Houthis, After only five years, specifically in 2009, the Houthis were fighting the Saudi Army and the Yemeni Army with anti-armor, machine guns, night-vision machine guns, and modern TG2 tanks, which they

»
Saleh believed that dragging the First Armored Division, led by MG Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, and the Al-Amaliqa (Giant) Forces Camp, led by MG Ali al-Jaifi, as the biggest military camps, as well as the Islah party to a doctrinal conflict with Houthis is enough to disrupt the Army and the opposition so that he can take over the whole power and succeed it
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took over from the military camps in Saada without fighting. The Yemeni Army was fighting with a few old and worn-out tanks, most of them are T52, and soldiers with damaged weapons. Saleh used to ask the Army to withdraw in every operation they succeed to impose the siege on the Houthi fighters. Saleh believes that in six wars against the Houthis, he has achieved many interests, including the weakening of the National Army, strengthening the parallel army, and enhancing the Houthi influence to hit his political opponents, such as the Islah party.

But Saleh did not realize that the Houthis are more dangerous to his regime, and that they have a history of defiance and coup against the agreements. Only after the Houthis arrived in Harf Sufian of Amran and Bani Hushaish on the outskirts of the capital Sanaa, in the sixth war in 2009, Saleh felt that the cautious consensus with the Houthis group did not help him to penetrate the group, but helped the Houthis to penetrate his regime.

A year before the Peaceful Youth Popular Revolution, international indicators were saying that Yemen was on the verge of failure and that it was threatening the security and stability of the regional and global environment, but what some did not realize was that the ruling party, the General People's Congress, had been penetrated and controlled by lobbies that were supportive for the Houthis, even after an official report, some of its contents were published in the press during the wars with the Houthis, said that the Houthis called the ruling party as "the General Shiite Congress" in



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The Houthis believed that the Peaceful Youth Revolution that coincided with the Arab Spring will cut the road before them to take control of the state and it may destroy their growing dream to restore the Imamate rule that they lost due to the 26 September Revolution 1962

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reference to the influence of the sectarian Houthis on the party's decisions.⁽⁷⁾

Just two years before the Peaceful Youth Revolution that toppled some of the pillars of Saleh's regime in 2011, the Houthis had already swallowed part of that regime.

The Houthis realized that the Yemeni Peaceful Revolution, which came within the Arab Spring, would cut the path of their control over the state, and that it would destroy their growing dream of the return of the Imamate rule they lost after the September 26 revolution in 1962.

The Hashemite political system is aware that a system like the imam regime that ruled Yemen for centuries must return by force, although it remained effective in all frequent regimes without being hostile to the principles of the republic.

The leader of the Houthis, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, affirmed that the rule of Al al-Bayt is a divine right, as he said in his speech on the religious occasion of al-Ghadir. The characteristics of the Houthi movement became clear as an armed, racial and violent movement.⁽⁸⁾

The Peaceful Revolution hampers the strategy of weapons

Since the outbreak of confrontations between the Houthis and the state in 2004, Iran has engaged in a major logistical support for the Houthis. It has formed an intelligent strategy based on plans to break up and destroy the society, to weaken the morale of the Army and to gradually expand on the ground with each war and getting weapons to form an organized army.

Houthi's strategy in Yemen is inseparable from Iran's strategy in the region, but the Arab Spring and the Peaceful Popular Youth Revolution in Yemen have embarrassed the Houthi armed struggle and slowed down Iran's strategic plan of expansion.

Like Iran that intended to swallow such revolutions by saying that "they are an extension of the Islamic revolution," the Houthis worked on dragging the country into armed conflict to reinvigorate its political and social forces and dismantle the military structure of the army, which is already weak, so



The Political Hashemite believes that the Imamate regime through which it had ruled Yemen for centuries should be restored by force, even though it is still active in all frequented regimes without announcing hostility against the Republican regime



that they can easily control the country. This is what they did during three years of war against the Yemeni society.

In 2011, battles broke out between the Republican Guard forces loyal to the regime of Saleh and the tribal fighters in Arhab and al-Hasabah. The Houthis provided the two parties with fighters in an attempt to expand the penetration and extend the clashes. The Houthis failed to prolong the war and exhaust the warring parties, but they succeeded in the penetration as hundreds of Houthi militias joined the Republican Guard camps.

The Yemeni political factions in power and opposition went to sign the Gulf Initiative in November 2011, which included a chronic program of a peaceful political transition of power. It was difficult that the GCC Initiative includes the Houthis because they are an armed movement, not a political one, and

they also refused to hand over arms and return Saada to the state sovereignty.

According to the profit and loss calculations, strategically, the Houthis will not inherit the state as easily as they bet on them, and the failure of the scenario of their full control over the state three years after their invasion of Sanaa proves that they slowly lose the ground under their feet.

Politics, society and weapons

The Houthis have created hostile ideological and social centers during wars in Saada. However, their targeting of tribes and the Army camps, since they departed Saada, has served as a wake-up call for the new Yemeni state, the Gulf neighbors and the international sponsors of the peaceful political transition of power, led by Saudi Arabia and the United States of America.



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The Houthis could overthrow the tribal vicinity of Sana'a that was publicly loyal to Saleh, the ally of Houthis in their coup, but on December 4, 2017 Saleh discovered that the tribal force was just a big illusion and that the Houthis inherited that force and his life has become the suitable price for the Imamate alliances

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The legacy of tribe, power and party

While the Houthi conflict with the Salafis was enveloped by a sectarian conflict to seem to be an extension of the conflict between Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran, the conflict between the Houthis and Al-Ahmar family had a historical root dated back to the past decades. It was an extension of a conflict between this family and Hashid tribes and the imams who ruled Yemen for decades.

The tribes of Al-Ahmar were keen to stay for

centuries in the closest and most influential position to the regime. Their relations with the rulers of Yemen were seen as a historical sequence, beginning with a rapprochement with the rising regime, and ending with hostility and confrontation during the collapse of that regime and the emergence of another new power that they can build an alliance with.

For some people who are interested in the Yemeni issue, it is not known that when the tribe weaken and begin to integrate into the structure of the political state with each stage of transition, any conflict is considered to be as a savior breath that return the spirit back to the tribe to appear in the political scene again and become influential for the interest of one of the conflict parties, not only interactive.

The tribes joined the peaceful revolution leaving the gun behind them. Many members of the tribes were killed, so many people who used to criticize the tribe as a traditional obstacle against urbanization changed their mind and began to look to the tribe as an important part of the change process. But the Houthi movement and through the influence, in the framework of the General People's Congress, was able to manipulate the tribal paper and penetrated the tribes and experienced it well. The Houthi group found that the tribes weakness points that were manipulated by Saleh regime are still open, including poverty, illiteracy and the lack of development that represent appropriate factors to recruit tribesmen in an open war, starting with the neighboring tribe and ending with full Houthi control of the society.



The Houthis managed to bring down Sanaa in the tribal frame, which was ostensibly loyal to Saleh, Houthis ally in the coup. But on December 4 Saleh discovered that the tribal power was nothing but a big illusion and that the Houthis had inherited the tribes and that his life had become the appropriate price for the Imamate alliances.

Before that, the Houthis opened multiple fronts to fight the tribes and the state. They expelled the Salafis from Dammaj and the Jews from Saada and then chased the Yemenis and blew up their homes in an attempt to clean the northern governorates at least as a center of governance without any opposition. But they have lost international sympathy with them as a sectarian minority as they promote their movement by wildly attacking other beliefs and hitting their Salafist rivals.⁽⁹⁾ Rather, they have prosecuted those who are accused of belonging to the Buhra.⁽¹⁰⁾ Thus, the justification of the West to support them as a minority to come to power has become weak as they are unlike other minorities that always put their loyalty outside the border in return for helping them to get the power -

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After Saleh regime has become infiltrated, some influential individuals in the regime provided Houthis with logistical support, exploiting the modern weapons that were looted from the Republic Guard camps
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the matter which makes the West believes that the minorities are most keen on its interests.

In addition to taking over the governance systems, the minorities have been used against the rising political trends, some of which are based on a moderate political Islam.

The Houthi movement has become a regional and international threat, especially after it targeted neighboring countries with missiles and ships



at the oil passages in Bab al-Mandab. This is a natural result of the mistake committed by some Gulf countries that turned a blind eye to the Houthis' bulldozing of the tribe, which is the basis of the structure of the Yemeni society. Some tribal dignitaries say that this mistake is due to an unbalanced reaction because of the tribe's support for the peaceful revolution. ⁽¹¹⁾

Saleh-Houthi alliance formed a solid bloc to bring down the change process, but with that alliance the Houthis got modern weapons and bought tribal loyalties in the same way Saleh used during his reign.

Although the six wars with the Yemeni Army have given the Houthis a military experience, and taught them the art of maneuvering in negotiations, and enabled them to fight in these wars and to form a small army, in addition to breakthroughs, but the reality of expansion of the Houthi battles between 2011 and 2014 was not based on their potentiality, but on the capacities of a deeply-rooted regime. After Saleh's regime became infiltrated, its operatives managed to provide logistical support

to the Houthis, exploiting modern weapons stolen from the Republican Guard camps, Air Force stores, or camps run by Saleh's family. Saleh, who was also related to the state, provided intelligence, training and funding to some groups of violence, especially the Houthi movement, directly by himself or indirectly through powerful figures around him. He also contributed to the weakening of the state when he ordered GPC to behave as an opposition against the consensus government, not as a partner that has half of the government members.

The signs of military cooperation between the Houthis and Saleh appeared early. ⁽¹²⁾ The state founded that some deaths of Houthis have military ranks and numbers since they left Saada and launched a war on tribes and the Army forces. The Houthi group appointed military personnel who were loyal to Saleh as Houthi field leaders before the Houthis swallow the party of «Saleh» and turn those personnel into members in the Houthi militias, who contributed to the killing of their leader, Saleh. As all these factors led to the defeat of the tribal

resistance against the Houthis in Saada, Amran and Sana'a, the last of which was Arhab tribes in 2014, the same way enabled Houthis to inherit Saleh's tribal legacy what has shown Saleh, in the first clash with the Houthis in December 2017, as an old monster that lost his nails and teeth. So the first confrontation ended with Saleh defeat and killing him by one snake after four decades of dancing on the heads of snakes.

Failure and vanity

The GCC Initiative has been a slap for Houthis as it made them hanging, neither partners in the government during the transitional period, nor controller of the state. But while Saleh was handing over the power, he helped the Houthis to expand all over Saada and supported them to launch attacks on cities and camps in Saada. At the same time, al-Qaeda took over the military camps in Abyan, in the center of the country, without any resistance. The Houthis obstructed the early presidential elections in Saada constituencies in February 2012 for electing President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi. After the formation of the consensus government, in which the Houthis obtained seats indirectly through figures from the General People's Congress and the al-Haq party, under the Joint Meeting Party. The Houthis began to play the alliances game, depending upon the power of Saleh who was angry with President Hadi, who seemed to be weaker before the risks, and on the Gulf fears from the virus of revolutions. While Yemenis encouraged the Houthis to join the peaceful revolution to build a new Yemen without

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The Houthis used members of the General People's Congress party (GPC) as field leaders before the Houthis swallow Saleh's party, and those field leaders were converted to Houthi militias that killed Saleh
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wars, the international community encouraged the Houthis to engage in the National Dialogue Conference and pressed for giving them seats at the conference close to the share of Islah party, the largest opposition party against Saleh.

The Houthis did not invest this encouragement for political gains. They did not abandon their weapons and military expansion and did not participate in the UN-supervised peaceful transfer of power, which made them fail to participate officially in the consensus government and not formally participate in the conclusion ceremony of the National Dialogue Conference.

The National Dialogue Conference ⁽¹³⁾ was able to come out with a document that helps the Yemenis to build a new civil state through decentralization and federal system, and which does not allow any regional or sectarian projects to impose a reality other than the reality of the state.

The most important outcome of the National Dialogue Conference was the extension of the state's sovereignty over all regions, the

disarmament of armed militias, the prohibition of the formation of any militia and restricting the use heavy weapons to the state only.

The outputs of the national dialogue addressed the great national problems and the consequences of previous conflicts and put forward visions to prevent their recurrence. They emphasized equal citizenship and the termination of privileges and drew the characteristics of the new federal Republic of Yemen.

The federal division was a major obstacle for the Houthis and other armed groups preventing them from achieving a total control, declaring secession or a self-rule of any territory. Including Saada, the stronghold of the Houthis, with Amran, Sana'a and Dhamar, angered the Houthis because they were seeking to take over the port of Midi in the coastal governorate of Hajjah and the oil fields in the desert governorate of Al-Jawf as an integrated region to rule away from the centralization of Sanaa, before controlling it.

During three years since the coup against the state,

the Houthis fought and contributed to multiple wars, not only in the northern governorates, but even in the eastern governorates (Mareb and Al-Jawf) and the governorates of the center (Taiz and Ibb), and the southern governorates of (al-Dalea, Shabwa, Lahj and Aden) until they reached the coast of the Arabian Sea. Since their departure from the southern governorates and their defeat in Aden on July 15, 2015, the Houthis began to lose land piece by piece in parallel with the Arab Coalition move to re-establish a national army and support a national resistance of a deep social root.

The Illusion of Supremacy

Through their alliance with Saleh's legacy and his networks that he founded during 33 years in power, the Houthis managed to swallow the state and destroy its institutions, with support from Saleh himself. The Houthis found some political indicators in the influential countries, regionally and internationally, which help them reach the governance paths in Yemen without abandoning their arms or their influence that they gained in Saada, north of the country, during six wars with Saleh's regime.

Although the strategic objective of the Houthis was to control the whole Yemen and its rule, the tactical goal after the popular youth revolution that erupted against Saleh in 2011, was at least getting a quota in power, similar to what happened with Hezbollah in Lebanon, without giving up their arms. This goal enabled them to achieve the strategic goal and they swallowed up the state. They began on the ground with the invasion of the capital Sana'a;

and most of the international solutions during the consultations in Kuwait and earlier in Switzerland went in this direction.

In the short and medium term, the Houthis' control has created an additional burden on the already collapsed country. The group's coup was a new route for the future of armed and combative militias, but at the same time the coup created a new factor for the early collapse of their own state.

The armed expansion of Houthis, their mischief of the state and the overthrow of the State's institutions have created unsolved problems. Most important of those problems was the enmity with the society and tribal forces, especially in areas that have suffered a lot from their actions that included forced recruitment, kidnapping, killing or

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Through their armed expansion and the meddling of the state and controlling its institutions contributed to creating untreatable problems, the deepest one of them is the hostility with the community and its tribal powers
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displacement, exploding houses and assassinating leaders.

The Houthis' victories and the swallow of the tribes represent a different picture of the reality of the community structure, but there are things that do not change in the long run. Yemen is a tribal society and its own sons, especially in the northern north, are more loyal to the tribe than political parties. Whatever their internal political disputes, when the vision is not clear and there is an enemy threatening the tribe, they unite and return to their social structure. This is why the tribe again regains control, influence and domination!!

The state failed to assist the tribe in its urbanization through peaceful political tools. After the tribe went to the option of the peaceful revolution, the state left the tribe facing groups of armed violence.

The tribe in the northern north of the country needed only one step to complete its urbanization in order

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The state failed to help the tribes to move towards urbanization through peaceful political tools. When the tribes joined the option of the peaceful revolution in 2011, the state left it uncovered before the armed violence groups

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to build a democratic system and a civil state. The party situation greatly penetrated the tribe, this was evident in its acceptance of the peaceful change in 2011. The tribe needs special attention through education, economic development, decentralized government. The Yemeni tribe is pragmatic, close to opportunistic, in the north; a combination of pragmatism and ideology in the east, and ideological with some pragmatism in the south. So tribe in Yemen is not similar to the tribe in Pakistan and Afghanistan where the tribe is almost ideology.

The situation of the tribe in Yemen is also not similar to the situation of the tribes in Iraq, which have been entrenched in sectarianism in search for power outlets but that increased vulnerability and fragmentation, in addition to the weakness caused by the Baath regime that integrated the tribes with a national identity without securing them with a participatory or democratic system

that preserves the rights of their members as Iraqi citizens. In Yemen, any confrontation with the tribal society ends with the victory of the tribal society, even later.

Even if tribes are subjected, they will not support those who use the method of humiliation against them, because their history says that the first enemy is that who marginalize them, and the most enemies are those who try to reproduce or divide the tribes. Thus, the Houthi movement put the future of its conflict with the tribe in a losing bet. The tribe did ride on the back of the peaceful revolution to topple Saleh's rule, who the tribe felt that he marginalized it, especially after Saleh started to establish a family regime parallel to the state.

The tribe did ride on the back of the alliance between the Houthis and Saleh to overthrow the state of President Hadi after he dealt with it with disregard, that appeared clearly in the lack

of tribal representation in the National Dialogue Conference, and finally the tribe that used to be loyal to Saleh is subject to the Houthis (to save its head), and will ride on the back of any force that can enter Sana'a and overthrow the state of the Houthis in the future!

The Houthi movement sought to control the power outlets in society and the state, but the reprisals, emanating from the Yemeni blood that the Houthis shed and the wounds and scars due to their attacks on the tribes, made the Houthis the enemy who should be avenged even from those loyal tribes who paid a heavy price on illusion of living in prosperity through the Houthi movement.

Control strategies:

The strategic objective of the Houthis is part of Iran's expansion strategy in the region, and Iran does not want more than the Houthis to remain as a force that threatens the security of the Gulf and Saudi Arabia, or at least Yemen becomes a mess

that mobilizes fighters ready to invade the border. But if we assume that the Houthis are a stand-alone project, the most important goal will be the establishment of an entity and a regime that will expand in the oil regions and in places of geopolitical importance to the world.

To achieve the strategic objective, the Houthis can achieve tactical progress objectives, the most important of which are:

- 1 - Completion of the overthrow of the state, both military and civilian.
- 2 - The penetration of government institutions, civil society organizations, international organizations and media, and influence their performance.
- 3- Eliminate any factors that led to previous revolutions against the imams or against Saleh regime, whether social factor such as tribe or political factor such as parties.
- 4- Creating chaos, and regional and sectarian conflicts.



- 5 - Imposing a new political reality through military expansion.
 - 6 – Eliminating the political and sectarian opponents in areas of control and weakening their influence in the state.
 - 7 - Obtaining international sympathy with them after the intervention of the Arab Coalition
 - 8 - Targeting Saudi Arabia to satisfy Iran and to prove its existence and strength.
 - 9 - It was able to bring a strong Iranian presence in the Straits of Bab al-Mandab, and some sectors affecting internally, regionally and internationally.
 10. It exploited war to develop its military capabilities on the ground, to make a demographic change to the capital Sana'a, and to recruit as many Yemenis as possible.
 - 11 - Exploiting the repercussions of the humanitarian situation due to the war in marketing their new grievances
- The regional and international factors that the Houthis found as helpful for them:
- 1 - Gulf and Western fears of the Arab Spring and its implications on their interests.
 - 2- The Iranian-Western negotiations and the nuclear agreement.
 3. The Russian-American conflict and the race for control in the Middle East.
 - 4 - Regional and international trend to thwart the emerging political Islam.
 5. Utilizing the Western strategy of supporting minorities.
 - 6 - The focus of the major countries on events in Iraq, Syria and Egypt.
 7. Exploiting the international war on terror and the international alliance to fight Daesh as well as exploiting the West leniency with Shiite violence groups and not including them in terrorist groups.
 - 8- Exploiting the tendency of some influential countries to benefit from the Houthis as a pressure force on the Gulf neighborhood to



achieve the economic interests of selling arms and getting oil.

9 - Before the arrival of Trump to power, there were attempts by Washington to contain them to cause a break between them and Iran and its military arms such as Hezbollah. Some people in the US administration still consider the Houthis as a national group, not an armed group.

10 - Exploiting the anger of countries, governments and organizations towards the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Yemen to obtain funding for their military activities through the flow of aid from international organizations.

The future of the Houthi movement

If we want to understand the future of the Houthi movement, its focal points, opportunities and threats against it, we must provide a realistic description of the movement.

The movement that makes alliances, fights, controls, and debates is a double and modeled movement that rapidly wins and rapidly changes its positions, and relies heavily on initiative to fill the gaps, but it seems that after three years of impenetrable war, the movement suffers from a case of intransigence before falling.

By going back to the history of wars and violence and the reality of peoples who look for democracy, civilization and freedom in the world, the Houthis movement that believes in a divine right of one kind of human being to rule, and in weapons as the only means of imposing thought and power, can only be described as underdeveloped violent groups.

This indicates that this movement carries the seeds of annihilation within it. Therefore it has no future, despite the fact that it receives and holds Iranian

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A movement like the Houthis that can make alliances, fight, rule, control and negotiate is a doubled and stirred movement. It wins quickly and relocates even more quickly

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thought as a tool for expansion and hegemony. The features of the Houthi movement are indications of its end.

The most important features of the Houthi movement:

- 1- A religious ideological movement that uses ideology, history and geography.
- 2 – The violent armed movement extended in the spaces amid the chaos.
- 3 - The movement of racial superiority depends on the class differentiation in society.
- 4 - The movement gets some of its views from the influence of some external trends that have regional and international conflicts.
- 5 – The movement gets its strength from small social, political and religious alliances. It allied with the tribe and then hit them. It allied with the General People's Congress and then dropped it. It allied with the political Hashemite and may

enter the race and conflict with it in future.

- 6- It is the movement of dual references, the local reference (religious) is Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, and its regional reference (militarily) is Hezbollah and its reference internationally (politically) is Iran.
- 7- The movement jeopardizes by receiving support and funding from local, regional or international parties that have conflicting interests.
- 8- It depends, in its alliances, on tactics and changes its alliances once the plan changed.
- 9- It wins quickly and expands militarily, intellectually and economically in the areas that it controls but then loses everything quickly as well.
- 10- It exploits the weakness and absence of the state in its expansion areas and contains influential figures, chaotic organizations, armed gangs and disgruntled political and tribal figures.
- 11- It penetrates the state, parties and society to impose their presence and swallow the power and benefits from it.
- 12- Accepts that it is a political, military and

ideological tool for local, regional and international actors to achieve its strategy.

In a careful assessment of the Houthi movement, especially after the Saudi-led Decisive Storm on March 26, 2014, and after the international sanctions resolution 2216 in particular, we find that the Houthi movement loses every day its power outlets. The killing of Saleh made it without political and social cover. The Republican Guard, the solid force that the Houthi movement relies on has become fragmented. This was evident in the frequent defeats of the Houthis after the date of Saleh's death on September 4, 2017. The sanctions resolution also made the Houthis lose the international sympathy as a minority.

The Houthi movement, after losing control in the southern provinces, is about to lose the eastern and western provinces. The National Army is on the outskirts of the capital Sana'a and may enter any time to Saada or Sanaa where the Houthis dream of restoring the rule.

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After the Houthis lost southern governorates, they are about to lose the eastern and western governorates. The National Army has become on the outskirts of the capital Sana'a and it may, any time, enter Saada or Sana'a, where Houthis dream to make their state

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Houthi Movement Scenarios:

The Houthi movement began an armed sectarian movement in the mountains of Maran in Saʻada in 2004, and within a decade it became the controlling power in Sanaʻa. This puts it in one of two classifications: Either the movement is an armed front for a political movement that represents the parallel and deep system of the imams as many researchers believe that it is the armed wing of the political Hashemite, or that the movement's head has become big because of its rapid victories on the ground and its external support, specifically (Iranian support).

By reading the natural datum that accompanied the

war in Yemen, we are faced with several scenarios of the movement, all of which prove the fact that the Houthi movement, as an armed military movement, is on the path of annihilation and will end as an armed phenomenon and forever.

The expected scenarios for that end are as follows:

Scenario 1:

The defeat of the Houthi movement as a natural result of the progress of the Yemeni government forces and the resistance supported by the Arab Coalition led by Saudi Arabia, and then this movement will be dissolved with the criminalization of affiliation to it legally. This scenario is the most expected.

Scenario 2:

The military, regional and international pressure may push the Houthi movement to surrender and declare its transformation into a political party and the end of the armed movement forever. But the history of the Houthi movement does not support this scenario at all except in one case that the control of its military capabilities is organized by the political Hashemite, not by the Houthi movement, to maintain its existence.

Scenario 3:

Before the military defeat or surrender, the Houthi movement may witness internally armed conflict between the armed wing of the Houthis and the political Hashemite, especially if there is a communication between the Arab Coalition and leading figures loyal to the political Hashemite. This scenario is expected even if its success is weak, however, it is similar to the scenario of disconnection between the two parties of the coup, the Houthi movement and former president Ali Abdullah Saleh. Thus, the legitimacy led by President Hadi will be the most beneficiary.

Scenario 4:

Any international intervention may convince the Houthis to return to Saada and abandon the rule in Sanaa. Hence, Houthiya will return to its hides in a certain geographical environment to establish its influence in preparation for a new phase of conflict.

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**Before the fall militarily
or surrender, the Houthi
movement may witness
internal conflict between
the armed Houthi wing and
the political Hashemite**

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Margins:

- 1-Iran is controlled by a complex dictatorship between its democratic, sectarian but sectarian theocracy operates according to the theory of divine right run by the religious leadership. Despite the election of the president of the country, the country's administration goes to the Supreme Guide appointed by the Council of Experts, a group of powerful clerics.
- 2-Learn about the Yemeni Republican Guard 52017/12/ - Al Jazeera Net
<https://goo.gl/FxpkuQ>
- 3-In Wikileaks (07SANAA1954), most observers, including the Embassy's special intelligence center, feel that Ahmed Ali is being groomed to be the next president to succeed his father Ali Abdullah Saleh.
- 4-Yahya Al-Houthi, the Parliament Observatory <http://www.ypwatch.org/members.php?go=member&id=269&lng=en>
- 5-US Embassy cables: Saudi defense-minister explains targeting of Yemeni-rebels with air-strikes WikiLeaks document
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/08/saudi-arabia-yemen-ali-mohsen>
- 6- Previous source
- 7- The description of the (Shiite General Congress) as a sign of the Houthi infiltration into the General People's Congress, was part of a confidential report during the wars with the Houthis prepared by a committee of ministries of Awqaf, Education and others headed by Mohammad Hadi Tawaaf.
- 8- A speech delivered on October 12, 2014 by Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, for the first time declaring the principle of the state as the divine right of the Hashemites
- 9-Report by Abaad (Dammaj.. Black Hole) November 9, 2013
- 10-Since taking control of the government, the Houthis have launched a campaign of arrests against the Buhra sect, a Shi'ite minority that believes the 21st Imam has chosen to disappear while the Houthis accuse them of links to Israel. One of Buhra members was sentenced to death by a Houthi judge early in 2018.
- 11-(Balance of fire) issued by Abaad Center about the peaceful revolution 2011
- 12- Saleh and Houhtis collaboration revealed in an audio recording broadcast by Al-Jazeera in its documentary program (The Black Box) in June 2016
- 13- <http://www.ndc.ye>

Violence stations..

Houthiyya on the way to the end



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Introduction

The armed Houthi movement flows all over Yemen and occupies news headlines in international newspapers and on TV channels as a rebellious movement that seized the power and pushed the Yemeni president and his government into exile. This movement would not have had such coverage if not for two important matters: Yemen's strategic location on the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the borders of Saudi Arabia, and its association with Iran regardless the size and quality of this association, which began intellectually in the early nineties.

The armed group is based on a religious intellectual culture that based on the «Twelver» doctrine of Iran and its groups in the region. The Houthis say that their principles are derived from the Zaidi doctrine, the closest sect to the Sunnis, and Yemen has never witness a sectarian civil war, as happened in Lebanon or Iraq. The Zaidis and the Shafiiis (the Shafii sect) have been living without any differences and praying in the same Mosques without any sensitivity.

The armed group is based on an ancient political legacy of the «Hashimiyya» class, which ran the country until the establishment of the republican regime and the overthrow of the «Imamate regime» in 1962. The constitution of the country stipulates an equal citizenship that dissolved the classes and everyone became equal before the law and the constitution. A divine right in the «two bellies» in reference to the sons of Al-Hassan and Al-Hussein, sons of Fatima, daughter of Prophet Mohamed. ⁽¹⁾

The Houthis used both the political Hashimiyya and the Zaidi to build the group and lead the Houthi family to glory and power. It fought six wars against the regime of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, who later joined the Houthis after the Popular Youth Revolution in 2011 in order to topple the internationally recognized legitimate government.

This paper presents the tracks of the Houthi movement in Yemen from its establishment until the execution of former Yemeni president in December 2017, and its impact on the future of Yemen.

Intellectual foundations

In a decade, the Houthi movement was transformed from a rebel armed gang against the Yemeni government in Maran Mountains in Saada in 2004 into a political partner in the running of the state in 2014 and then into a military force that controls the state by de facto legitimacy in September 2014. The Houthi movement has social, developmental, political and intellectual roots that made it come back to rule the Yemenis after it extended from the mountains of Saada in the north until it took control of the capital of the Republic of Yemen on September 21, 2014. By the end of the year, the Houthi revolutionary committees took over seven governorates, Saada, Hajjah, Amran, Sana'a, the capital, Dhamar and Ibb.

The demands of the Houthis, on which the movement is based, grew gradually. The movement began with rational demands related to the class of the Hashemite and then regional demands related to the people of Saada, and then expanded its demands to become political to rule the region that includes the governorates of Sana'a, Amran, the

capital and Dhamar, as well as the oil governorate of Al-Jawf, in the east, and Hajjah, in the west, with its Midi port on the Red Sea. The Houthi movements increased the demands to claim the right to restore the state of imams and it may dream of an empire, not only in Yemen but in the whole region. ⁽²⁾

Zaidi controversy

The Houthis do not deny their main goal of reviving the Imamate / Caliphate in Yemen and see that the president / ruler of the country is not Hashemite but the Imam / Caliph should be Hashemite according to their belief. All their works are derived from the history of the Hashemite imams who ruled Yemen for a thousand years.

Some sources categorize the group as Shiite Twelver, but the Houthis deny this and assert that they did not turn on the Zaidi doctrine, although they agreed to meet with the Twelver in some issues such as the celebration of Ghadir and the memory of Ashura. ⁽³⁾ Mohamed Badr Al-Din Al-Houthi: «We are the core of the Zaidi faith, thought, culture and behavior, and the affiliation of Zaidi doctrine to Imam Zaid ibn Ali, peace be upon him,

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is a dynamic affiliation, not an ideological affiliation, as it is for the followers of Imam Shafi'i and imams of other doctrines. In this concept, which we have mentioned or otherwise, who claim that we turned on the Zaidi doctrine must determine the rules through which we exceeded the Zaidi doctrine and we came out of it, but with credibility and fairness.»⁽⁴⁾

Badr al-Din al-Houthi traveled to Tehran and lived there for several years. He was influenced by Khomeini and the Iranian model. He believed that it is possible to revive the Zaidi caliphate in Yemen⁽⁵⁾. Badr al-Din al-Huthi, who is a jurist of the Zaidi sect, had a great influence in shaping the track of the Houhi movement, which he regarded as the core of the Zaidis, and that the affiliation of the Zaidi to Imam Zaid ibn Ali was a dynamic rather than a sectarian one. ⁽⁶⁾

His son Hussain Badr Al-Din al-Houthi, one of the founders, went to Iran in 1986 and stayed there for 18 days. According to those who accompanied

him, he tried hard to enter Iran through Syria despite the Iranian war with Iraq. He managed to find a channel to enter and meet scholars from Iran and Iraq. His brother-in-law, Abdul-Rahim al-Hamran, who accompanied him to Iran, said: «This flag, the banner of Imam Khomeini, may not be compensated.» He even considered the joining of Badr Brigade, which was under construction, to defend the Islamic Republic of Iran in the war imposed by the former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. ⁽⁷⁾

Al-Shabab al-Mu'min (Youth Believers) and the Beginning of Rebellion

With the political pluralism after 1990, Hussein al-Houthi and his father joined a number of Zaidi leaders to establish the Al-Haq Party. Later, they withdrew from the party after the Yemeni and Saudi authorities tried to create a conflict within the party leadership. They withdrew along with a group of the most important leaders in the party.





More 3000 members also withdrew from the party after the party failed to make internal reforms⁽⁸⁾. After that, Hussein al-Houthi and al-Hamran joined the organization of Al-Shabab al-Mu'min (Youth Believers) which was formed by his brother Mohammed al-Houthi and other young people. The objective was to take care of the youth and keep them away from destructive ideas, the Wahhabi attack on the Zaidis in Yemen.⁽⁹⁾ A number of Zaidi jurists (including founders of the Al Shabab al-Mu'min) have accused the Houthis of leaving the Zaidi school and importing some of the heresies of the Twelver doctrine, or of being radical Zaidis, a charge shared by Hanabilis, who are hostile to the Houthis. ⁽¹⁰⁾

Hussein Al-Houthi completed his bachelor degree at Sana'a University. Between 1993 and 1997, he was elected as a member of the Yemeni Parliament. Hussein Badr al-Din Al-Houthi, and his father also, refused to justify Yemeni President Ali

Abdullah Saleh's war against the Socialists. But he continued to support him later in order to limit the influence of other political parties. His brother Yahya Badr al-Din al-Houthi was elected as a member of the House of Representatives in 2003 to represent the General People's Congress party (Saleh's party).

The United States launched several military campaigns after the events of 11 September 2001 and entered Afghanistan before entering Iraq. At the same time, Hussein al-Houthi returned from Iraq to Yemen because of the illness of his father's wife (the mother of Abdul Malik al-Houthi). In 2002, the Houthis raised the slogan «Allah is Greatest, Death to America, Death to Israel, Damn the Jews, Victory for Islam.» ⁽¹¹⁾

After a series of letters between Hussein al-Houthi and President Saleh, he announced the launch of the war. With simple capabilities, the Yemeni Army could suppress the organization of

the armed Houthis, which began its rebellion in 2004. The first war could destroy the nucleus of this organization and killed the founder Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi. His brother Mohamed Badr al-Din al-Houthi went to Sanaa to meet Saleh. He stayed there for two months but Saleh did not meet him. He returned to Saada where his father, «Badr al-Din al-Houthi,» began a new rebellion. After the father, the Houthis group was headed by his son Abdul Malik al-Houthi. ⁽¹²⁾

Six wars

In the first confrontation, the Yemeni government and the media launched a media war against their rival fighters, accusing them of loyalty to Hezbollah and Iran, and of seeking to restore the Imamate rule. Al-Houthi denied these charges in an open letter on 26 June of that year confirming his allegiance to the president and the republican system in which he said that the reason for the disagreement was the government's pro-US position in addition to the Saudi policy in Yemen. ⁽¹³⁾

In March 2005, a series of accusations and counter-accusations between the government, Badr al-Din al-Houthi (father of Hussein) and Abdullah al-Razami, a former member of the Parliament, both

belonging to the Al-Haq party, was launched. The opposition and the Popular Forces Union were accused of preparing to resume the rebellion, while Badr al-Din al-Houthi accused former President Ali Abdullah Saleh of not being ready to end the conflict. As a result, the second round of fighting broke out with more fierce attacks on the north and west of Saada. The fighting continued for about two months. The government announced victory and the end of hostilities in May 2005, although the Houthis extended from the Maran Mountains to the north and west of Saada.

The third round resulted from the continuation of skirmishes from the second round, which extended from late 2005 until early 2006. A new variant of tribalism emerged in these confrontations. Fighting began in the form of confrontations between pro-government tribesmen and tribal fighters supporting Houthi militants. ⁽¹⁴⁾

The area of confrontations extended to 25% of the total area of Saada governorate, which included many areas and districts, including (Sohar, Al-Safra, Al-Salem, Saqeen, Haidan and Majz) and other areas. Abdul-Malik al-Houthi was the most prominent field commander in this war.⁽¹⁵⁾ Despite



Saleh's visit to Washington in November of the same year, he asked for financial aid to combat al-Qaeda and did not ask for Washington's help to fight the insurgency in the north. In this war, the regional factor emerged and Iran began manipulating events by supervising the appointment of Abdul-Malik al-Houthi,⁽¹⁶⁾ brother of the founder of the group, as a leader, which Saleh used to seek support from the Gulf without taking real measures to weaken the movement.

At the beginning of 2006, the fighting stopped abruptly to give an opportunity for carrying out the first competitive presidential elections. This increased the certainty of many that Saleh had high coordination with the rebels, especially after Saleh appointed Yahya al-Shami, close associate of the Houthis, as governor of Saada. It seems that Saleh used the war to get money from the Gulf and the West and to cut the nails of his political foes.⁽¹⁷⁾ The war in Saada calmed down after the elections until 28 January 2007 when the Houthis killed a number of soldiers in their attack on military points. The fourth round began, and the Houthis took control of most of the Saada areas. They displaced the Jews from the governorate. The war stopped in June 2007 after a mediation by Qatar that brokered an agreement that was signed by the government and the Houthis in Doha in February 2008, but later the Houthis rejected to implement the agreement. This year the southerners escalated their discontent with Saleh's regime and the military retirees announced the formation of a peaceful southern movement. It was only weeks before the fifth war broke out in March 2008 following accusations by the authority against the Houthis of breaking the

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Doha agreement when soldiers were killed in a Houthi ambush and detonated a bomb in a mosque in Saada frequented by military personnel.

Saleh was surprised that this war in this round extended to the vicinity of the capital as clashes took place in Sufyan in Amran and Bani Hushaish in Sanaa, which made Saleh use the Republican Guard for the first time, as the Republican Guard was absent from any role in previous wars. On July 17, 2008, Saleh announced an unilateral ceasefire that coincided with the 30th anniversary of his rule, but the Houthis put Sana'a before their eyes.

The Houthis in Saada carried out kidnappings of foreigners working for international health and relief organizations. This matter led to the outbreak of the sixth war on August 11, 2009. The authorities put six conditions for the cessation of

operations, most notably the withdrawal of the Houthis from all sites and all the districts of Sana'a governorate, to deliver what they seized of civilian and military equipment, the disclosure of the fate of the kidnapped foreigners, and the cessation of sabotage. But the Houthis were rejecting any concessions in favor of the option of peace.

During this war, the Houthis attempted to divert attention from their rebellion to gain local and regional sympathy by accusing Saudi Arabia of supporting Saleh in his war against them and so they carried out an attack on the border with the Kingdom. This pushed Saudi aircrafts to intervene. The Saudi intervention restricted any movement by the Houthis despite leaking information that they obtained special weapons from the Republican Guard including RPG, night telescopes, and anti-tank guns that they used against Saudi soldiers. In the same year 2009, Yemen witnessed an important event that was the announcement of the establishment of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. This year Saleh benefited greatly from the unlimited support from the West to fight

terrorism. The event coincided with the political movement of the opposition to save the country where the National Consultation Meeting was held in Sana'a on 20 May to elect a committee to prepare for the National Dialogue Conference. The Houthis exploited the deteriorating in the country and expanded in Saada after the end of the sixth war on February 12, 2010. On January 25, 2011, hundreds of people went to the streets in Sanaa demanding changes in the government following proposals by the government to amend the Yemeni constitution to allow Saleh's son to take power. Thus, a new stage in the history of the Houthi group started.

Exploitation of the Peaceful Youth Revolution

This phase was a breath of relief for the Houthis as they began to spread more in the governorates taking advantage of the democratic glare after the fall of Saleh's regime. The Houthi movement found an appropriate opportunity to cause internal wars that weaken the state and the Houthis' opponents. After large demonstrations on February 11



demanding the departure of Saleh, the Houthis used the demonstrations to declare their peaceful involvement in the protest squares but they were moving militarily to expand more and more. They tried to control the Harf Sufyan area in Amran governorate, which they failed to take over in the sixth war in 2010. The Yemeni air force responded and killed a number of Houthis in an air strike on March 12, 2011.

On February 20, 2011, the Houthis organized demonstrations in Saada, similar to peaceful demonstrations in Sana'a to demand the regime's departure. After the massacre of Jumat al-Karama (Friday of Dignity) at Change Square in Sana'a on 18 March 2011 and the joining of Major General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar on March 21 to protest that demand the departure of Saleh, the Houthis became hostile towards the peaceful revolution. The coordination with Saleh resulted in the handover of Saada to the Houthis without confrontations on 29 March 2011 and at the same time al-Qaeda took control of camps in Abyan without fighting.

By the end of 2011, the Houthis had expanded their wars out of Saada and extended to the eastern Al-Jawf and western Hajjah resulting in many deaths and injuries and a large displacement in March 2012.

The Houthis were the most radical towards any peaceful transition. They rejected the Gulf Initiative signed by Saleh on 23 November 2011 for the transfer of power to his deputy, Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi. They also prevented the February 2012 presidential elections in most of Saada districts.⁽¹⁸⁾

On February 25, 2012, President Hadi took the power and the Houthis stepped up their combat

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operations to control the land. This year was a year of invasions in which they attempted to control the port of Midi in Hajjah and the Salafist Institute in Damaj, north of Saada. They refused to lift the sit-in camps from the Change Square in the capital Sana'a and turned peaceful sit-ins to armed sit-ins by mid-2013.⁽¹⁹⁾

On February 2, 2014, the Houthis succeeded in defeating Al al-Ahmar family in Amran and exploded their home. Al al-Ahmar were sheikhs of Hashid tribes for a long time. Sheikh of Hashid Abdullah bin Hussein al-Ahmar, who died in December 2009, was one of the most prominent figures of the regime in Sana'a, and one of the founders of the Islah party that combines tribal, political and ideological groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood.



The governorate of Amran was also a stronghold of the Hashid tribe to which the former president Ali Saleh belongs. Saleh's regime was based on tribal nerve as the army leaders were from Hashid tribe as well as the tribal leader Sheikh Abdullah bin Hussein al-Ahmar used to have an enormous political influence within the Yemeni state because of his tribal background, not because of his political position as a party leader or speaker of the House of Representatives. ⁽²⁰⁾

In spite of the fact that the Houthis totally take over Saada, where the Yemeni state was absent, and the appointment of Fares Mana'a, one of the top Yemeni arms dealers, as a governor of Saada their eyes were on the capital Sana'a in conjunction with their war against Salafis in Damaj.

Alliance with Saleh and Iranian weapons

Tensions escalated in 2013 as a result of the movements of the armed Houthis. In early February

2013, the Yemeni government announced the seizure of a cargo ship coming from Iran loaded with weapons and explosives, including anti-aircraft missiles, «Sam 2» and «Sam 3» that were en route to be downloaded secretly on the Yemeni coasts. Although the Houthis participated in the National Dialogue Conference, which was inaugurated on March 18, 2013, they continued their military operations in Saada. In August of that year, the Houthis broke into the Damaj area. ⁽²¹⁾

Yemen was politically paralyzed after the January 2014 National Dialogue Conference because the Houthis rejected the conference's outcomes document, along with Ali Abdullah Saleh. Then the alliance between Saleh and the Houthis began to emerge. A large network of «Saleh» military and tribal leaders allowed the Houthis to advance towards Sana'a. The lack of confidence among political parties conflicting over the power, and

people's discontent with the post-revolution phase that was erupted by Ali Abdullah Saleh's regime, resulted in a severe fuel and gas crisis that people suffered since March 2014.

The Houthis managed to quickly pass through the Yemeni state and tribe from the far north to the capital Sana'a in the following year. In September 2014, the collapse of the Yemeni army's resistance was almost dramatic, as some have described it. The guards of Radio Sana'a, the Cabinet and the Ministries of Health and Information handed over their positions without fighting, and even left the scene ⁽²²⁾. The Houthis arrived in Sana'a. The Houthis took control of the headquarters of the 6th and 1st Armored Division, the 4th Brigade Command of the Presidential Guard, the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, and the Moral Guidance Department, which broadcasts the state television programs, where the guards handed over those buildings without fighting.

They overthrew the government of Mohamed Salem Basindwa (the post-revolution consensus government) on September 21, 2014, and imposed a siege on the Yemeni President AbdRabbo Mansour Hadi imposing by force the signing of

the Peace and Partnership Agreement under the auspices of UN Special Envoy to Yemen Jamal Benomar. ⁽²³⁾

The well-known presence of Saleh - the old man in the Yemeni politics - at the scenes of the Houthi coup gave the connotation of the counter-revolution. As a reminder, the former president, who was ousted through the «Spring 2011», not only remained at the head of the ruling party, but was also supported by a large number of the armed forces, and helped in the military invasion of the capital, Sana'a. ⁽²⁴⁾

The Collapse of Sanaa!

The Iranians announcement that they are ruling four Arab capitals, «Sanaa, Baghdad, Beirut and Damascus,» ⁽²⁵⁾ had provoked anger among Gulf neighbors. The Houthis opened the skies for Iranian planes, and arms shipments from Tehran to the Houthis in Sanaa as well as the arrival of military experts from Iran and the southern suburb of Lebanon to help the Houthis were reported. They really have become at the center of Yemen. The outbreak of a civil war began more imminent than in the cities of Al-Bayda, Taiz, Marib and Al-Jawf, in addition to Arhab in Sana'a. People of many governorates were disappointed because of

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the weakness of the state to counter the Houthis. The community began to fear the Houthis who took control of the capital.

The Houthis have expanded throughout the country and occupied a position in the government according to the Peace and Partnership Agreement, but the Houthis banned any expression of opinion and confiscated freedoms. Activists tried to protest against the authority that came from Saada, but the Houthi repression, torture and direct targeting of any activist and his family were far greater than expected. And until January and February 2015, the situation was more miserable than ever as President Hadi and members of his government were under house arrest. President Hadi could flee to Aden in February 2015, so the Houthis escalated the confrontations that extended from the village to the city to the coast to the mountain to the valley. The Houthis have threatened Riyadh with military maneuvers on the Yemeni-Saudi borders. ⁽²⁶⁾

Ali Abdullah Saleh has been threatening President Hadi and his government who were in Aden at the

time that they will be pursued, pointing out that they will have to flee to Djibouti only ⁽²⁷⁾. The Houthi militants moved to Aden to hunt down President Hadi, who requested a military intervention from Saudi Arabia to save the country from the Houthis. On 26 March 2015, Saudi Arabia announced the leadership of a coalition of several Gulf and other Arab countries to confront the Houthis in order to restore power to the legitimate president.

The Houthis after the storm beams

The «Decisive Storm» brought the return of Yemeni President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi as the legitimate president, the surrender of the Houthis, the handover of weapons they looted from the Yemeni army, and the destruction of ballistic missiles as the main goals of the Decisive Storm. ⁽²⁸⁾

Twenty five days after the announcement of the Decisive Storm, specifically on April 21, 2015, the command of the operation announced its cessation and the beginning of Operation Restoring Hope, after the Saudi Defense Ministry announced «the



removal of all threats to the security of Saudi Arabia and neighboring countries,» and after the destruction of heavy weapons, ballistic missiles and the air force held by the Houthi militias and forces loyal to Saleh.

But that was only at the level of neutralizing military air force. As for ballistic missiles, the Houthis got more ballistic missiles with a support from Iran. The Houthis and Iranians strengthened their relations more than they were before the Decisive Storm.

The Houthis participated in Kuwait peace consultations and previous consultations in Geneva, Switzerland, but the armed group was controlling the decisions of any military moving. They rejected most of proposals made by the world countries and the United Nations. Thus, the war entered decisive turnings.

A few days before the announcement of the end of Kuwait's consultations in August 2016, the Houthis and their ally, Saleh, announced the formation of a supreme political council to govern the areas under their control. The council appointed a "rescue government." The Houthis also allowed to the House of Representatives to resume its sessions with a low quorum. They all are loyal to the former president Ali Saleh.

The Houthi-Saleh alliance continued amid quarrels and accusations of treason and complicity until they reached armed clashes by mid-2017 following the transfer of the Central Bank from Sanaa to Aden, which made the funds and supplies of war for the Houthis decrease, in addition to financial and administrative corruption within the de facto authority in Sanaa.

Since the beginning of 2017, the Houthis have applied a plan to weaken and dismantle the

remaining blocks loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, and the remaining Republican Guard brigades as well as the popularity of his party, the General People's Congress.

On the occasion of the founding of the General People's Congress on 24 August 2017, Saleh tried to restore some of balances after the Houthi bulldozing of all the institutions that he used to control in the past. But the Houthi bow was the first successive strike that ended with a costly defeat of Ali Abdullah Saleh whom the Houthis killed on December 4, 2017. Houthis after this date entered a critical stage of violence, cycles of conflict and bloodshed. This stage was characterized by a clear absence of any political cover for their movement, which reflected negatively on the military performance of Houthi fighters in the battlefields as the Houthi movement began to lose areas and leaders day after day by the end of 2017.

Houthi Movement Scenarios

Between the scenario of subjugation and surrender and the scenario of the military defeat, many other scenarios that were open to the Houthis have been lost until recently. Washington, the United Nations and the European countries are trying to pressure the Arab coalition, the Yemeni government and the Houthis to start the dialogue and find political solutions.

The Houthi movement seeks one goal, which is to rule the Yemenis by force or to be annihilated without achieving that goal. The follower of this bloody movement finds that its steps are heading to a dead end, to the collapse that the movement has borne its seeds since its inception.

Margins:

- (1) Abdul-Malik al-Houthi..Third Imam, 28 January 2015, Asharq al-Awsat
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- (2) The Abaad Center monitors the tracks of the Houthi movement in Yemen, March 26, 2015
- (3) Al-Houthi Group .. <http://www.aljazeera.net/encyclopedia/movementsandparties/2014/12/7>
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- (10) «The legitimate position of the Houthi sedition: the state's fight against the rebels is a legitimate right and it is obliged to do so by law and constitution.» Ministry of Defense.
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- (19) Houthis re-positioning in the arena of change in Sanaa and put tents along the wall of the university
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The terror of Iranian weapons..

Houthi Forces Threaten Gulf Security



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Introduction:

Iran has had several attempts to infiltrate deeply into the Yemeni society since the 1980s, but the Iran-Iraq war and Sana'a actual participation with its fighters alongside Baghdad against Tehran prompted the latter to declare the end of the war to attract a large number among young people belonging to the political Hashimite and Zaidi sect in Yemen.

As part of the cultural exchange, Iran managed to recruit its supporters who are now leaders of the Houthi movement, some of whom returned early. Some returned after the Houthis invaded Sana'a on September 21, 2014. The Iranian leaders said that Sana'a became the fourth Iranian capital in their possession after Baghdad, Damascus and Beirut.

Although the military relationship between the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and the Houthis is not visible - from a Western point of view - it was revealed after the Arab Coalition started its

operations on 26 March 2015 to restore the state and legitimacy from the Houthis who besieged the government and chased the elected president. The war exposed the danger of the Houthi arsenal of ballistic weapons and other weapons after they seized military and security weapons with the help from former Yemeni ally on military and security weapons; in addition to an arsenal of arms that came from Iran that represents a real danger to the regional and international - not only Yemen.

On December 19, residents of Riyadh heard an explosion that the Saudi authorities announced that it was their defense system as it had intercepted a ballistic missile coming from Yemen. This was not the first rocket by which the Houthis expressed their military capabilities. On November 4, 2017, the Houthis fired a ballistic missile at King Khalid Airport in Riyadh, a civilian facility that is more than 1500 km away from the Yemeni-Saudi border, indicates that these different capabilities were not within Yemen's arsenal of ballistic missiles.



The Houthis say they have developed ballistic missiles and that they also targeted the UAE capital, Abu Dhabi, the second Saudi ally in the Arab Coalition, with a cruise missile targeting the nuclear reactor of Barakah, on December 3, 2017. The UAE denied this ⁽¹⁾. The United States of America, and Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies accuse Iran of launching such missiles.

Regardless of the ability of the Houthi group to attack targets in the depth of the Kingdom or the rest of the Gulf states, the growing of Houthi force missiles despite the UN resolution 2216, which prohibits the arrival of weapons to the rebels, confirms that a greater threat still threatens the national security of the Gulf. This prompted Washington to check the remnants of a missile that was launched at Riyadh. «The missile is made in Iran and sent to the Houthis in Yemen before they fired it at the Saudi capital on November 4,” said US Ambassador to UN Nikki Haley calling on the international community to join the coalition in a

united front to counter the global Iranian threat.⁽²⁾

This paper highlights the growing capabilities of the Houthi force missiles (specifically) and its relationship with Iran, as well as giving an answer to how the strength of the Houthis reached this point! And the Iranian arms smuggling line.

Weapons of the Yemeni army before the control of Houthis

Before the Houthi invasion of the Yemeni capital of Sana'a in September 2014 and the start of flights between Tehran and Sanaa - continued until March 2015. Yemen already had an arsenal of ballistic missiles. This arsenal combines the arsenal of missiles that were owned by the southern Yemen state- the ally of Soviet Union before unification 1990 - in addition to missiles purchased by the regime of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh during his reign of power between 1978 and 2012. The ballistic missiles stockpile has been a major concern for Saudi Arabia and its Gulf Cooperation Council allies since Yemeni President Ali Abdullah

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Saleh agreed to relinquish the political power in November 2011 in return for immunity from prosecution. ⁽³⁾

One of the main objectives of the Yemeni political transition period, which began according to the Gulf Initiative, was to remove ballistic missiles stocks from the hands of the Yemeni Republican Guard, an elite military force that receives direct orders from Ali Abdullah Saleh. The Republican Guard was headed by Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh until he was isolated by new Yemeni President AbdRabbo Mansour Hadi. But even after that, the loyalty of this elite force to the family of «Saleh» remained until al-Houthis defeated the Republican Guard and killed Saleh on December 4, 2017, two days after violent clashes between allies of the coup at the center of the capital Sanaa.

When those efforts failed, the Saudis tried to destroy the ballistic missiles stockpiles by air raids when the Houthis took control of the Yemeni

capital, Sanaa, a move that was fairly effective but the war prolong enabled the Houthis to get new technologies and missiles systems they claim that they developed themselves.

«It seems that Iranian experts have helped the Houthis develop some of stored ballistic missiles to reach a larger range, but that was at the expense of the destructive capability of the missile's head, which means that firing such missiles at Gulf cities has no destructive effect, but messages of pressure and threat,» «missiles expert and informed government official said.⁽⁴⁾ «The Houthis can get Korean missiles or Chinese or Iranian-made through the smuggling routes that the Iranian Revolutionary Guards master,» he added.

The report of the Security Council ⁽⁵⁾ that depended upon survey documents of the Yemeni defense force and arms data of the countries that exported weapons to Yemen, it was found that the remaining weapons are: «(384) tanks, (572) armored vehicles,

(193) artillery, 75 jet aircraft, (2) Helicopters, (4) warships, (2) rocket launchers».

There is no real knowledge of the number of ballistic missiles, but the international survey shows that there are medium and long-range missiles, including six Scud-B missiles merged after the unification of Yemen in 1990, they were the property of the southern Yemen state, in addition to 21 Toshka missiles. It is believed that the Yemeni army has 15 Huasong-6 missiles from North Korea, and that the missile brigades have 85 barrels of a chemical substance - believed to be received from Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq - but military sources in the Yemeni army have confirmed that those barrels only contain fuel for missiles. The Houthis and Saleh have 45 Huasong-5 missiles, North Korea. These missiles were launched at the Saudi border and at the positions of the pro-legitimacy National Army in other governorates at various times.

The Houthi militants began to use anti-tank guided missiles in their operations in August 2015, as videos by Houthis showed a missile attack on a Saudi Abrams tank on Saudi border as part of the

Houthi movement's propaganda campaign on its Al-Masirah TV channel.

The missiles that appeared in many videos have characteristics similar to those of the Russian-made Konkurs 9M113 and 9M133, but each missile has a similar Iranian one. According to the data, Yemen did not import any of those missiles.

According to the United Nations team, it was noted that «TOW» missiles and their related electronic components were marked with the names of Iranian industrial companies. It was also noted that the Konkurs missiles were marked with characteristics similar to those of Russian and Iranian. It was noted that those missiles were probably subject to maintenance or repair in the Republic of Iran.

The Development of Ballistic Missiles by the Houthis

Despite the naval embargo and the complexity of the arms access to the Houthis, Tehran was able to deliver arms to the Houthis through a variety of maritime and land routes. In an interview with Breaking Defense magazine, the chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph Dunford,

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stated that Iran had not changed its aggressive behavior and that it continues to provide Houthis with cruise missiles and sophisticated equipment to target ships on the Straits of Bab al-Mandab. The Houthis have already managed to target several ships of the Arab Coalition in 2017. They also targeted an American battleship in the Red Sea three times in October 2016. ⁽⁶⁾

It is worth noting that the Houthi missile arsenal passed through different stages during the military operations between March 2015 and November 2017 as follows:

Al-Najm al-Thaqib

In May 2015, the Houthis announced a missile system called «al-Najm al-Thaqib 1 and 2» that are being launched from single and dual platforms, fixed and mobile. The Houthis said that these missiles could break the blockade that was imposed by the Arab coalition according to the

UN Resolution 2216, without further details (in the issued statement).

The range of the «Al-Najm al-Thaqib 1» is 45 km. It is equipped with a 50 kg explosive head. The length of the rocket is three meters (without fins). The Al-Najm al-Thaqib 2 has a range of 75 km. It is equipped with a explosive head that weighs 75 kg of highly explosive substance. These characteristics are similar to the Iranian «Ekab» missiles, similar also to the missiles owned by the Lebanese Hezbollah, called (Ekab 1 and Fajr 3).

Al-Sarkha (Scream)

In August 2015, the Houthis announced a 17 km range Al-Sarkha «Scream» missile, carrying a 15 kg explosive head, 2.4 meters long, with a front detonator, and a hidden rear one that could be exploded remotely.

Zelzal 1 and 2

In November 2015, the Houthis announced the



manufacture of the Zelzal-1 and Zelzal-2 missiles launchers, a type of Iranian non-guided portable missile. The Iranian Revolutionary Guards produced Zelzal missile platform during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988). The Revolutionary Guards has an experience in distributing Zelzal platforms to militias.

The Zelzal-2 technology - an alternative to the 610 mm platforms - was transferred from the original Zelzal of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards to agents such as Hezbollah. The Republican Guards also provided Hezbollah with other variants of missiles and shells produced by the Revolutionary Guards.

Al-Sumud / Ekab

In September 2016, the Houthis announced al-Sumud missile, four-meter-long and diameter 555 mm. The missile's head weighs 300 kg and the total weight of the missile is one ton, the range of the missile is 38 km, the number of shrapnel is 10,000. An Iranian missile with the same specifications was used in the Iran-Iraq war, and was used by the Iraqi Hezbollah in Falluja. It is called «Ekab» missile. According to the shape of the missile, both have a conical head and fins at the back.

Developing missiles with a larger range

In late 2015, the Houthis entered a new stage, the ballistic missiles stage, where the Houthis developed Russian ballistic missiles to reach a larger range and highly explosive capacity, but it can target nearby Saudi towns or other Yemeni cities.

Qahir-1

The stage of developing the Houthi missiles began in December 2015. The Houthis unveiled that they have Qahir-1 ballistic missile, a Sam 2, ⁽⁷⁾ which was developed and modified locally to become a two-stage surface-to-surface missile with solid and liquid fuel. It is 11 meters long and weighs two tons. It has a current range after development and modification of 250 km. ⁽⁸⁾ According to Janes'

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«TOW» missiles and their related electronic components were marked with the names of Iranian industrial companies. It was also noted that the Konkurs missiles were marked with characteristics similar to those of Russian and Iranian

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Intelligence Review the missile was based on that part of the Soviet S-75 surface-to-air missiles and (SA-2), long-range missiles in Yemen.⁽⁹⁾ (Similar to an Iranian-type «hunter»⁽¹⁰⁾

Zelzal-3

The Houthi movement announced in July 2016 the firing of a missile (Zelzal-3) into the Saudi Arabia. Some analysts classify and distinguish Zelzal missile to be similar to a short-range ballistic missile, a range of 65 km, length of 6 meters. Its head is one ton, and the number of shrapnel is 10,000.

Al-Houthi may be a substitute for the original Iranian version. Closely, it does not appear that «Zelzal-3»⁽¹¹⁾ may have been produced domestically in Yemen, or the Iranian technology has been used in producing this missile. This missile is shorter and has bigger fins while the Iranian missile can be fired from the railway platforms.

In August 2016, Iran's official news agency IRNA acknowledged that the missile Zelzal-3 was an Iranian-made. «The missile that was fired at Saudi Najran city from the Yemeni territory was Zelzal-3, owned by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards.»⁽¹²⁾

Threat against most of Saudi cities

The Houthis' ability to develop weapons has increased, even as they have been able to threaten the Saudi capital, Riyadh. The Houthis have declared what they said «post-Riyadh» phase.

Burkan-1

This threat began with the announcement of the launch of Burkan-1 in September 2016. The

Houthis claimed that they targeted the Saudi Taif city, but Saudi Arabia then announced that the missile targeted Mecca. The Houthis say it is the upgraded version of the Russian Scud-C missile. In August 2014, Iran also announced it has a missile «Nizak-2,» that it said was the development of Russian missile (Scud-C). The range of both missiles (Houthi and Iranian) is 800 km, a length of 12.5 m and diameter 88 cm. Its head weighs a half-ton with highly explosive capacity, and the total weight of the missile is up to 8 tons.

The Houthis announced that this missile was fired into King Abdulaziz Airport in Jeddah and King Fahd Air Base in October 2016.

The two missiles are similar in shape, the conical head and rear fins.

Burkan H2

The Burkan H2 missile was first launched on July

22, 2017. The Houthis announced the targeting of Yanbu oil refineries in the western part of Saudi Arabia, at an estimated distance of more than 1,200 km. This threat was the most prominent threat to oil resources and also threatens most of Saudi cities.

The missile was used to hit King Khalid Airport in Saudi Arabia's capital, Riyadh, on November 4, 2017 but was intercepted by Patriot missiles.

According to international media, the missile is very similar to Iran's Qiam-1 missiles. ⁽¹³⁾

The Houthis fired the same missile at the city of Riyadh on December 19, 2017, and said that it targeted Al Yamamah Palace where King Salman was preparing to announce the Saudi budget this year. ⁽¹⁴⁾

Cruise missile

On December 3, 2017, the Houthis announced



that they fired a «mobile winged missile» at a construction site for the «Barakah Nuclear Power Plant,» located 230 km southwest of the UAE capital, Abu Dhabi. The UAE authorities denied the arrival of any missile. The Houthis said the missile was manufactured locally. The Houthis subsequently broadcast a video tape showing the launch of a missile connected to a jet engine and booster rocket, apparently a mobile platform.⁽¹⁵⁾ The missile landed in al-Jawf governorate, north of Sanaa, and did not reach its destination, activists said.

The missile was similar to the Iranian Soumar ⁽¹⁶⁾ mobile missile, which forms an Iranian version of the Russian Raduga «Kh-55» missile. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's weapons transfer database, several «Kh- 55» missiles were smuggled into Iran through Ukraine since sixteen years.⁽¹⁷⁾ According to the Yemeni weapons data, there is no such type of missiles.

The Iranian Defense Minister launched the production of Soumar missiles in March 2015.⁽¹⁸⁾ Brigadier Hussain Dehghan said in a statement on the sidelines of a ceremony of unveiling the new missile that Soumar production based on modern technologies in navigation, propulsion and structure. He said the domestically-made missile can hit a broad range of targets in all circumstances thanks to its high tactical capabilities, long survival over the battlefield and radar-evading properties. According to the German newspaper «Die Welt»,

the first field test of the missile was conducted in January 2017. The missile reached 600 km. The maximum range of the «Kh-55» that is transferred from the «Soumar» missile is 2500 km and can reach a speed of 860 km per hour.

The UAE «Barakah» station is located about 1100 km from the nearest possible site from which the missile was launched in Yemen, which means that any Kh-55 missile, with a speed close to its top speed, needs about one hour and twenty minutes to reach its target. In addition, most of the missile's flight should be over Saudi Arabia - the main ally of the UAE in the Arab Coalition against Iranian-backed Houthis - but mobile missiles, like Kh-55, usually fly at low altitudes (nearly 100 meters above the earth surface) and are difficult to detect. It depends upon the guidance system of the missile. It is not known what type of guidance system for the apparent missile that appeared on al-Masirah TV channel. ⁽¹⁹⁾

Smart missiles (land-sea)

On October 1, 2016, the Houthis announced the targeting of a civilian vessel operating with the UAE naval forces in the Red Sea. The USS Mason was also attacked three times with the same technique. Despite the Houthis denied the attacks, the US Navy said it had intercepted the missiles before they get to the target.

A video of the missile that the Houthis fired from a seemingly mobile platform on the Red Sea coast, actually confirmed that the missile was a smart Iranian-made «Noor» missile (C802) that entered

the service in the Iranian armed forces in 1991. In its specifications, «the missile is 120 km long and 6.38 meters diameter. The length of the engine is 1.24 m, while the weight of the engine is 715 kg, of which 150 kg is related to the weight of the semi-armored warhead. The missile can fly at a rate of 0.9 Mach.» The Chinese missile has only a small amount of explosive material, estimated at 165 kg. The Noor missile is launched from mobile platforms and is guided by two «television» and «radar» methods. (The US Navy later confirmed those assumptions).

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Drones

In February 2017, the Houthi group in Yemen revealed that it had locally manufactured drones to carry out combat, reconnaissance, surveying, assessment and early warning missions. The aircraft manufactured were a model called "Hudhud", "Hudhud 1", "Al-Raqeeb", "Rased" and "Qasef-1." The most important tasks are to carry out technical and combat missions, including the role of artillery correction, monitoring and locating the enemy site and its forces and equipment and personnel, and sending information to the missile unit and artillery force and the force of support and evaluation,⁽²⁰⁾ which means that the aircraft role of combat is already suicide and target other sites. A report by the Arms Control Organization during the conflict in March 2017 noted that the unmanned aerial vehicles found in Yemen were of the type claimed by the Houthis to have been locally manufactured and called «Qasef-1», although their serial numbers and designs indicated that there is another form of a production line for Iranian drones known as «Ababil». ⁽²¹⁾ The center relied on its analysis of 7 unmanned aerial vehicles, 6 of which were captured in October 2016 by a well-known Iranian smuggling through Amman. Another one was found after an attack by the Houthis near Aden in Yemen in February 2017.

The following table 1 demonstrates the similarity of serial number of Houthi seven UAVs, either those recovered or crashed down near Aden. ⁽²²⁾

Table 1

List of serial and batch numbers on Qasef-1 UAVs recovered in Yemen

Item	Serial Number	Batch Number	Location Recovered
UAV	22-122-33	B2	Marib Governorate
UAV	22-122-34	B1	Marib Governorate
UAV	22-122-38	B4	Marib Governorate
UAV	22-122-39	A5	Aden Governorate
UAV	22-1721	B3	Marib Governorate
UAV	22-1721-0	B6	Marib Governorate
UAV	22-1722-9	B5	Marib Governorate
UAV Engine	N/A	A7	Marib Governorate

The serial numbers indicate that another plane was shot down by the Iraqi forces during the battles with the Islamic State Organization (Daesh). The UAV was used by the Al-Hashd al-Shaebi "Popular Alliance" and fell into the hands of Daesh that managed to control the plane and re-broadcast information in its interest before being shot down by Iraqi forces.

The following table displays the serial numbers of Houthi UAVs that were recovered and the Iraqi UAV that Daesh captured indicating that the source of the UAV is Iran. ⁽²³⁾

Table 2

Serial numbers of Model V10 gyroscopes observed in Iranian-manufactured UAVs

Item	Serial Number	Location Recovered
Qasef-1	1233	Marib, Yemen
Qasef-1	1768	Marib, Yemen
Qasef-1	2076	Marib, Yemen
Qasef-1	2099	Aden, Yemen
Qasef-1	2109	Marib, Yemen
Qasef-1	2216	Marib, Yemen
Qasef-1	2218	Marib, Yemen
Ababil- 3	2301	Baji, Iraq

This type of UAV is manufactured by the Iranian company for the manufacture of aircraft

«شركة صنایع هوائی سازی ایران (هسا)». The «Iranian space force» depends upon it in the manufacture of weapons. The company says that the drone «Ababil» is one of its products. ⁽²⁴⁾

Table of Houthis new weapons and similar Iranian

Weapon	Iranian identical	Length	Range	Note
ajm al-Thakeb	Ekab1	3 meters	45- 75 km	Similar to Hezbollah's missiles used in Iraq
Zelzal 1 & Zelzal2	Zelzal 1 & Zelzal2	2.5 meters	15km	Hezbollah has 100,000 missiles of this type
Qaher-1	Sayad	11meters	250 km	Modification of SA-2
Zelzal-3	Zelzal-3	6meters	300km	Iran announced it in 2017
Burkan-1	Nayzak1	12.5 meters	800km	
Sumud	Ekab 2	4 meters	30-40km	Iran Used in war with Iraq
Sea missile (smart)	Noor missile	6.38meters	120km	Similar to Chinese C802. The Houthis used it in the attack against USS Maison and UAE ship in 2016
Burkan H2	Qiam-1		1200km	Targeted Riyadh and oil Yanbo area
Winged Cruise	Suomar	12meters	1600- 2500 km	
Drone	Qasef-1	Ababil		Iran used it in Iraq

Have ballistic missiles been smuggled into Yemen?!

The United States, the Saudi-led Arab coalition and the Yemeni government accuse Iran of smuggling ballistic missiles to the Houthis in Yemen. Iran denies that ballistic missiles are coming from Tehran and says its support for the Houthis is «advisory and moral.»⁽²⁵⁾

A few months after the start of the Decisive Storm in Yemen, the Arab Coalition announced that the air raids targeted 90% of the ballistic missiles held by the Houthis. But until the end of November 2017, the Houthis continued to target Saudi areas, and the positions of the Yemeni Army and Popular Resistance.

Therefore, we are in front of open scenarios of

how ballistic missiles reached to the hands of the Houthis:

First Scenario:

Iran has officially coordinated with agents such as people within the Arab Coalition or within the United Nations crews, especially after the media circulated allegations that the Houthis acquired Chinese missiles, purchased by Iran from China, through areas where the Egyptian forces are present.⁽²⁶⁾ This scenario is impossible because of the existence of the United Nations' inspection mechanisms, which examine and check all shipments to Yemen in implementation of the Security Council Resolution (2216) that bans arms to Yemen. So it is difficult to smuggle a ballistic missile, 11-meter long, directly.

Second Scenario:

Iran has already sent ballistic missiles to the Houthis crossing the oceans and seas, until those missiles entered through the smuggling ports to Yemen without any coordination with figures in the Arab Coalition or the United Nations. But this possibility is also weak due to the large size of a single missile. This scenario can be applied to the Iranian drones as the Yemeni Army intercepted many Iranian drones en route to Sanaa during smuggling attempts through the coastal smuggling line in southern Yemen.

Third scenario:

Iran has smuggled basic materials to manufacture or develop ballistic missiles in Yemen such as

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Iran relies on smuggling weapons, including ballistic missile parts, into two groups: «Unit 400 and Unit 190» belonging to the Quds Force
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spare parts of vehicles or sensitive equipment. The Iranian weapons technology may be used for reprocessing inside Yemen, including rocket fuel and dismantled ballistic missiles. This is probably the closest scenario to reality.

Fourth Scenario:

The Houthi group had a hobby of manufacturing ballistic missiles or self-development, and this is currently impossible because of the Houthis situation.

Thus, if the third scenario is the actual scenario of Iran's smuggling of weapons, how is that?!

Unit 190

Iran relies on smuggling weapons, including ballistic missile parts, into two groups: «Unit 400 and Unit 190» belonging to the Quds Force. The latter is responsible for the smuggling of weapons and modern technologies of wars outside the borders of Iran. Since the 1980s, the Unit190 used the state's capabilities (aircrafts, ships, intelligence and politics) to its interest to form large weapons smuggling networks that include generals, security, naval and military commanders across the longitude and latitude of the geopolitical map of the Middle East.

On the internet network, there is a site called Vsquds⁽²⁷⁾ that is specialized in the operations of the Quds Force, including the smuggling of weapons to Yemen. The site refers to the «Unit190 – Unit of arms transfer». This Unit is one of the special units within the Quds Force that is responsible

for smuggling weapons to its militias and areas of conflict, including Yemen.

The site referred to the shipment of weapons (Jihan-1), which was dropped by the Yemeni government in 2012. The shipment that belongs to the Unit 190 contained 40 tons of weapons, including anti-aircraft missiles.

The Jihan arms shipment was seized in the Arabian Sea, where Iran is seeking access to Yemen by virtue of the presence of international forces fighting piracy.

US and French forces announced in 2017 that they had arrested three arms shipments coming from Iran on different dates, while the Arab Coalition has seized an arms shipment with its crew in the sea. Minister of Fisheries Fahd Kafayn said in (October 2016) that 40 Iranian ships (medium size) are trying to penetrate the territorial waters of Yemen. The Iranian contingent on Yemen uses a variety of methods to transport arms, which are shipped in the middle of goods to maintain secrecy, maximize cargo access to its destination and ensure that no link with Iran is detected if it falls into the hands of any other force. The smuggled weapons are usually concealed inside closed cages in a big container and surrounded with camouflage materials. To find out the concealed weapons, tons of cargo must be checked.

Through Unit 190, Iran relies on the shipment to be registered as a relief or humanitarian aid and can pass easily through United Nations agencies

and ports. The unit has developed advanced packaging methods that give the first impression that the goods in the containers are completely clear. It makes the shape of smuggled arms similar to the goods used for camouflage, such as milk powder, or building materials or even auto parts and household items.

Routes of smuggling

Iran has a history of arms smuggling across the oceans to its armed groups in all countries of the world. The sea route is easier and more flexible than other shipping routes, and the above-mentioned units smuggle these weapons.

We can point to two main routes of arms smuggling to the Houthis.

First Route: Through the Arabian Sea - Sultanate of Oman

In September 2016, the French Intelligence Online Service reported that Saudi Arabia was concerned about an «Iranian lobby in Oman» that would help smuggle weapons to the Houthis using the islands and the Sultanate's territory as Iranian weapons stores until they were transferred to Yemen. According to intelligence, Riyadh also believes that Muscat is turning a blind eye to the Houthi support from Dhofar, «the Omani province on the border with Yemen.» Some believe that Salalah Airport, the main city in Dhofar province and small islands in the region are routes and stores for the Iranian arms going to the Houthis as Muscat does not fully control this region, which has always been

rebellious in submission to the central authority.⁽²⁸⁾ Oman denies these reports, but it is not a requirement that the central authority in Muscat is fully aware of what is going on. One of those who tend to close coordination with Iran is General Sultan bin Mohammed al-Nu'mani, Minister of the Sultan's Palace. The bulletin claimed that al-Nu'mani belongs to one of the most prominent Omani families, and officially oversees the state security apparatus, the internal intelligence service of Oman.

Whether coordinated by Omani officials or not, the Sultanate, with its coastal strip, is a place of smuggling weapons as commercial goods through which Iran uses camouflage means and transport trucks through the Yemeni desert to the areas of the Houthis in Sanaa and Saada.

Second Route: Through Somalia to Hodeidah ports

In February 2016, the joint naval forces intercepted two sailboats manufactured by Al-Mansour, a company that manufactures sailboats and ships in the city of Konarak, Iran. Since 2012, it has smuggled heroin, cannabis and arms, as it has done recently.

According to reports from Iranian organizations, Al-Mansour is located next to the headquarters of Iran's Revolutionary Guards.

Al-Mansour's sailboats carry the logo of their company in three places on the boats, one on each side and the third on the rear of the boat, as shown

in the following figure:



The Field Investigation Team of the Arms and Conflict Research Center in the Somali city of Puntland has identified three ports frequented by sailboats to load cargo of smuggled weapons, namely the port of Bossaso, Qandala and Qoryale. According to various sources, smugglers use these ports to unload their cargo either to the local market or to reload arms to Yemen.⁽²⁹⁾

Iran was able to use a large smuggling network, owned by Ali Abdullah Saleh for smuggling weapons, coming from Latin America, across the Red Sea.

Fares Mana'a, who was appointed by the Houthis as governor of Saada, 2012-2014, and included in the UN sanctions for the smuggling of arms to Somalia, was one of the arms dealers mentioned in a Reuters' investigative report according to Brazilian court documents. The Federal prosecutors in southern Brazil charged two former executives of Forjas Taurus in May with shipping 8,000 handguns in 2013 to Fares Mohammed Hassan Mana'a, whom UN described as an arms smuggler active around the Horn of Africa for over a decade.

It is known in Latin America that Hezbollah and Iran have drug network that offer forged documents and IDs, according to many international media

outlets that have reported about that since 2009 until today.

These weapons pass from the country of origin through Africa to the Red Sea, from which arms are being transported through commercial networks, including fish companies, through sailing boats.⁽³⁰⁾

Do the Houthis build weapons?

Information is circulated about the presence of Iranian and Hezbollah experts in Yemen in order to operate the Iranian weapons technology. This may be true to some extent, but such weapons industry requires considerable manpower to build.

Informed sources - operating within a narrow frame within the armed Houthi group - leaked information on the presence of Yemeni experts in Iran, Lebanon and Pakistan for training.

According to those sources that talked to the Abaad Center⁽³¹⁾, the war wounded Houthis who leave the country for treatment in India or Egypt or other countries, go for training in Iran on re-installing ballistic missiles of basic materials or the installation of materials that do not arrive from Iran through smuggling.

Two sources told the Abaad Center that their relatives were on therapeutic trips in India and then left for Iran, then Lebanon and then Pakistan for military courses, most of which included modification or installation of missiles. Two other sources said they were involved in providing schema for constructing underground laboratories, 50 feet in deep and, steel-lined to avoid any air strike. It also has capability against any explosion, with all necessary security precautions.

Margins:

- (1) Yemen: UAE denies launching missile towards by Houthis and the Arab Coalition provides air support for Saleh
http://www.france24.com/en/20171203_03/12/2017
- (2) Washington offers remnants of a missile fired at Riyadh: An international coalition must be formed to confront Iran (14 December 2017 / CNN /
<https://arabic.cnn.com/middle-east/2017/12/14/me-141217-haley-iran>
- (3) The Gulf initiative came after a popular revolution and the authority transferred from Saleh to deputy president, Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi, who was already elected as the consensus president of Yemen in February 2012.
- (4) One of Abaad researchers interviewed with a rocket expert and a former government official who declined to be identified. The telephone interview was held on the evening of November 15, 2017
- (5) Final report of the Panel of Experts in accordance with paragraph 6 of resolution (2216) http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2017/8
- (6) CJCS Dunford Talks Turkey, Iran, Afghan Troop Numbers & Daesh/ JAMES KITFIELD/ on June 16, 2017 / <https://breakingdefense.com/2017/06/cjcs-dunford-talks-turkey-iran-afghan-troop-numbers-daesh/>
- (7) کام بلند موشکی یمن/ «سام 2» چگونه بر سعودی‌ها «قاهر» شد + تصاویر
<https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1394/10/01/949152>
- (8) What is Qaher-1 missile that Yemen developed and was fired at a Saudi base
http://ar.farsnews.com/middle_east/news/13940922001046
- (9) yemeni-s-75-sam-reportedly-back-in-action <http://www.janes.com/article/57411>
- (10) بدافند هوایی کامل‌تر شد/ شکار در ارتفاع بالا با موشک «صیاد ۲» + تصویر
<http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13930607000419>
- (11) از زلزله زلزله‌ها تا قیام سجیل‌ها/ مشهورترین موشک‌های ایرانی + عکس و مشخصات کامل
<https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1393/08/26/560022>
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Follow the margins

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- (31) Four sources, one of whom worked to take precautions for any explosion in the underground building. He said that the Houthis put a cover on his head until they arrived at the place after six hours travel and then a break in a deserted house for two hours before being transferred by a third party to the site by traveling on rough and desert roads for two hours in mid-2015. He pointed out that only those who were present at the site were the Houthi guards and 8 construction engineers. He returned to his house after two weeks of work there, which included staying in the same area that he said seems to be a large farm. Then he said they covered his head again and took him back

The killing of Saleh neutralized Russia and
lifted the cover of Houthis ..

America seeks to defeat Iran in Yemen

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Abstract:

Changes in international positions towards the Houthis are increasing according to several factors: an increase in the humanitarian crisis in Yemen; the targeting of Saudi cities with Houthi ballistic missiles that have recently reached Riyadh; the international discontent with Iran and the brutal killing of former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh (according to the American expression).

The US position has witnessed a dramatic change since the new administration came to the White House. Yemen was the scene of the US changes in the Middle East. In 2017, Washington committed itself to support its allies and return relations after being affected during the Obama administration. The visit of James Mattis, US Secretary of Defense, to Riyadh in April 2017 and the displaying of US evidence that Iran is involved in arming the Houthis in a US military base outside Washington (December 2017) highlighted the above-mentioned changes toward Iran and the Houthis.

The factors above contribute to the US push toward the liberation of Hodeidah (west of Yemen) from the Houthis after the UN efforts failed to convince the Houthi group of its plan. The killing of former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh affected Russia that announced the withdrawal of its diplomatic mission from Sana'a and the transfer of its mission to Riyadh, which means less restrictions on US efforts to go ahead in its orientation in Yemen.

The confrontation of Houthis in Yemen will achieve a lot of Trump's program, including the: stopping of Iran's tools, fighting al-Qaeda, making stability in the Middle East, stopping the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Yemen; restoring the confidence of old allies, Gulf states. These gains will be obtained without high costs.

Introduction

The new US administration has changed its way of dealing with Yemen after the increasing of the Iranian influence and terrorist groups in the country. Washington is taking advantage of these concerns for more progressive action in supporting its allies and the legitimate authority, represented by Yemeni President AbdRabbo Mansour Hadi. Yemen has been the focus of meetings of Western politicians and military figures with leaders in the Middle East, specifically the Gulf Cooperation Council countries. The meetings that US Secretary of Defense, James Mattis, held in the Gulf states in April 2017, specifically Saudi Arabia, were an announcement of the new US change. The lack of seriousness of Houthis in dealing with the peace agreements; the worsening humanitarian crisis and the arrival of ballistic missiles to Riyadh contributed to an American emphasis on the need to continue to face the Iranian threat from Yemen. Americans seem to be more convinced than ever that taking Iran out of Yemen will lead to a lasting peace in a country that has been suffering from a waging war since more than two years.

Background of the American Shift

In mid-December 2017, the United States presented in Washington for the first time Houthi missiles that were fired at Riyadh as a sufficient evidence of Iran's involvement in arming the Houthis. The evidence included charred remnants of what the Pentagon said were Iranian-made short-range

ballistic missiles fired from Yemen on November 4 at King Khalid International Airport outside the Saudi capital Riyadh as well as a drone and anti-tank weapon recovered in Yemen by the Saudis⁽¹⁾. Although the Pentagon did not say when or how the weapons were transferred to the Houthis from Tehran (which denied the evidence and said it was fabricated), US Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley expressed confidence that Tehran was responsible for transporting these weapons to the Houthis in Yemen.

"These are Iranian made, these are Iranian sent, and these were Iranian given," Haley told a news conference at a military hangar at Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling, outside Washington.

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The Pentagon said that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates provided the United States with all the remnants of weapons that were recovered. The Saudi-led military coalition, which back the internationally recognized Yemeni government, has been fighting the Houthis in Yemen's more than two-year-long civil war.

The unprecedented presentation, which Haley said based on intelligence, is part of President Donald Trump's new Iran policy, which promises a harder line toward Tehran. That would appear to include a new diplomatic initiative.

This American shift through displaying the anti-Iran evidence in a press conference was that second shift as the first one was in April 2017 when the US Secretary of Defense ended two days of talks in the Saudi capital Riyadh with senior officials

including the king, crown prince Mohammed bin Salman. The delegation that came with Mattis included correspondents from US newspapers. He told them clearly that he looks forward to ending the war in Yemen through peaceful talks sponsored by the United Nations, but during his comments with Prince Mohammed bin Salman after the meetings he told reporters that in order to reach to the peaceful talks «Iranian influence in Yemen should be countered.»

The speech of the new US administration has changed from the speech during the last years of the administration of President Barack Obama. Saudi-American relations have been strained since Riyadh has led an Arab coalition to support Yemen's legitimacy in March 2015. Although the United States has declared its support for military



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Although America wants to see an end to the civil war in Yemen, its main focus is on combating al-Qaeda extremists in southern and central Yemen

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operations with logistics and intelligence, but the US support gradually decreased sequentially or almost stopped with the cessation of arms shipments that Saudi Arabia had bought from Washington. Donald Trump returned those shipments of smart and guided bombs to be shipped back to Saudi Arabia. The United States and Saudi Arabia appear to be closely correlated according to geopolitical changes in the United States and in Yemen as well. Mattis faced pressure to stop the logistical support for the coalition in the Yemeni war - including the Congress and international organizations- by talking about training the Saudi air force to prevent mistakes against civilians.

«We are going to continue to train them how to do target identification, try to get their capabilities up in those areas. We're going to continue to work with their pilots and explain how you do bombing runs, that sort of thing,» Mattis told reporters on December 29, 2017. «Anything we can do to limit the civilian casualties, we will be doing.»⁽²⁾

This US-Saudi convergence and these steps are the result of the efforts of Mattis, who is a big opponent of Iran. In March 2017, he sent a letter to the National Security Adviser McMaster proposing to provide significant military assistance not only to Saudi Arabia but also to the UAE. What is happening is the new administration, which has seen how Tehran's continued involvement in the affairs of states in the region had bad effects.

Although America wants to see an end to the civil war in Yemen, its main focus is on combating al-Qaeda extremists in southern and central Yemen, it is its main security concern. US officials believe that the threat of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is greater than that of the Islamic state organization, which America is fighting in Iraq, Syria, Libya, Afghanistan and elsewhere. ⁽³⁾ For this reason, it needs a state that extends its influence all over Yemen to make stability and prevent al-Qaeda from exploiting war to expand the organization's influence. This cannot be achieved with the existence of the Houthis with heavy weapons because the Houthis are an «ideological» group and no less terrorist than al-Qaeda. As commander of the US Central Command in the Middle East,

Joseph Votel, said that the threat of al-Qaeda in Yemen is «four- star» compared to the Iranian threat.⁽⁴⁾

While he was in Riyadh, the US Secretary of State James Mattis said Iran continues its activities in helping the Houthis «to try to overthrow the regime in Yemen by providing military equipment, funding and training... We have intercepted weapons shipments and discovered the existence of a complex Iranian network to arm and equip the Houthis.»⁽⁵⁾ At a UN session to discuss the quadrennial reports (April 20), US Envoy Nikki Haley said that Iran continues to «arm the dissident Houthis in Yemen» and called on the UN Security Council to address the issue as a matter of priority when discussing this item.⁽⁶⁾

US gains in Yemen

The Republic of Yemen represents the appropriate place for the US Administration to prove its vision about the foreign policy with low international political and military costs through several aspects:

(A) Combating terrorism:

The assisting of the Arab coalition forces will be an unprecedented opportunity to crush al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) that is based in southern Yemen. AQAP represents a regional and international threat. The US Administration has confirmed that the Al-Qaeda organization threatens Americans at home as well as European countries, especially after Al-Qaeda attacks on American interests since the nineties of the last century.

(B) Confronting Iran:

Unlike their intervention in Syria and Iraq, the intervention of America and its allies in Yemen represents a confrontation with Iran to stop Iran's plans in Middle East that threaten the Gulf States. The intervention in Syria and Iraq collides with Russia and China, and the complexities of Iraq and the early intervention of Iran will not allow the suspension of the Iranian methodology it used with the armed militias. The situation is the same for Lebanon. Yemen is not central to Russia and China and the governments of the two countries fully support the legitimacy of the Yemeni president (Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi), but this cannot be free of some complications.

(C) Restoring old allies of America:

The instability in Yemen is a source of concern for its neighbors, who represent the United States' allies. So by ending the insecurity in Yemen that threatens regional and international security, Washington can restore the confidence of its allies

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**The Republic of Yemen
represents the appropriate
place for the US
Administration to prove its
vision about the foreign
policy with low costs**
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and alliances as the US alliances were mistrusted after the Obama's administration abandoned its agreements.

(D) No loss of American power:

US forces do not recognize the presence of special forces in Yemen, except those conducting military operations similar to the operation that targeted the village of Yakla in Al-Bayda in central Yemen on 29 January 2017,⁽⁷⁾ but it confirms the presence of military advisers either in the operating room of the Arab Coalition or through the US Central Command for the Middle East. The consolidation of the return of the Yemeni state with a strong army and with the support from the Arab coalition countries reinforces the vision of the new American administration about not sending new troops to the conflict areas.

(E) Restoring stability to Yemen sends international and regional optimism to the new American administration: This is reflected in the files that were suspended during the Barack Obama's administration. A strong US return to the region would help restore Washington's influence which has receded slightly in the Middle East under the Obama administration, which led to a disruption of balance and the emergence of new players who have fueled conflicts.

How to intervene in Yemen

The United States does not have the intention to send military troops to Yemen to confront the Houthi insurgents. Trump will have to settle many differences within it if it decides to intervene directly. It is difficult for any US troops to exist on the ground after the killing of the American officer

in the military operation in "Yakla.»

The Trump administration faces a campaign inside the US Congress to stop any US aid to the Gulf in the process. These pressures, along with media that do not like Trump's policies yet, will not dissuade the US administration from helping its allies but will eventually yield to the necessity of the US support for allies to help them liberate the port of Hodeidah, western Yemen, that is still under the control of the Houthis.

In March 2017, the US Secretary of Defense, James Mattis, submitted a request to the White House to support for Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to liberate Hodeidah port from the Houthis - a request that Abu Dhabi had made in mid-2016 but the Obama administration ignored – the matter that was delayed due to a UN road map in April 2017 for a neutral third authority to run Hodeidah port. Regional fears of a humanitarian

crisis in Yemen have already prevented a military operation (at least from a possible perspective) but now that the former Yemeni president has been killed by his Houthi allies early in December 2017, and the exposure of the political cover of the Houthis make the opportunity for political consultations almost absent and put the military solution in the forefront.

The United States of America will intervene in Yemen as a support to its allies to counter the Iranian expansion and reach comprehensive negotiations between the parties of conflict in Yemen to find a political solution for the crisis in the country in order to fight terrorism. The liberation of the port of Hodeidah from the Houthis will be an opportunity to stop the humanitarian crisis in the country and dry the funding resources for the Houthis as the strategic port receives 80 percent of the country's imports.

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It seems that the aspects of this support will be logistical and limited to the following:

- (A) The conduct of military operations with the Arab Coalition and the Yemeni Army leaders
- (B) Military advisers to Yemeni government forces
- (C) Drones to target Houthi leaders and locations of their forces, in addition to the ground surveillance
- (D) Satellite imagery to survey mines, the troops progress and the Houthis trenches
- (E) Increasing imports of modern weapons (including guided bombs).

The repercussions of the intervention against the Houthis

The US confrontation against the Houthis is the first intervention of its kind against a pro-Iran militia. Certainly, this intervention will have its expected repercussions internationally and regionally, but the presence of Saudi Arabia as a soft power and the biggest influential in the Middle East alongside the UAE will ease that reaction.

The official Russian position rejects US aid for the


liberation of the port of Hodeidah. The Russian daily newspaper «Nezavisimaya Gazeta» warned, in its Russian version, of an expected clash between Washington and Moscow, and described the US assistance as “direct invasion of Yemen, which could lead to a military escalation that may include Russia and Iran indirectly.»⁽⁸⁾ It seems that Moscow wants to respond to the American bombing of a military base for Syrian regime in April 2017 after the regime carried out a bloody massacre using a chemical weapon that killed hundreds of children in Khan Sheikhoun.⁽⁹⁾

But there have been several changes in the Russian position since April 2017

First: King Salman's visit to Moscow in October, the first visit by a Saudi monarch to Russia.

Second: In July, Moscow agreed to appoint a Yemeni ambassador from the leadership of President AbdRabbo Mansour Hadi. The first time Russia has agreed to change the ambassador since 2011.

Third: Moscow tries to work seriously with the media



and the King Salman Relief Center to promote the Saudi point of view. During 2017, a delegation from Moscow visited the center two times, in April and in December.

Fourth: the killing of the former Yemeni president and the full control of the Houthis prompted the rest of the Russian mission in Sana'a to leave; which means a new chapter of Russian policy in Yemen. Therefore, it is the task of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to prevent a possible clash between Moscow and Washington in Yemen, or at least to neutralize Russia in the Yemeni file.

In addition, more US involvement in Yemen's military conflict is a sign of more hostile stance by the United States against Iran. The White House escalation of action against Iran-backed rebels in Yemen is part of a wider plan to confront Tehran by targeting its allies in the Gulf states. Yemen, for Trump's administration, is the first battlefield with Iran. ⁽¹⁰⁾

As a result of the disappearance or stagnation of the Iranian papers in Syria and Iraq, Iran will pay to win the upcoming battle of Hodeidah, but without any international benefit. The Iranian attempt and its international clamor will be diminished by Russia's silence about the American assistance to the liberation of the Hodeidah port. Iran will lose an important outlet for crossing arms and experts through Hodeidah port that is controlled by the Houthis.

Iran does not have the strength to support the

Houthis. Despite the Iranian desire to increase military and training support for the Houthis to the highest levels, several geopolitical and international factors hamper its work except some rare and limited opportunities that Iran could exploit.

EU countries will stand by Britain in supporting the liberation of Hodeidah port for humanitarian reasons and to secure their interests in Yemen. The EU countries have the same concerns about the impact of the Houthis on international shipping via rocket attacks on ships from the Red Sea coast, suicide bombers and large-scale naval mines. The

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oil trade across the Red Sea feeds most of these countries, so securing this important international corridor is a strategic priority for European governments as well as for China.

Like the Americans, the Europeans believe that securing the shipping line with support from Arab forces (within the framework of the Red Sea Security Agreements) and the United States secures this line and does not prolong the conflict that may extend to their strategic interests.

Despite the expected American support, the future scenarios regarding the future of the Houthi movement are closed. Americans do not want

to uproot this movement, which they believe is national, not sectarian, and they may contribute to imposing a political solution on all sides to prevent the fall of the capital Sana'a militarily in the hands of the government forces and the Arab coalition. But time is the most influential indicator as signs of the military deterioration of the Houthis since they lost the political and social cover after killing former president Ali Saleh has become remarkable. The world may be surprised with a different Yemeni situation in any morning of 2018. Yemen is a country of moving sand that does not stop.

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Hadawiya and Houthiya ..

Imamate in the offspring of Hassan and Hussein

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Introduction:

There is no doubt in minds of honest researchers that the Houthi movement is a revival of the heritage, thought and practices of the imams in Yemen over one thousand years. The Houthis revived the Hadawiyya theory with its two pillars: Al-Dawah (Imamate) and Al-Khoroj (Jihad).

The imams were looking for a king like other Alawiyya and non-Alawiyya families who ruled Yemen and other areas, but they differed from them claiming that their rule and making it limited to them is their divine right and the origin of religion. This was the most important requirements of the theory of divine selection. The theory says that God preferred Ahl al-Bayt, Fatima Az-Zahra and Ali ibn Abi Talib and their descendants until the Day of Judgment. This gave them rights and privileges including the monopolization of the rule that they do not share with others or what is called «limit the rule to the descendants of Hasan and Hussein, sons of Ali and Fatima). It was Abu al-Jaroud Ziad ibn al-Munther (150 AH) who first

talked about this limitation of the rule. ⁽¹⁾ Despite Imam Abdullah bin Hamza said: "Zaidiya is in fact al-Jaroudiya and we do not know about Imams, after Zaid bin Ali, who are not Jaroudiya, their fellows as well."

But we did not find clear evidence that the imams who followed Zaid directly like his grandson Yahya bin Zaid and Mohamed Al-Nafs al-Zakia have supported the rule limitation as they died and did not leave any books that can be consulted. The historical facts prove the opposite. Ahmed bin Issa bin Zaid (247 AH / 861 AC) - grandson of both the Imam «Zaid» and «Hassan bin Saleh»- the founder of the Salhiya group of Zaidiya that supports Shura system and does

not limit the rule, says the rule is not limited⁽²⁾. Imam al-Qasim al-Rasi, the grandfather of Imam al-Hadi, was the first to adopt the political Jaroudiya (that limits the rule to the Hasan's and Husein's descendants). Although he was unable to establish a state that applies and protects the theory- his grandson Imam al-Hadi also did not succeed in that when he came to Yemen in 283 AH – and was disappointed to get the Yemenis response to him to overthrow the Abasiya Caliphate and sit on its throne in the name of Al Al-Bayt according to the theory, he wrote about the theory in his letters in "The Science of Speech" as one of the religion origins.⁽³⁾

But he has addressed it in the



book (Judgments), a book of jurisprudence, where he said: «Any adult should believe that the Imamate is in the offspring of Hassan and Hussein without others, and that the Imam after them – one of their offspring- who walked their pace, and who was like them and follow their faith.” (4)

Other imams after him followed his vision. Imam Ahmad bin Sulaiman (died 566 AH) said: «The relatives of the Prophet, the Messenger of Allah, say

that the Imamate is special for Al Hassan and Al Hussein and their offspring.»⁽⁵⁾ Imam Abdullah bin Hamza (died 614AH) said: «The Imamate after Ali and his two sons Hassan and Hussein is limited to their offspring and their children associated with them via parents.”

What many of Ahl al-Bayt (Prophet's family) believe - except those who belong to the doctrines of the Imamism and Jaroudiya of Zaidiya- that

(the Imamate after Hassan and Hussein, is limited to those who are active and strive of their descendants) only.

Imam al-Muayyid-Bilah Ahmad ibn al-Husayn al-Harouni (333-411 AH) said: «[Imamate of Ahl al-Bayt] If one asks: What do you say in the imamate after al-Hassan and al-Hussein? We say that it is fixed in their offspring, males, not females, except the daughters. It is a consensus among all Ahl al-Bayt. They did not differ in that the Imamate cannot be out of the offspring.”⁽⁶⁾

According to this theory, the imams ruled from the beginning of Imam al-Hadi (283AH) until the fall of the last imam, Mohammad al-Badr Ibn Hamid al-Din in 1962.

The State of Hadawiyya in Yemen

Dozens of the descendants of Hassan and Hussein emerged in the name of the divine truth. Some of them managed to establish separate states from the mother country (Abbasid Caliphate), in Daylam, Morocco and Yemen. The Zaidiya states fell in Persia and Morocco and then the thought and doctrine fell as well. The followers of the

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The followers of the Zaidiya/

Hadawiyya theory of politics have lost the most important reasons that led scholars of Sunna and Shia Twelver to strive for political theory. The imamate for Twelver is not a branch of the religion that accepts interpretation as Sunnah doctrine does, but it is one of the fundamentals of religion that is parallel to monotheism and prophecy

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Zaidi doctrine in these countries converted to the common doctrine in their countries (Sunni Malikite in Morocco, and Twelver Shi'a in Persia (Iran) and Iraq). The Zaidiya-Hadawiya state of Yemen, found by Imam al-Hadi Yahya bin Al-Hussein Al-Rasi in 286 AH, resisted the factors of annihilation, even though it remained in constant conflicts with its opponents for more than one thousand years until it fell in the 26th September Revolution in 1962. Throughout the period, they continued to adhere to the theory of Jaroudiya or Hadawiyya imamate, without any change. The followers of the Zaidiya/Hadawiyya theory of politics have lost the most important reasons that led scholars of Sunna and Shia Twelver to strive for political

theory. The imamate for Twelver is not a branch of the religion that accepts interpretation as Sunnah doctrine does, but it is one of the fundamentals of religion that is parallel to monotheism and prophecy.

The followers of Zaidiya/Hadawiyya follow the Twelver but they did not limit the rule to 12 imams as Twelver did and therefore they did not reach a dilemma like Twelver that, after one thousand years, had to search for a way to make some amendments and additions to reach to the theory of Wilayat al-Faqih (jurist) and established an Islamic Republic accordingly. The theory of Zaidiya-Hadawiya based on two conditions, the offspring and Jihad, which enabled it to continue in Yemen

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Because the Zaidiya doctrine remained exist only in Yemen and in mountainous and remote areas in the north of Yemen and not related to the outside world, it remained far from the renewal of the political thought
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even through its continuous wars for more than a thousand years. It is the period of the political coma for the Shia Twelver. Because the Zaidiya doctrine remained exist only in Yemen and in mountainous and remote areas in the north of Yemen and not related to the outside world, it remained far from the renewal of the political thought.

In the new era, specifically in the first half of the past century, and when the Arab countries had become independent from the Ottoman Empire and started to build states that are closer to the spirit of the new era under the influence of the West and the constitutional and democratic thoughts that were sought by the Islamic elites that made jurisprudences exceeding many concepts of the Islamic political heritage, Sunni and Shiite alike, in order to go in line with the values of the new era, Yemen was heading another direction to return to the past and stay away from the new era. Imam Yahya Hamid al-Din led the resistance movement against the Turks and Yemen obtained its independence in 1918 and then announced the

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The Yemeni people were aspiring for a better life than that imposed by the Turks, so they fought in a long struggle against the Ottoman rule and were proud of Yemen's independence under the leadership of Imam Yahya Hamiduddin in 1918. But two decades later they discovered that they went back for centuries

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Mutawakiliya Kingdom, which followed the method of imams before him that considers Imam as the son of the Messenger of Allah, who can accuse anyone opposes or criticizes him of being a disbelieve or a punk. He imposed on Yemen a terrible political and cultural isolation. The Yemeni people were aspiring for a better life than that imposed by the Turks, so they fought in a long struggle against the Ottoman rule and were proud of Yemen's independence under the leadership of Imam Yahya Hamiduddin in 1918. But two

decades later they discovered that they went back for centuries. The liberated Yemenis wrote about this in the book (Looted and Stricken Yemen) by saying: «Yemen, in its mountainous regions, coasts and various provinces in the plains and valleys, was under the rule of Turkey and enjoyed a popular rule commensurate with the state of the new era, better than now. If the Turks rule continued until today, the Yemenis would have gradually live under an appropriate popular rule more and more. This is why we note



that the Turkish governors and senior officials were not alone in power ... In each governorate, there was a center called the board of directors, whose members were the elites of the country who worked on the needs of their citizens. They were good tools for the government to make justice. They were mediators between the people and the officials...Moreover Yemenis have representatives in Ottoman Parliament. They used to debate, argue and ask questions freely in the interests of their country... etc.»⁽⁷⁾

These modern manifestations of governance were the first that Imam Yahya began to abolish, because it opposes the system of imamate, ruled by the sons of the Messenger of Allah, which makes the imam like the apostle and is responsible for his flock in all matters of their religious and secular life. This is what Imam Yahya did. He used to intervene even in what people should read or learn. When the free Yemenis brought some of the books and modern publications to Yemen, the Imam accused them of heresy and disbelief and

promised them of discipline and murder. Judge Abdul Rahman al-Iryani mentioned in his memoirs that the first time he listened with his colleagues to the radio was in Taiz in 1947.

«So I was eager to buy a device, but how can I do that? The purchase of the radio was forbidden under the pretext that it was broadcasting songs that were forbidden. I sent a letter to Imam Yahya asking for permission to buy a radio to listen to the news and cultural and scientific programs. Imam Yahya himself replied on my letter authorizing the purchase of a radio and said (one like you, cannot do enjoy listening to entertainment), to confirm that the prevention of citizens from getting radios was only because of his fears of sedition via listening to forbidden songs, and because he was sure that I am secured against sedition he authorized me to buy one. I mention this incident to give the reader an idea about the isolation that was imposed on Yemen in the era of Imam Yahya to the extent that the citizen needs a special permission by the pen of

Imam himself in order to acquire a radio.”⁽⁸⁾

However, a number of Yemenis who had been educated in Egypt, Iraq and Syria were able to convey modern ideas to Yemen to form the Yemeni National Movement in the mid-1930s. But when they planned for the constitutional revolution in 1948 they did not dare to abolish the Imamate as a system of governance or choose non-Alawi ruler to avoid any reaction from the people against them because they destroyed faith and religion, according to the religious mobilization of the Yemeni tribes on which the Imamate regime was based. So the revolution of 1948 and the coup of 1955 failed.

They finally succeeded in

overthrowing the Imamate and proclaiming the Republic in the revolution of September 26, 1962. However, the supporters of the Imamate did not give up easily. They fought a fierce war, with regional and international support, against the Republican regime and restored what they considered their divine right to rule for seven years until they besieged the capital Sana'a. The capital was almost to fall into their hands after the withdrawal of the Egyptian forces supporting the revolution from Yemen after the setback of 1967, but the steadfastness of the rebels and the mobilization of the people with them led to the defeat of the imamate supporters and their surrender

after that. The National Reconciliation in 70 resulted in the return of the imamate supporters and absorbing them in the institutions of the new

Republic state - except the family of Hamiduddin.

Revival of Hadawiya Imamate Thought

The Imamate fell as a state, but it did not fall as an idea. Although it lived in a period of latency throughout the seventies, it had soon begun to look for supporters, especially after the triumph of the Iranian revolution led by Imam Khomeini in 1979. Supporters of Zaidiya-Hadawiya saw that the Iranian revolution was a victory for their doctrine, not for Khomeini, who was prohibiting the revolution and



However, a number of Yemenis who had been educated in Egypt, Iraq and Syria were able to convey modern ideas to Yemen to form the Yemeni National Movement in the mid-1930s. But when they planned for the constitutional revolution in 1948 they did not dare to abolish the Imamate as a system of governance



the establishment of a state until after the coming out of al-Mahdi. It is true that Khomeini worked hard in the framework of this doctrine, but his diligence is close to the doctrine that ruled Yemen for centuries. The expansion of the Salafism in Yemen, which began in the early 1980s with the return of the Salafist Cleric Muqbel al-Wadei from Saudi Arabia to Saada, the historical stronghold of Zaidiya, encouraged the clerics and supporters of the Imamate to revive the Zaidiya-Hadawiya

heritage that is related to the rule and the eligibility of Ahl Al-Bayt and to give the right to control all political, spiritual, educational affairs of the people. They established schools, forums and educational centers whose number increased after the Yemeni unity and the adoption of democracy and pluralism in 1990.

Al-Haq Party and Imamate Statement


With the establishment of parties and political organizations, and in the framework of

pluralism and democracy, which was accompanied by the establishment of unity in 1990, a number of quiet figures announced the establishment of the al-Haq party in early 1991. The founders of the party saw that the Supreme Leadership of the Party should include the most prominent jurists of Zaidiya-Hadawiya doctrine, regardless their ability to run a party work or believe in it, such as Majd al-Din bin Mohammed al-Muayadi, Badr al-Din al-Houthi, Mohamed Mohamed al-Mansur, Ahmad Mohamed al-Shami, Hamoud

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Abbas al-Muayyad and Qasim Mohamed al-Kibsi.

These figure represent the most important scholastic references of the Zaidiya in Yemen. Although Majd al-Din al-Mua'yidi was president of the party and Badr al-Din al-Houhi was his deputy in Saada away from the intellectual and political argument in Sana'a, the leaders of the party in Sana'a tried to issue a statement on the imamate and that it should be limited to the descendants of Hassan and Hussein (Al-Batnin). The statement was already issued, but sparked great controversy among the Zaidi circles and followers. While some saw it as a major development in the thought of the political Hadawiya - as it was the first time that scholars from the Hadawiya doctrine recognize the legitimacy of the status quo since the overthrow of the Imamate system and the announcement of the republican system in 1962- but researchers and other writers saw that the statement was only an attempt to improve the image of the newly born party and camouflage its racial and sectarian nature,

which is contrary to the law of the political parties. Those who formulated the statement and signed it had been careful not to refute or criticize the issue of the divine selection of the family and the imamate limitation. The statement addressed the Imamate as a general political term, not as a specific regime that ruled Yemen on the basis of superiority of a race of people over others by monopolizing the imamate and not to allow others

to rule. The Imamate as a political term is not wrong as the term stands for (guiding Imamate and misguiding Imamate).

The statement, in this way, undermined the form and the term and did not extinguish the content that was stuck in minds of Yemenis of all races (all who are fair). The statement said: (After the Imamate had no place and not accepted to rule in its name, except within its linguistic meaning of good example).

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With the establishment of parties and political organizations, and in the framework of pluralism and democracy, which was accompanied by the establishment of unity in 1990, a number of quiet figures announced the establishment of the al-Haq party in early 1991. The founders of the party saw that the Supreme Leadership of the Party should include the most prominent jurists of Zaidiya-Hadawiya doctrine

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So the issue seemed to be the issue of a political term only, not the issue of the content. For them, it is not problem if the rule has become (President of the Republic) instead of (Imam), but he should be one of the offspring (Al-Batnin). According to the statement, if the Imamate has a place or enjoys acceptance to rule in its name, there is no reason not to restore the form because it is the origin, but the problem is that it (has no place). This phrase was mentioned in the

forefront of the statement. Thus, it is clear that the introduction of the statement went to change the form of the Imamate just because it is not accepted.⁽⁹⁾ Although the devious language of the statement, senior Zaidi scholars in Saada, including the head of the al-Haq party, Majd al-Din al-Mu'ayyidi, and his deputy, Badr al-Din al-Houthi, refused to sign it the statement despite its importance, and despite al-Mu'ayyidi signed a number of statements that are less

important than this statement. The researcher Ashwaq Gholais said those who remained adherent to the right of Ahl al-Bayt in the rule had considered this statement a significant retreat from the intellectual framework of Zaidiya. ⁽¹⁰⁾

Imamate in the intellectual documents of Houthis and Hadawiya scholars

Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi grew with the theory of the Imamate and confirmed it in his documents. He is impressed with Khomeini, because he is from Ahl al-Bayt, but he rejects the Khomeini's mechanism that «the jurists are only qualified to implement the provisions of Islam and the establishment of the limits of God and guarding the gaps of Muslims.»⁽¹¹⁾ According to Hussein al-Houthi, the nation must have information from Al al-Bayt. The science confirmed by Hussein al-Houthi in his documents is the Imam, who, he said, is the leader of the Quranic march, as his successor, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi is called. However, Hussein al-Houthi's rivals, who are members of his family and followers of Majd al-Din



al-Mu'ayyidi, including Hussein's cousin, cleric AbdulAdheem al-Houthi, continued to criticize Hussein al-Houthi and his brothers on the charge that they were lenient in presenting the case of the imamate and restricting it to the offspring. Most followers of Hussein al-Houthi and Hussein himself and some of his brothers were part of the forum of the Young Believers, which was founded in 1992. This is a big charge because «the sons of Badr al-Din al-Houthi and a large group of the people of Razih, wanted to take the Zaidi doctrine,» saying, how? The man said they are any young people- «They were dependent on the Yemeni government and on the constitution, because it says democracy and does not say the imam,» stressing that the young people at the outset «cheated the government by saying that the imam is not limited to the offspring or Ahl al-Bayt. They dropped the condition of the offspring in return for the government helps them and cooperates with them. It actually helped them. They philandered the presidency that offered them

four hundred thousand riyals per month, when the Yemeni currency at the time was of a great value. That lasted until the war (between the Houthis and the state), almost twelve years.”⁽¹²⁾ It is clear from the man's talk that he meant the founders of the Young non-Hashemite Believers who have already tried to transcend the political heritage of Zaidi, so they were blasphemed and even were about to be cleansed, as the Secretary-General of the Forum of Young Believers said. All this has nothing to do with Hussein Al-Houthi as he was not one of the founders of the Young Believers, but after his return from Sudan in 1999, the conflict returned - and more severely - over the leadership of the Young Believers, the formulation of their curricula and guiding their activities, between the Secretary General of the Forum of the Young Believers (Mohammed Salem Azzan) and his fellows and Hussein al-Houthi and his supporters. Badr al-Din al-Houthi, with his religious weight, sided with his son Hussein al-Houthi. Hussein al-Houthi has

supported accusations by Majd al-Din al-Mu'ayyidi and his supporters that the leaders of Young Believers, who are non-Hashemite, seek to sabotage the doctrine of Zaidiya and cast doubts about the superiority of Ahl al-Bayt, and limiting the rule to them.

For this reason the Young Believers split. I do not think the cleric Abdul-Azim al-Houthi was ignorant of this, especially since the interview with him was in 2010 when the Houthis were powerful and could publicly spread their ideas contained in the documents of the founder Hussein al-Houthi. The ideas are not different from the ideas of Abdul-Azim al-Houthi, but the man was complaining, in the interview, of the exclusion and attempts of killing him and his followers by the Houthis (the followers of Abdul-Malik al-Houthi). Abdul-Azim wanted to diminish their Zaidism and alienate the Zaidi youth, especially in Saada, and to show himself more faithful and defender of the Zaidiya, so he found only the condition of Imamate in the offspring of Hassan and Hussein: «This is

a necessary condition of the fundamentals of religion and we will not relinquish it. We have demonstrated our insistence in the Presidency Council, and this is for those who say that I am closed, who is the closed one? who announces his doctrine in the Presidency Council and imposes it on the presidency and all parties in Yemen of all kinds?! We have said that this religious condition is one the fundamentals of religion that we will not give up.» ⁽¹³⁾

Some Zaidi scholars who were keen on the success of the Houthi project without any tension saw that the continuation of the dispute between the two Zaidi wings in Saada would weaken the Houthis and give justification to their opponents to continue to distort the Houthis while all wings in Saada and other areas believe in the same ideas that the doctrine adopted for more than one thousand years, and reject any attempts to question about the main issues on which the political Hadawiya theory based, including the divine selection of Ahl al-Bayt and the duty of the imamate, and restricting the

rule to the offspring of Hassan and Hussein and considering it as an origin of the religion. On this basis, they moved and there was a dialogue between the different parties that agreed to form a committee of scholars to formulate the intellectual and political principles to be the political program of the Houthis who called themselves Mujahideen.

The committee started its work on Friday, 17/3/1433 AH. The committee was charged with drafting the agreement between the Zaidis in general and the Mujahideen in particular, including Abdul Malik Badr al-

Din al-Houthi and some Zaidi scholars and their followers, on top of them Zaidi scholars AbdulRahman Hussein Shaim and Hussein bin Yahya al-Houthi. «According to the introduction of the document signed by Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, representative of the Mujahideen (Ansar Allah) - as they call themselves- and those mentioned in the document, representatives of the wing of al-Mua'yidi and then signed by some Zaidi scholars in Sana'a, including Mohammed al-Mansour and Hamoud Abbas al-Muayyad. The Committee dealt with a number of issues that are agreed on and included in the

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books of the Hadawiya heritage and the state of Hadawiya based on and lasted for more than one thousand years, on the top of them was the issue of divine selection. The document had been given a main title and then said the following: «As for the issue of divine selection, we believe that God Almighty selects whoever He wants from His worshipers, groups and individuals, and we believe that God had chosen the Ahl al-Bayt of his Messenger, making them the guides of the nation and the heirs of the book after the Messenger of God until the Day of Judgment, and that He prepares, in every era, someone to be a beacon for His slaves and handle the affairs of the nation and promote them in all areas.” Then the document detailed the requirements of the divine selection that is the right of the Ahl al-Bayt to monopolize science, knowledge, guidance, Jihad and the Imamate considering this right as one the fundamentals of religion.

In this document, the Houthis stressed that their political project was only a restoration of an outdated historical project.



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It is ironic that most of the Zaidi scholars, who were not affiliated with the Houthi movement, did not object the document but rather blessed it and defended it. Some of them signed it even though they signed the statement of Zaidiya scholars in 1990, which said that the Zaidiya had abandoned the Imamate as a historical formula as it became no longer suitable to the new era. Some researchers had expressed regret to the decline of those Zaidi scholars after they took a positive step two decades ago by abandoning the Imamate while that step was supposed to be developed, not to retreat during the Arab Spring that demanded freedom and equality. The truth is that there was no real criticism of the Imamate and abandonment of it in the 1990 statement to say that the Zaidi scholars retracted their previous progressive judgment! The statement of 1990 was only taqiyya (prudence) and an attempt of purification to improve the image of the al-Haq party. The researcher Mohamed Zabara at the time presented a scientific and methodological criticism of the statement and

concluded his study at the time as saying: «Who reads the statement that was signed by Zaidi scholars thinks that they retreated this ideology, but at the same time they will be informing the party's members that the truth in the statement is that there is no retreat or abandoning of such dangerous ideas as the racial preference, and the right of the offspring of the Imamate and rule, and questioning the positions of the companions of Prophet Mohamed after his death.»⁽¹⁴⁾

In words, the statement says that there was a will from the Messenger of Allah to Imam Ali bin Abi Talib to be the ruler after him and that the companions violated this mandate and refused the rule of the Imam Ali, and that Imam Ali waived his right in exchange for the safety of the blood of Muslims. The statement says the descendants of Imam Ali, who have the right, will give up their right of the Imamate and rule, because the Imamate is no longer accepted today. If one day the Imamate is accepted, it should return to the owners of this right. And because they will give up this right to keep

the blood of Muslims today, but what should be done at least is that the owners of this right have to choose the hired ruling!!

This is what was confirmed by Abdul-Azim al-Houthi in a newspaper interview in 2012, when he was asked about the signatories of the statement in 1990, when many Zaidi scholars in Sana'a signed on the legitimacy of the republican system and the elections, and whether they had already deviated from the theory of limiting the Imamate to Ahl al-Bayt and the offspring and believed in the republican system, he replied: «I will answer you here with what I answered Ali Abdullah Saleh in his council. He asked me if I think that Mohamed Al-Mansour and Hamoud Abbas al-Muayyad, are hypocrite? I said to him: No. They are not hypocrites, and he said, What prompted them to approve the elections?» I told him, they are afraid of you because you are tyrant. He said, does this mean that this fatwa was just taqiyyah. I said, yes, taqiyyah is legal in both Zaidiya and Shafa'iya.

Margins:

- (1) Collection of Sayyid Imam Humaidan Ibn Yahya Al-Kasimi. 1/296.
- (2) We discussed this in detail and with the irrefutable evidence in our book «Between Zaidiya and Twelver: The Doctrinal Identity of the Houthi Movement: (under printing).
- (3) The Good Collection 615.
- (4) Al-Ahkam (Rulings) for Imam Al-Hadi Yahya Bin Al-Hussein
- (5) Collection of Humaidan quoting the Hikmat al-Dor for Imam Ahmad bin Suleiman.
- (6) The insight into Tawheed and justice by Imam Al-Muayadbelah Ahmad Ibn Al-Hussein Al-Harouni (333-411 AH), investigated by Abdul-Karim Ahmed Jadban p. 88.
- (7) Ali Mohamed Abdo - previous reference - p. 31
- (8) Memoirs of President Judge Abdul-Rahman bin Yahya Al-Iryani, the first part 1910-1962, the Egyptian General Book Press, first edition 2013, p.130
- (9) Mohamed Zabara in: AbdulFatah al-Batool "The Threads of Darkness, Era of Zaidiya, Imamate in Yemen.
- (10) Ashwaq Gholais, previous reference, P. 175.
- (11) Imam Khomeini in his book, "The Islamic Government," P. 70
- (12) Interview with Mohamed Abdul-Azim Al-Houthi, Al-Ahaly newspaper, 10 January 2010.
- (13) Previous reference .
- (14) See Mohamed Zabara, Supplement to the book of Abdul-Fatah al-Batool "Threads of Darkness"

Parallel State Entities ..

The illusion of Sectarian Emirates in Yemen

Mujeeb al-Humaidy

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This study confirms that any future political settlement that ensures the remaining of a Houthis parallel military and administrative entity within the future Yemeni state will bear the seeds of failure and provoke war again in any crunch. It concludes that the restoration of lasting peace in Yemen requires the compelling of the Houthis group to integrate into the political community, to abandon its ideological fervor and the imposing sectarian militarism on the Yemeni society by force, and to give up its illusion of establishing sectarian Emirates and entities parallel to the state. The study asserts that the remaining of any sectarian entity parallel to the state in any part of Yemen will stimulate the

forming of other sectarian entities in other parts of the country, and will threaten internal peace and the regional and international security.

The study reviews the historical background of the Zaidi-Salafi conflict in the Saada region, and concludes that there is no fundamental relationship between the imams and the Wahhabis in the new conflict.

Historical background

The emergence of the Wahhabiya movement in the middle of the 18th century coincided with the beginning of the collapse of the Zaidi Qasimiah state in northern Yemen. ⁽¹⁾ The Turks were the common enemy of the Wahhabiya movement

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After the Turks left Yemen, no political conflict between the Imam of Sana'a and the Wahhabi took place. The only conflict was between the Imam and Emir of areas around Saada, the Emir “al-Idrissi”. The Emir al-Idrissi was a common enemy of Wahhabism and Zaidi

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and its political patronage based on tribalism - the Saud family and Arab tribes - Yemen and its allied tribes, which extended to Lahj and Aden. The Turks withdrew from Sana'a in 1630 after long battles and bitter fighting under the Imam al-Moayyid before returning to it in 1849. ⁽²⁾ The Zaidi and Wahhabi states were engaged in fierce wars against the Turks.

In the early 19th century, the Wahhabis seized Mecca and Al-Madinah before they were kicked out by Mohammed Ali Basha who re-took control of the Hijaz. Then Mohammed Ali Basha asked

the Imam of Sanaa to cooperate in confronting the Wahhabiya in exchange for the recognition of the Ottomans and the return of Asir to Yemen, but the Imam rejected this offer. The refusal was developed into a conflict ended with the Ottoman control of In the Middle East before their withdrawal in 1911. During this conflict, the colonial countries represented by Britain and Italy provide financial support to the Arab tribes fighting the Ottomans⁽³⁾ After the Turks left Yemen, no political conflict between the Imam of Sana'a and the Wahhabi took place. The only conflict was between the

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After the fall of al-Idrissi, the first political conflict between the Yemeni Mutawakliya and Saudi Wahhabism on the extension of control and influence

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Imam and Emir of areas around Saada, the Emir "al-Idrissi". The Emir al-Idrissi was a common enemy of Wahhabism and Zaidi.

The relationship between the imam and Britain during the World War worsened in line with the improved relations with the Ottomans at the time. Al-Idrissi was supported by Britain and Italy and managed to occupy Hodeidah, yet the Imam did not prefer to engage in war with the British.

After the fall of al-Idrissi, the first political conflict between the Yemeni Mutawakliya and Saudi Wahhabism on the extension of control and influence on the areas used to be under the control of al-Idrissi. During the conflict, the Wahhabiya exploited superstitions, sorcery, glorifying tombs and graves that were popular in Tihama and Asir to spread the call for unification and the extension of the political influence, and the call for the revival and renewal of religion and the fight against superstition and worship of idolatry and the imposition of advocacy by the power of arms and

tribal and nomadic tribalism ⁽⁴⁾. With the beginning of the Cold War between the eastern and western camps, the relationship between the Yemeni Mutawakiliya and Saudi Wahhabiya improved. After the Imam's rejection of the alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood in the face of the British alliance with Al-Ashraf and Al Saud, the Brotherhood continued with the Liberal Movement opposed to the Imam, and the constitutional revolution came in 1948 to contribute to deepening the relationship between the Yemeni Mutawakliya and Saudi Wahhabism. This relationship continued after the outbreak of the October and September revolutions, and the withdrawal of the Imamate regime from Sana'a to the areas of Sa'ada, Al-Jawf and Hajjah, to wage an exhaustive war with the republican regime, supported by the American-Saudi camp ⁽⁵⁾ against the republic, which was supported by the Egyptian-Soviet camp. The conflict ended with the surrender of the Imami camp, the signing of the reconciliation agreement



at the end of the sixties, and the liberation of Saada from the control of the Imami regime in 1969. After the reconciliation agreement was signed, Badr al-Din al-Houthi and Majd al-Din al-Muayyidi and returned to Saada after their escape to Saudi Arabia ⁽⁶⁾. Some Imamate families were still trying to extract some of sectarian authority in Saada, such as taking the Khums (one fifth).

Developments of the theory of Imamate

It was assumed that after the war between the monarchs and the republicans ended with the stability of the republican system, Zaidi developed its political theory and studied the causes behind the collapse of the imamate system and its inability to absorb the latest developments of modern systems

and to make a scientific effort in bringing the theory of the imamate closer to the theory of Shura and the democratic republican concept in order to change the Zaidi doctrine into a juristic one that can reconcile with the modern political legitimacy of the modern state, but the traditional control over the doctrine prevented this development.

The stage of critical reviewing and reading of the theory of the Imamism was delayed until after the unification, when the first studies referred the causes behind the failure of the Zaidi political theory to the deviation of the theory of imamate from the rule of Shura to the rule of al-Batnain and to the unannounced inheritance of the rule. This inheritance became public when Imam Yahya

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It was assumed that after the war between the monarchs and the republicans ended with the stability of the republican system, Zaidi should have developed its political theory and studied the causes behind the collapse of the imamate system and its inability to absorb the latest developments of modern systems and to make a scientific effort in bringing the theory of the imamate closer to the theory of Shura and the democratic republican concept in order to change the Zaidi doctrine into a juristic one that can reconcile with the modern political legitimacy of the modern state, but the traditional control over the doctrine prevented this development

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named his son Ahmed to be the crown prince failing to put restricts to prevent the multiplicity of preachers to the Imamate, who control the principle of power, oppression and predomination.

In the beginning of the nineties, a statement was issued for the first time demanding the abandonment of the terms of the Imamate by a number of senior Zaidi scholars representing the Preparatory Committee of the Al-Haq Party. The statement emphasized to abandon the idea of the Imamate and the recognition of the republican system. But those who signed the statement are the scholars in Sana'a only while the Zaidi scholars of Saada were absent, on top of them Majd al-Din al-Mu'ayyidi and Badr al-Din al-Houthi. The researchers believe that the absence of Badr al-Din al-Houthi and al-Mua'yidi from the signing of the statement means their adherence to the right of Al al-Bayt to rule. The statement was considered as a significant retreat from the ideological framework of Zaidiyah ⁽⁷⁾

This insistence on the importance of the traditional theory of Imamism in the Zaidi doctrine leads some researchers to call for an ideological and jurisprudential crystallization of Zaidi doctrine away from the political theory.

Ideological Transformations and Polarization Game

With the stabilization of the republican regime in Sana'a in the 1970s, and the emergence of the eastern camp in Aden and the outbreak of the central front, with support from the south and the eastern camp, the Saudi regime felt that it needs to improve its relations with the Republican ranks in

its two sides, military and tribal. This transformation coincided with the victory of the Iranian Khomeini revolution in 1979. The project of exporting the revolution, and the embracing of the revolution by the eastern camp helped to revive the dreams of the remnants of the Imamate regime to re-establish their state, taking advantage of the intensification of the conflict between North and South and the crystallizing of a new supportive scheme that can be a foundation to re-establish the imamate.

During this period, Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi traveled to Tehran, and one of the requirements of cooperation between the two parties was the building of convergence between the Zaidiya and the Twelver (Ithna'ashariya).

Dr. Ahmad al-Daghshi asserts that this rapprochement was crystallized in the extremist

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The victory of the Iranian Khomeini revolution in 1979, the project of exporting the revolution, and the embracing of the revolution by the eastern camp helped to revive the dreams of the remnants of the Imamate regime to re-establish their state

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(Zaidi sect of Jarudiya), which was implicated in accusing As-Sahaba (companions of prophet Mohamed) of apostasy, while he stressed the importance of distinguishing between the two sects and denying the claim of similarity. ⁽⁸⁾

The first nucleus of Houthi thought was formed in 1982 ⁽⁹⁾. In the same period, Salafi cleric Muqbil bin Hadi al-Wadei returned from Saudi Arabia to Saada after being expelled from Saudi Arabia after he was accused of participating in the promotion of the ideas of Juhayman al-Otaibi three months before the Juhayman group occupied the Holy Mosque. Al-Wadei established Dammaj Center, Madrasat Dar al-Hadith, in Saada.

Cleric al-Wadei from Zaidi to Salafi

Cleric Muqbil bin Hadi al-Wadei said that the term "transformed from Zaidi" is not right and that cannot be applied to those who lived in the geography that was under the control of the political Zaidiya, stressing that the word «Zaidi» can be applied only to those who studied the Zaidi doctrine and satisfied with it, but the public, he said, follow the person who they trust ⁽¹⁰⁾.

Al-Wadei asserted that he was not eager to join the Zaidi doctrine and that he tried to learn from Zaidi clerics at Al-Hadi Mosque, but they did not help him, and they maybe have tried to exclude him from learning on racial grounds that is based on the culture of social hierarchy that was enhanced by the frequent Imamate regimes for one thousand years.

This is what the author of «The Political Islam at the Time of Al-Qaeda» pointed out to a part about al-Wadei in his article entitled «Secrets of the Ideological Path: Yemeni Salafist between the Religious Radicalism and Social Strategy.» The author considered al-Wadei to be the main theoretician of the most salient trends of the Yemeni and world Salafism.

The researcher pointed out that al-Wadei "was not a member of the religious aristocracy of the Prophet's dynasty (the only gentlemen who can aspire to the position of the high imamate), nor of the aristocracy of the "judges" or their chief advisers, nor even of the aristocracy of the "sword," that is formed until today by chiefs of large tribes,

the main armed force of the Imamate for a long time»⁽¹¹⁾. The author notes that al-Wadei had to emigrate to Saudi Arabia under the pressure of the economic situation and after a brainwashing attempt was imposed on him at the al-Hadi Mosque. «The isolation and exile that he began to suffer are not only two ideologies, but they have an explicit social dimension and an expression of disregard by the Prophet's descendants against the man (al-Wadei),” said the author.

The author narrates how the members of the religious aristocracy used to call him a shabby tribal man when he tried to be adherent to his social class and would not dream of leaving his class. They said mocking at him: «Whatever we do to clean “the floor cloth” it will never be white.”

The author emphasizes that this religious and social alert was very humiliating because it was issued by those who used to protect their skins with large umbrellas so as not to look like peasants. “Muqbil has noted in his biography: I will remember it all my life », said the author ⁽¹²⁾.

Dammaj and the Houthi phenomenon

The previous review of the biography of Al-Wadei refers to the nature of the challenge imposed by the ideology of Zaidi fanaticism in Al-Hadi Mosque on the psychology of Sheikh Al-Wadei. Al-Wadei had to return to Saada to prove to his opponents that it is not the floor cloth and tribal who cannot comprehend the teachings, but he can compete them and exceed them. So al-Wadei returned in the mid-1970s, and tried to promote his ideas in the same al-Hadi Mosque where the first public confrontation with Zaidi scholars took place and

developed into a clash of hands. Al-Wadei asserted that they tried to kill him, but members of his tribe protected him. The security authorities intervened and arrested al-Wadei with a number of those who clashed with them and imprisoned them.

According to some researchers, the establishment of Sheikh Muqbil al-Wadei's Dammaj Center, was one of the most important factors of the establishment of the Houthi centers of “Youth Believers.» The author of the book «The Phenomenon of Houthi» confirms that the establishment of those centers was a practical response «to the challenge posed by the Salafi center of Dammaj in Wadiah, near the city of Saada, under the administration of the late Sheikh Muqbil bin Hadi al-Wadei (1422AH-2001): the head of Salafiya in Yemen, with the historical knowledge of the fact that Saada represents the

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Some believe that the government's support for the Dammaj Center was not against the Zaidiya, but it was targeting the Muslim Brotherhood, the main political opponent of Saleh's regime
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seat of the Hadawiya Zaidiya in Yemen ⁽¹³⁾..» The writer confirms that Sheikh al-Wadei "raised the banner of campaign against the sectarian Zaidiya and Shia in general, which led his Zaidi opponents there to have violent reactions to face him including the establishment of what was known as the forums of 'Young Believers.' Such confrontations were not recorded before, for almost two decades, since the announcement of the Yemeni Revolution in 1962, shortly after al-Wadei returned from Saudi Arabia late in 1980s.»⁽¹⁴⁾

This Salafi threat contributed to the crystallization of the so-called the Revival Zaidiya, based on the perception of the danger of the loss of Zaidiya identity in the face of Wahhabiya. ⁽¹⁵⁾

A report by the Global Crisis cited the Houthi leader Yahya al-Houthi as saying, «Our main motivation for action is to combat Wahhabism,» pointing to the existence of intellectual and cultural conflict

from the beginning of the revolution, and that the government seeks economic aid from Saudi Arabia and supports the spread of Wahhabism for this purpose.» ⁽¹⁶⁾

This may justify the support of Saleh's regime to the Dammaj Center. Some believe that the government's support for the Dammaj Center was not against the Zaidiya, but it was targeting the Muslim Brotherhood, the main political opponent of Saleh's regime. The author of the Book 'The Political Islam' said that «the Salafist radicalism against the Muslim Brotherhood, the opponent of Ali Abdullah Saleh's regime, is partly the product of the leniency of the tolerant government. As Salafists are clearly less involved in the dynamic political modernization than the Muslim Brotherhood, this support, which is the same in many countries of the region, is realistic and scornful.»⁽¹⁷⁾

On the other hand, the support for the Young

Believers - the nucleus of the Houthi movement - has been for the same purpose, and this relationship explains the lack of conflict between the two parties during the six wars between the Houthis and the Saleh regime, and the conflict erupted after the collapse of Saleh's regime since the beginning of the popular revolution in 2011.

Six Wars and Revolution

All indications indicate that the Salafis in general and the Salafis in Dammaj in particular were careful not to be involved in the six wars, although they were careful to encapsulate their positions in supporting the regime by obedience to the ruler and the legitimacy of fighting that who is disobedient. The Houthis did not accuse them of actively participating in the conflict during these wars, but accused them of providing the religious cover for these wars. This was confirmed by their press office, which responded to the Salafis' conference on 30 November 2011 that condemned sectarian calls and exercises and anything that can provoke sedition and division among the people of Yemen. The statement from the Press Office of Houthis, expressed appreciation of this position and asserted at the same time: "Who is engaged in sectarian activity and calls for and incites the sectarian sedition and publishes fatwas of takfir against all those who disagree with their opinion or thought are the owners of Dammaj Center, and those who stand behind them, and justify the killing of people under claims that they Rawafidh (Shia) who should be killed.» ⁽¹⁸⁾

The escalation of the conflict in Dammaj cannot be isolated from the political and security implications

following the peaceful revolution, which has encouraged the ambitions of the sectarian project to take control of the society by force of arms. While the Houthis' opponents have confirmed secret agreements between Saleh regime and the Houthis to enable them to take control of the northern north areas to obstruct the change move, sources close to the Houthi group denied these accusations, and asserted that they deal with the ruling party as the legacy of the sick man that they (Houthis) should receive the largest share.

Saada and the Agency's wars

The socio-economic and geographical nature of Sa'ada and the neighboring region have transformed it into an international arena of proxy wars with local hands. If we have briefly reviewed the history of these wars in our history before the beginning of the twentieth century, the facts indicate that this region witnessed bitter proxy wars, and direct intervention by Turks, Britons and Italians at the beginning of the last century. We can clearly see this willingness to become tools of proxy wars in the pages of "The Kings of the Arabian Peninsula," written by the British colonel in Southern Yemen, Colonel Harold, in 1923 in English, and it was translated by the late ambassador Ahmed al-Medwahi. The book explains how British role in inciting Arab tribes of the Arabian Peninsula to demand independence from the Ottomans, and to fight them.

The book refers to the British support for Ashraaf in Jordan, Al Saud in Najd and Adarisa and Al Hamid al-Din in Yemen, and the south of Mecca, and other tribes in northern Yemen and sultans in the south.



The British official explains how the tribal leaders were wasting their time behind «gold». He pointed to a document sent by Sultan Yafei to the Imam asserting that the Britons are buying the Arabs with gold, and that the Arabs cannot resist bribery. The British official referred to a letter from one of the sheikhs asking for his name to be included in the list of sheikhs who receive salaries from Britain to stand with Britain in the face of the Zaidi Imam.

The writer explains how the tribes of Yemen and the Arabia Peninsula used to get money from both Turks and the imam, and how they were received money from both sides. They believed in that the danger of reconciliation.

This sign confirms the existence of a fundamental problem in the social and economic structure, which results in the readiness of many social components to enter into any war based on the ability of the

conflicting parties to pay, and the investment of any conflict between two fronts as an opportunity to benefit from the parties. In light of this rule we can read the ability of the tribal Republican row and the tribal monarchy row after the September Revolution to make disputes between the eastern and western camps to engage in a proxy war, with the participation of the Soviet Union, Syrian and Algerian planes, and the US-Saudi camp supporting the monarchy.

After the transformation of the conflict, mentioned above at the beginning of this study, and the transfer of the Imamate trend from the American camp to the Iranian-Russian camp, groups that adopt the slogan (Death to America) appeared in a clear attempt to drag the parties to the international conflict into Yemen and to attract support, in addition to defending their sectarian identity in the face of

Salafism, which was associated with Wahhabism. During the six years of wars, there were mutual accusations between Saleh regime and the Houthis. Saleh accused the Huthis of receiving support from Iran, while the Houthis accused Saleh of receiving support from Saudi Arabia to fight them. Both sides were trying to exaggerate the regional role by seeking support and extorting the regional environment in the context of sectarian polarization that was growing at the expense of security and stability of the country, and in the interest of narrow projects.

Because both the regime and the Houthis continued to turn themselves into tools in the sectarian regional polarization game, the Popular Uprising against the regime in 2011 raised the fears of the Houthis that the success of the revolution may result in enhancing the political identity of Yemen on real democratic foundations and the feeling of the movement that it lacks for the scarecrow that it used to use in the game of sectarian polarization- presenting themselves as an oppressed minority- which made them believe that building a state on sound foundations would make them lose justifications for survival and contribute to besieging the environment that was fertile for their polarization.

Conclusion:

The clogging of prospects of the peaceful change, the emergence of the power heritage project and the decline of the democratic margin in Yemen in the latest years of Saleh's regime have contributed significantly to turning religious violence options into attractive options, as well as the role of this

decline in enhancing the ability of Al-Qaeda and the Houthi group to convince religious youth in a community of arms, illiteracy and poverty. The three elements, weapons, poverty and illiteracy will continue to be dangerous factors in recruiting many members of the Yemeni society as cheap tools in the hands of conflicting groups over sectarian violence schemes.

In view of previous facts and in light of the reality that Yemen lives in today as a result of the repercussions of the Houthis coup and their control of the capital, and with the approach of the National Army of the legitimate government from Sanaa, any talk about any political settlement that ensures the existence of a parallel military and administrative Houthi state within the future Yemeni state will bear the seeds of failure and incite future conflicts in any future crunch. Therefore, the restoration of lasting peace in Yemen requires the compelling of the Houthi movement to integrate into the political society, to abandon its ideological fascination and the project of imposing sectarian militarism on society by force of arms and to give up its illusion of building sectarian emirates and parallel entities. The survival of any sectarian entity, parallel to the state, in any part of Yemen, will stimulate the building of other emirates and doctrinal entities in other regions threatening again the internal peace and regional and international security.

Margins:

- (1) Abdul-Bari Taher, from a lecture on the first roots of the Yemeni-Saudi conflict .. Religion and tribe between Zaidiya and Wahhabiya, in the al-Jawi Cultural Forum, republished in the website of Al-Tagammu newspaper on this link:
<http://www.attagammua.net/index.php?action=showDetails&id=1677>
- (2) Harold Yacoub, The Kings of the Arabian Peninsula, translated by Ahmad al-Mudhwahi, p. 16, Dar al-Awda Beirut, 1988
- (3) previous source.
- (4) Abdul-Bari Taher from a lecture on the first roots of the Yemeni-Saudi conflict .. Religion and tribe between Zaidi and Wahhabism, at the Jawi Cultural Forum, republished on the website of the Tagammu newspaper at this link:
<http://www.attagammua.net/index.php?action=showDetails&id=1677>
- (5) The Egyptian analyst Mohamed Hasanein Haikal pointed out that Israel had given arms shipments and had contacted hundreds of European mercenaries who are fighting alongside the Yemeni monarchs in Yemen. [30] Israel has established a secret air bridge between Djibouti and northern Yemen. The war provided an opportunity for Israelis to monitor and evaluate the Egyptian military tactics and their ability to adapt to combat conditions.
http://ar.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A8_%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86
- (6) Adel Al-Ahmadi, Rose and Stone, p. 129.
- (7) Ashwaq Ahmed Gholeis, «Revival in the Thought of Imamate in the Zaidiya in Yemen» a scientific letter.
- (8) Ahmed al-Daghshi, "Houthi phenomenon," a comprehensive systematic study, Sana'a, 2009..
- (9) Adel Al-Ahmadi, al-Zahrah and al-Jabal, p. 129.
- (10) The Salafi Sciences Network website: <http://aloloom.net/vb/showthread.php?t=7346>
- (11) Franço Berga, Political Islam at the Time of Al-Qaeda: Re-Islamization, Modernization, Radicalism, Sahar Saeed's translation, p. 42, 2006. <http://www.muqbl.com/play-96.html>
- (12) Franco Berga, Political Islam at the Time of Al-Qaeda: Re-Islamization, Defiance, Radicalism, Sahar Saeed's translation, p. 42, 2006.
- (13) Ahmed al-Daghshi, previous source, P. 11.
- (14) Previous reference, P. 11, 12.
- (15) Global Crisis Group, N. 89, Middle East Report, May 2009, p. 7.
- (16) Previous reference, p. 10.
- (17) Franco Berga, Political Islam at the Time of Al-Qaeda: Re-Islamization, Modernization, Radicalism, Sahar Saeed's translation, pp. 47-48
- (18) The statement is published on the Office's website on «Facebook»
<https://www.facebook.com/AlhothiOffice>

Revolutionary Houthiyya and Political Hashimiyya ..

Alliance of governance and struggle for survival ..

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The name of the Houthis is attributed to the Yemeni Shiite cleric Badr al-Din Amir al-Din al-Houthi (1926-2010), who was known for his tendency to take over the ruling on religious bases and not to recognize the republican system.

In 1986, he established the so-called «Youth Union» along with his companion, Majd al-Din al-Mu'aydi (1914-2007), through which he aimed to present the Twelver doctrine (Ithnaashariyya) based on the theory of the Wilayat al-Faqih. He presented himself as the «Al-Wali al-Faqih». This was the reason for the disagreement between him and his companion, who considered himself as the leading Imam, according to the theory that the Zaidi symbols reached to come out of the dilemma of the obligation that the imamate must be from the two tattoos (in reference to relatives of Prophet Mohamed from his daughter Fatima).

The dispute between al-Houthi and al-Mu'aydi

resulted in split of (the Youth Union), as al-Mu'aydi withdrew from the union with many of comrades and supporters.

With the reestablishment of unity between the two parts of Yemen, northern and southern Yemen, in 1990, Badr al-Din al-Houthi instructed his eldest son (Mohamed) to establish the Youth Believers Forum along with one of his students (Mohamed Salem Azzan). The forum exploited the freedom space that has become available after the Yemeni unity as the constitution allowed the formation of political, intellectual and cultural organizations.

The new organization was able to circulate the Twelver ideology (Ithna'ashariyya) – that the eldest Houthi (Badr al-Din al-Houthi) dreamed to promote in the Zaidi areas since a long time - within seven years from 1990 to 1997. The Houthi movement managed to establish their first cultural camp in the city of Saada, the most zealous governorate



for the Zaidi belief and its cultural and intellectual stronghold. This move aroused the anger of the political Hashimiyya that saw this organization as a danger to its existence because it is based on the theory of Khomeini called "Wilayat al-Faqih." The symbols of the political Hashimiyya wanted to refute this thought through their senior references, including Majd al-Din al-Mu'ayidi, Mohamed Mohamed al-Mansour and Abbas Al-Moayad, and other symbols of the political Hashimiyya.

When differences between the two groups escalated and began to appear in public, after it was behind the scenes in order to preserve the rationalism structure from fragmentation, the political symbols of the political Hashimiyya, including Major General Yahya al-Mutawakil, Dr. Ahmad Sharaf al-Din, Dr. Mohammad Abd al-Malik al-Mutawakil, and Ahmad al-Kohlani, intervened to reach an agreement to contain this dispute and former President Ali Abdullah Saleh witnessed the agreement, in light of which the Houthis were given annual financial support for their activities in return for their commitment to the principles of the Zaidi

doctrine.

During the signing of this agreement, Badr al-Din al-Houthi and his descendants Hussein, Abd al-Malik and Abd al-Khaliq were living in Iran since they fled the country following the outbreak of the summer war in 1994 because of the Houthi support for secession between north and south and the Houthi allegiance to Ali Salem al-Baid, whom Houthis see as member of the Hashimi family. The man and his three sons stayed in Iran for almost seven years and comprehended the doctrine of Twelver, Ithna'ashariyya. They returned to Yemen after a special amnesty in 2001, mediated by the symbols of the political Hashimiyya.

After the return of Badr al-Din and his sons to Yemen, Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi took control of the organization of the Youth Believer (Al-Shabab al-Mu'min) and managed to exclude his brother Mohamed and also Mohamed Azzan from the leadership of the organization. So, Hussein al-Houthi began to present the Twelver belief explicitly in his lectures and seminars, under the name of antagonism against America and Israel,



and then we can say that the organization of the Youth Believer (Al-Shabab Al-Mu'min) has become an Iranian revolutionary organization.

Al-Shabab Al-Mu'min increased behind the new leader of the Houthis encouraging him to declare the rebellion against the state in 2004, which ended within a few days. But the rebellion quickly reorganized ranks under the leadership of his brother Abdul-Malik, who fought against the state other five wars ended in the sixth war in 2009. During wars, the Houthis received material, military, political and media support from Iran and the Lebanese Hezbollah.

During the Youth Peaceful Revolution that broke out within the Arab spring revolutions, the Houthis managed to take over the entire governorate of Saada exploiting the glare of the Arab spring revolutions and the regime's busyness with the suppression of the revolution. They participated in the peaceful revolution's squares, and at the same time they expanded militarily in the provinces of Al-Jawf, Hajjah and Amran. After the fall of Saleh's regime and the transfer of power to President AbdRabbo Mansour Hadi 2012, the Houthis participated in the National Dialogue Conference along with other peaceful political and revolutionary organizations, and from that time they called themselves a new name (Ansar Allah).

In 2014 and in an alliance with both the former President Ali Abdullah Saleh and the organization of the political Hashimiyya, the strategic ally of Saleh, the Houthis could invade the province of Amran and then the overthrow of the state and the takeover of power in Sanaa, and then began to wage war against the southern provinces to

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Al-Hashimiyya got an overwhelming defeat in Yemen following the outbreak of the revolution of September 26, 1962 by the rebels against the rational Imamate rule, but it continued to resist and fight for the restoration of the Imamate rule
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have control over most of the governorates until the beginning of the Deceive Storm, led by Saudi Arabia, in March 2015. At the end of 2017, the Houthis managed to kill their ally, former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, after the siege of his home in Sanaa for two days.

As for the historical roots of the political Hashmiyya, it extends to more than a thousand years, the age of the Imamate rule in the northern North Yemen on the basis of a religious political theory called (theory of al-Batnain).

Al-Hashimiyya got an overwhelming defeat in Yemen following the outbreak of the revolution of September 26, 1962 by the rebels against the rational Imamate rule. However, it continued to resist and fight for the restoration of the Imamate rule against republicans who were supported by



President Jamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt. The war between the republicans and the monarchs (the political Hashimiyyab) continued until 1970, which witnessed reconciliation between the republicans and the monarchs under the auspices of Saudi Arabia and Egypt, where the agreement led to the inclusion of the political Hashimiyya in the government under the umbrella of the republican system.

Following the agreement, the monarchs (the political Hashimiyya) in Sana'a formed a special secret organization aimed at restoring the rational rule through penetrating the civil and military institutions of the state through a long-term strategic plan that ends with the seizure of power even under the umbrella of the republican system. The secret organization moved on towards its objectives and it was almost to achieve the objectives but the sudden appearance of the Houthi group and the outbreak of the Arab Spring revolutions broke the road.

Intellectual conflict

Al-Hashimiyya is based on the theory of the «Imamate of Al-Batnain» in the sense that it should be the ruling on the offspring of Ali Ibn Abi Talib from Fatima, the daughter of the Prophet Mohamed. This means that the rule should be for the descendants of Hassan and Hussein, the sons of Ali. At this point, the political Hashimiyya agree with the Twelver (Ithna'ashariyya), which the Houthis adopt and promote, but they differ in the details explaining this theory. At the time when the Hashemiyya believes that the rule should be limited to the descendants of Hassan and Hussein, the Houthis believe that that the rule should be limited to the descendants of Hussein only, without Hassan, who the Houthis say voluntarily handed over the power to his opponent Muawiya. This idea of Twelver makes the political Hashemite ineligible for the rule as all Hashemite imams who ruled Yemen over the past one thousand years were the descendants of Hassan bin Ali. This intellectual

dispute between the two parties made each party claims that the other is disbeliever.

After the fall of the rule of the Imamate (the political Hashemite) in Yemen because of the revolution of September 26, 1962 and then the agreement between Republicans and monarchs in 1970 and the end of the war between them, the political Hashimiyya became in a big intellectual dilemma that caused a major disintegration in the ranks, how they can accept to live under a political system that is not subject to their theory (The rule of Al-Batnain). The symbols of the political Hashimiyya, on top of them (Majd al-Din al-Mua'yadi) agree on the need to develop a new intellectual theory along with the lines of Khomeini's theory (the mandate of the jurist). In the early 1980s, during the reign of Ali Abdullah Saleh, the new theory of (Imam al-Qa'ad and Imam al-Qa'im) came out. The theory accepts the rule of a person from outside the baton and to swear allegiance to the president (Imam al-Qa'am) with allegiance to another person to be (Imam al-Qa'ad). Majd al-Din al-Mua'yadi was selected to be the Imam al-Qa'ad and he continued to be the leader of the political Hashimiyya in Yemen, Najran and Hejaz until his death in 2007, in addition to his membership in the Supreme Council of Al AlBait Wise Men in Yemen, the political secret of the political Hashimiyya.

Although Badr al-Din al-Houthi is also a descendant of Hassan ibn Ali, his ambition to take the Imamate and his extreme hostility to his most prominent rival, Majd al-Din al-Mua'yadi, made him falls in the arms of Iran and adopts the Twelver ideology. He presented himself to the Iranians as the «Yamani»

who will help in facilitating the appearance of the upcoming Imam, according to Twelver belief. In the Twelver faith, al-Yamani is a Yemeni man descending from Hassan bin Ali who will take over the rule in Yemen and his takeover represents an introduction to the appearance of the upcoming Imam. This is one of the reasons why Iran supports Houthi alone, in addition to achieving its strategic, geographic and political objectives through supporting rebellion movements in Yemen and

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other countries.

The intellectual conflict between al-Muayidi and the Houthi caused ideological conflict between the political Hashimiyya and the Houthi movement. The conflict pushed the religious symbols of the political Hashimiyya to issue a number of fatwas supporting the regime of Saleh during his war against the rebel group of Houthis in Saada, but this conflict began to decline after the death of Majd al-Din al-Mua'yidi and the inability of the political Hashimiyya to choose another one to be the Imam al-Qa'ad because of the fierce competition between the symbols of the political Hashimiyya. This brought them back to the same intellectual vacuum, but their secret political organization remained largely cohesive.

This intellectual vacuum was an opportunity for the Houthi movement. Badr al-Din al-Houthi returned from Iran to present himself as a new imam and led many wars alongside with his son, Abdul-Malik, but he (Badr al-Din) soon died in 2010 from injuries he sustained in the last war with Saleh's regime in 2009.

Repositioning and Race for Survival

Al-Hashimiyya found its path to play a political role via Ali Abdullah Saleh. It exploited Saleh's passion for power and his desire to bequeath the power to his family and allied with him through one of its political figures. For his part, Saleh facilitated the political Hashimiyya infiltration into the state's military and civilian institutions. He placed many of their sons in the Republican Guards and the Central Security



Organization, and gave them leadership positions in the government and the judiciary and in his own political party, which provided a strong political cover and a large military and civilian authority to the Hashimiyya, while at the same time the Houthis in ongoing wars with Saleh's regime enabled them to expand and spread in the province of Saada.

After Yahya al-Shami took over the leadership of the secret organization of the political Hashimiyya and because of his tendencies to the alliance with the Houthi movement, the two organizations began to harmonize. This encouraged many Hashemites to begin showing compassion for the Houthis. Since the transfer of power to President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi in 2012 through the GCC Initiative,

the political Hashimiyya provided the Houthis with political organizational expertise and it could convince them to establish a political office and rename their group (Ansar Allah). From this point, the two organizations began to move towards one goal - to take over the power by force- especially after Saleh left the power due to the February Revolution 2011. Thus, the political Hashimiyya has thrown its political and organizational weight in favor of the Houthi movement and contributed greatly to supporting the coup in partnership with former President Ali Abdullah Saleh.

During the years of the coup, the political Hashimiyya realized that it had fallen into a serious dilemma in its alliance with a vengeful person and



The political Hashimiyya exploited Ali Abdullah Saleh's passion for power and his desire to bequeath the power to his family and allied with him through one of its political figures. For his part, Saleh facilitated the political Hashimiyya infiltration into the state's military and civilian institutions. He placed many of their sons in the Republican Guards and the Central Security Organization, and gave them leadership positions in the government and the judiciary and in his own political party, which provided a strong political cover and a large military and civilian authority



a reckless one. This itself threatens its strategic project to restore power. The political Hashimiyya felt that it had become a socially and regionally rejected group because of the barbarism of the coup alliance. The Houthis to kill Ali Abdullah Saleh, which was a political cover for the Hashimiyya political safe cover for resettlement in the event of disposal of the Houthi movement and the failure of the coup.

The political Hashimiyya feels it is exposed to danger because part of its leadership is foolishly lenient with the Houthi project, such as brigadier Yahya al-Shami. It has become aware that this identification with the Houthis may cost a heavy price in case the Houthi armed movement is defeated in the war led by the Arab Coalition since March 2015, and may lead to the fragmentation and collapse of the two movements, the Houthi Iranian Revolutionary and the Political Hashimiyya.

It seems that the best and most accessible scenario for the political Hashimiyya now is the urgent response to the lines of communication that have been secretly opened by the Gulf neighborhood in exchange for abandoning the Iran-related Houthi revolutionary movement and conducting political dialogues leading to the rescue of the Hashimiyya organization from the deadlock of the Houthiyya as another scenario within several expected scenarios.

But the most dangerous is the third scenario, which is expected to repeat the brutalization of the Houthi movement and a new cycle of violence between the components of the coup, especially since the clashes between Saleh, the Hashemite ally,

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The best scenario now for the political Hashimiyya now is the urgent response to the lines of communication that have been secretly opened by the Gulf neighborhood in exchange for abandoning the Iran-related Houthi revolutionary movement

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and the Houthis ended with the murder of Saleh on December 4, 2017. New confrontations may end up with another Houthi brutality against the leaders of the political Hashemite some of whom were already assassinated very early, especially if Tehran has a long strategy for Yemen to keep it in chaos in order to ensure that the Gulf remain under constant threats.



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