The bottom line for decision-makers is clear:

The success of the new government will not be measured only by its formation or presence in Aden. It will be measured by its ability to prevent the Houthis from dragging Yemen into Iran’s war, prevent remnants of parallel formations from dragging Aden into disorder, and convert external support into government performance felt by citizens.

Methodology and Analytical Approach

Abaad Observatory for Early Warning and Strategic Indicators adopts a multi-stage monitoring and analysis methodology designed to transform raw materials, news items, reports, and dispersed data into indicators that can be understood, measured, and assessed. The aim is to help decision-makers, researchers, and relevant stakeholders read ongoing developments in Yemen and anticipate their possible trajectories.

The methodology begins with collecting monitored materials from media sources, official statements, local and international reports, organizational outputs, and available field indicators. These materials are then classified into key tracks: political, economic, social, military, security, rights, and humanitarian indicators.

After classification, the materials are analyzed across four main levels: event intensity, indicator direction, level of impact, and early-warning significance. The Observatory does not treat news items as isolated incidents, but rather as signals that may reveal broader trends, rising risks, or exploitable opportunities.

Abaad Observatory for Early Warning and Strategic Indicators also uses artificial intelligence tools to support the processing of raw information, sorting of materials, detection of recurring patterns, classification of indicators, and generation of initial readings that help the analytical team produce faster and more structured situation assessments.

Artificial intelligence is not used as a substitute for human judgment or editorial responsibility. It is used as an assisting tool within a research and analytical process supervised by the Observatory’s team. All outputs are subject to human review, consistency checks, editorial refinement, and political and strategic interpretation before being approved in the final version.

Fixed Editorial Note

This report is not intended to provide a monthly news archive or to simply restate all developments in chronological order. Rather, it seeks to produce an analytical reading directed at decision-makers. Accordingly, the issues addressed in this report are arranged according to their level of impact and strategic significance, not merely according to the date on which they occurred.

Therefore, some events that may appear limited in media volume may receive greater analytical weight if they are connected to the future of the state, the monopoly of force, unified security command, the settlement track, or the rights and humanitarian situation.

First: Executive Summary

February 2026 was a highly sensitive month in the trajectory of the Yemeni crisis. Three major tracks overlapped: the escalation of regional tensions linked to Iran, the test facing the new Yemeni government in Aden, and continued attempts by remnants of the dissolved Southern Transitional Council to disrupt the state-recovery process.

The main headline of the month was a clear Yemeni warning to the Houthis against joining Iran’s war. The Yemeni government condemned Iranian attacks on Arab states and warned the Houthis against turning Yemen into an arena serving Iran’s agenda or into a military platform within a wider regional confrontation.

At the same time, the arrival of the new government in Aden and the holding of its first cabinet meeting there became a practical test of the state’s ability to establish its presence in the temporary capital after the previous month’s decisions to dissolve the Southern Transitional Council and reorganize military and security authority. However, attempts to storm Maashiq Palace, the closure of dissolved STC offices, and mobilization by Aiderous Al-Zubaidi’s supporters showed that the battle to restore state authority has not ended; it has moved into a phase of testing the state’s ability to impose order without sliding into chaos or internal clashes.

February also showed that the economic file has become a direct benchmark for the new government’s success, especially after the announcement of an executive program to improve services and economic stability, reports of possible Saudi support exceeding five billion dollars in 2026, and discussions around economic integration between Yemen and the Gulf states.

On the rights and humanitarian tracks, issues of press freedom, detainees, forcibly disappeared persons, migrants, detained UN staff, and Houthi restrictions on humanitarian work remained pressing indicators in the wider scene. They also served as a reminder that no political or security stabilization can be complete without serious attention to rights and humanitarian files.

Second: General Risk Indicator

Overall risk level: Red / High

The risk indicator in February is elevated for five main reasons.

First, the Houthis moved closer to using Yemen within Iran’s wider confrontation, whether through maritime threats, military mobilization, or heightened readiness amid U.S.-Iranian tensions.

Second, Aden remained politically and security-wise fragile despite the arrival of the new government. Attempts to create disorder and storm Maashiq Palace revealed that networks linked to the dissolved Southern Transitional Council still have the capacity to disrupt the scene.

Third, the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab returned to the center of strategic warning, with the European Union extending Operation Aspides and continuing concerns over Houthi threats to international navigation.

Fourth, the economic file became an immediate test for the new government. Promises of support, projects, and development will not translate into stability unless they produce tangible results in services, salaries, prices, and investment activity.

Fifth, rights and freedoms remained under heavy pressure, including the storming of Aden Al-Ghad newspaper, the detention of journalists, the file of forcibly disappeared persons, growing humanitarian needs, and the deterioration of the humanitarian operating environment in Houthi-controlled areas.

Third: Key Transformations in February

1. Political Transformation: The New Government Between Legitimacy and Practical Testing

February marked the new government’s transition from formation and oath-taking to the test of actual presence in Aden. The government took the constitutional oath, Prime Minister Shaye Al-Zindani and several ministers arrived in the temporary capital, and the cabinet held its first meeting there, approving an executive program aimed at improving services and strengthening economic stability.

The implication is that the government is no longer facing only a test of legal legitimacy, but a test of performance. Citizens will not wait long for the results of political rhetoric. They will judge the government through security, services, salaries, institutional discipline, and its ability to govern Aden without yielding to political blackmail or security disorder.

Official discourse also clearly linked any future negotiations with the Houthis to the principle of restoring the state and ending the coup. This reflects a government attempt to move from crisis management toward addressing the roots of the conflict.

This track, however, faces two challenges: the continuing fragility of Aden and the difficulty of turning regional and international support into swift and visible impact.

2. Regional Transformation: Yemen Between Iran’s War and Red Sea Security

The regional transformation was the most dangerous in February. Iranian attacks on Arab states and Yemen’s warnings to the Houthis against engaging in any military adventure placed Yemen before the possibility of shifting from an internal conflict arena into part of a wider regional confrontation.

The Yemeni government clearly sought to isolate Yemen from Iran’s war and to emphasize that the Houthis are not an independent national actor, but an Iranian instrument that may be used in the Red Sea or against neighboring states.

At the same time, Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab security emerged as an international, not merely Yemeni, issue. President Al-Alimi’s call for stronger security partnership with the European Union, the extension of Operation Aspides, and growing warnings about Houthi threats to navigation all indicate that Yemen has become central to the security of maritime routes and international trade.

The implication for decision-makers is that Yemen faces both an opportunity and a risk. The opportunity is to transform international attention to Red Sea security into support for the Yemeni state. The risk is that the file may be reduced to an international maritime approach that bypasses Yemeni state institutions.

3. Military and Security Transformation: Aden and the Battle to Prevent the Return of Chaos

February continued to expose the fragility of the security situation in liberated areas, especially Aden. Attempts to storm Maashiq Palace, mobilization by supporters of the dissolved Southern Transitional Council, and the closure of its offices by the Giants Brigades all confirm that the post-STC phase remains open and contested.

The most important message in this file is that restoring the state cannot be achieved by closing offices alone. It requires building a unified security authority capable of preventing disorder, protecting institutions, and applying the law without revenge or selectivity.

The Houthis also appeared militarily through mobilization toward the Saudi border, the western coast, Marib, Al-Jawf, Taiz, and Al-Bayda, in addition to raising readiness levels amid regional tensions. This means the government is facing dual pressure: internal pressure in Aden and Hadramawt, and Houthi military pressure linked to Iranian calculations.

The strategic implication is that any prolonged government preoccupation with internal disturbances may give the Houthis an opportunity to reposition or escalate.

4. Economic Transformation: Gulf Support and Integration as a Test of Results

The economy appeared in February through four key indicators: the cabinet’s first meeting in Aden and approval of a program to improve services and economic stability; reports of broad Saudi support that may exceed five billion dollars in 2026; expected development and investment projects in Aden; and the possibility of economic integration between Yemen and the Gulf states without waiting for a comprehensive political settlement.

These indicators open an important window of opportunity. If the government succeeds in translating support into services, salaries, and visible projects, it can strengthen public confidence and give state recovery a living, economic dimension.

The risk, however, is that promises may exceed implementation capacity. Previous experiences show that external support does not automatically produce stability unless accompanied by transparent institutions, performance indicators, oversight, and clear priorities.

The implication is that the economy is the non-military front of state recovery. Without rapid economic impact, the government will remain vulnerable to public pressure and political blackmail.

5. Rights and Humanitarian Transformation: Freedoms, Detainees and Migrants Under Pressure

February revealed a highly complex rights and humanitarian environment. On one hand, calls continued for the release of detainees and forcibly disappeared persons. On the other, journalists remained under threat, as shown by the storming of Aden Al-Ghad newspaper, the continued detention of journalists, and reports documenting widespread violations against media workers.

The migrant file also emerged after the International Organization for Migration reported the death of 922 Ethiopians on the eastern migration route to Yemen during the previous year. This is both a humanitarian and security indicator, reflecting the dangers of migration routes, weak protection, and the connection between migration, smuggling networks, and organized crime.

In addition, UN estimates indicated that the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance may increase by around three million during the year, amid Houthi restrictions on humanitarian organizations and a deteriorating humanitarian operating environment.

The implication is that the rights and humanitarian file is not a secondary issue. It is part of the state’s legitimacy and Yemen’s image before the international community. A credible state cannot be built while the files of press freedom, detainees, prisons, migrants, and humanitarian access remain unresolved.

Fourth: What February’s Indicators Mean for Decision-Makers

February’s indicators show that Yemen has entered a dual test: the test of the new government at home, and the test of the state in the face of the risk of the Houthis being drawn into Iran’s war.

On one side, the government needs to prove that it can govern from Aden, not from abroad. On the other, it needs to build a diplomatic and security narrative that links the Houthi threat, Red Sea security, and protection of the Yemeni state without allowing Yemen to become merely an arena within a regional conflict.

The indicators also show that the battle to restore the state after the dissolution of the Southern Transitional Council is no longer only about decisions. It is about the ability to manage security, services, politics, and rights simultaneously.

The central question for decision-makers is whether the new government can transform the current moment of political and regional support into a convincing model of governance, or whether it will remain hostage to Aden’s fragility, Houthi pressure, and competing local and regional networks.

Fifth: Rising Risks

1. Houthi Involvement in Iran’s War

This was the highest risk in February. Any direct or indirect Houthi entry into Iran’s confrontation would turn Yemen into an arena of regional deterrence and escalation, and would multiply risks to the Red Sea, Saudi Arabia, and liberated areas.

2. Disruption of the New Government in Aden

The movements of dissolved STC supporters and attempts to create disorder may aim to portray the government as unable to manage the temporary capital. This requires a firm and lawful security plan without revenge.

3. Reducing Red Sea Security to an International Approach

If Red Sea security remains an international file separate from building the Yemeni state’s capacities, the government may lose the opportunity to turn maritime security into an entry point for sovereignty recovery.

4. Rapid Failure in Service Delivery

The new government may face public judgment within a short period, especially with talk of a “100-day” window. If no progress appears in electricity, salaries, prices, and public facilities, its political momentum may weaken.

5. Escalating Rights and Media Pressure

The storming of newspapers, continued detentions, and the file of enforced disappearance may become pressing international issues and weaken the image of the state and anti-Houthi forces.

Sixth: Available Opportunities

1. Turning the New Government into a Performance Model

The government’s presence in Aden can become an opportunity if it is tied to a clear performance plan and monthly indicators in security, services, and the economy.

2. Building a Yemeni-Led International Partnership on the Red Sea

European and international interest in maritime security can be transformed into support for the Coast Guard, ports, maritime intelligence, and state institutions, rather than remaining limited to separate naval operations.

3. Leveraging Saudi and Gulf Support

Reports of broad Saudi support and Gulf economic integration can be used to launch rapid-impact projects in Aden and other liberated governorates.

4. Legally Dismantling Networks of Disorder

Closing offices of the dissolved Southern Transitional Council should be accompanied by a legal and administrative process to dismantle financing, incitement, and security duplication.

5. Using the Detainees’ File to Build Humanitarian Confidence

Ramadan and the Amman consultations provide an opportunity to press for the release of detainees and forcibly disappeared persons, turning the file into a humanitarian confidence-building entry point.

Seventh: Possible Scenarios

Scenario One: Dual Containment of Escalation

Probability: Medium

The government, with Saudi and international support, succeeds in consolidating its presence in Aden and preventing the Houthis from dragging Yemen into Iran’s confrontation, while diplomatic and security pressure continues around the Red Sea.

Scenario Two: Limited Security Disorder in Aden

Probability: Medium to High

Supporters of the dissolved Southern Transitional Council continue efforts to disrupt the government through protests, attempted storming of institutions, or security incitement. The disorder remains contained if the state responds firmly and legally.

Scenario Three: Iran-Linked Houthi Escalation

Probability: Medium

The Houthis increase mobilization or hint at maritime and military escalation in support of Iran, raising the risk of regional confrontation and placing the government before the challenge of deterrence and international coordination.

Scenario Four: Limited Economic Momentum Without Tangible Transformation

Probability: Medium

Projects and financial support are announced, but their impact on citizens is delayed, creating a gap between promises and performance and giving opponents an opportunity to challenge the new government.

Eighth: Recommendations for Decision-Makers

1. Prevent Yemen from Being Linked to Iran’s War

A clear political and diplomatic message should hold the Houthis responsible for any involvement in Iran’s war and emphasize that Yemen is not a proxy battlefield for any regional actor.

2. Stabilize the Government in Aden Through an Urgent Security and Service Plan

The government’s return to Aden must be translated into institutional security, services, management of ports and facilities, and daily follow-up, not merely symbolic presence.

3. Turn the “100 Days” into a Government Performance Dashboard

Specific performance indicators should be announced for the government’s first 100 days: electricity, salaries, security, ports, revenues, prices, and public services.

4. Establish a Yemeni Red Sea Security Cell

Red Sea security should not be left to international powers alone. A specialized Yemeni cell is needed to link the government with the Coast Guard, ports, intelligence agencies, and international partners.

5. Address the Legacy of the Dissolved STC Through Legal Channels

Closing offices is not enough. Financing, incitement, parallel security structures, and violations must be addressed through a legal process that preserves civil peace.

6. Prioritize the Detainees and Forcibly Disappeared File

The Amman consultations and Ramadan should be used to push for the clearing of prisons, release of detainees, and disclosure of the fate of forcibly disappeared persons.

7. Protect Press Freedom as an Indicator of State Seriousness

The Aden Al-Ghad case and the detention of journalists must be addressed transparently, because press freedom has become a benchmark distinguishing the state from militia behavior.

8. Link External Support to Results

Saudi, Gulf, and international support should be managed through declared indicators so that it translates into public trust rather than being absorbed by bureaucracy or networks of influence.

Ninth: Concluding Situation Assessment

February 2026 was the month of the new government as much as it was the month of warning against Iran’s war. The state found itself facing a complex equation: stabilizing authority in Aden, preventing the return of disorder, confronting Houthi mobilization, protecting the Red Sea, and converting economic support into tangible results.