Introduction

This report provides an annual analytical reading of how international think tanks, media institutions, and policy-oriented research platforms addressed Yemen during 2025. It is based on twelve monthly files published by Abaad Studies and Research Center as part of its “Abaad Translations” series.

The purpose of this report is not merely to summarize the translated materials, but to extract the major trends that shaped how international research institutions viewed Yemen throughout the year; identify the most prominent issues, actors, and shifts; and assess how these developments affected Yemen’s position within regional and international calculations.

The 2025 monitoring shows that Yemen is no longer viewed internationally as merely a local civil-war arena. Rather, it has become a strategic node intertwined with Red Sea security, the Iran–Israel conflict, Saudi–Emirati competition, global trade security, expanding Russian and Chinese influence, and the future of the Yemeni state itself.

Executive Summary

2025: The year Yemen moved from an internal-war file to a regional and international security file

International think tank coverage in 2025 shows that Yemen shifted from being framed primarily as a humanitarian and political file linked to civil war, to being treated as an international security issue directly connected to freedom of navigation, global supply chains, regional deterrence, and the role of Iran and its proxies in the Middle East.

At the beginning of the year, international attention focused heavily on the Houthi threat to navigation in the Red Sea, as well as U.S., British, and Israeli strikes against Houthi positions. Early files addressed issues such as Iranian spy ships, arms smuggling, the designation of the Houthis, and the group’s transformation into a cross-border maritime and missile threat.

By March and April, the coverage focused on the impact of U.S. strikes, the Houthis’ capacity to produce weapons, and the extent of their dependence on Iran.

By mid-year, the scope of attention widened to include cooperation between the Houthis and Somali terrorist organizations, the growth of the Houthi missile arsenal, the role of China and Russia in the Red Sea, and the smuggling of dual-use components. Yemen was increasingly analyzed within a security map extending from Bab al-Mandab to the Horn of Africa, and from the Gulf to East Asia.

In the final quarter, attention shifted toward two parallel questions: first, how to cut the Iranian supply artery to the Houthis and neutralize their threat in the Red Sea; and second, whether Yemen had entered a new phase of internal fragmentation, particularly amid the escalation of the southern question, Hadramout, Al-Mahra, and Saudi–Emirati rivalry.

d Sea through politics, armaments, diplomatic cover, or dual-use components.

: Implications for Decision-Makers

1. The Houthis cannot be separated from the Red Sea

Any policy toward the Houthis must treat them as both an internal and external threat. They control Yemeni territory, but their impact extends to the Suez Canal, Bab al-Mandab, Israel, the Gulf, and international trade.

2. Military strikes alone are not enough

Most coverage converged on the conclusion that airstrikes may temporarily weaken Houthi capabilities, but they will not end the threat unless accompanied by supply interdiction, financial disruption, the building of a unified Yemeni force, and the activation of inspection and sanctions mechanisms.

3. Division within the anti-Houthi camp is the greatest vulnerability

The end of the year shows that the greatest danger to Yemen is not only the Houthis, but also the fragmentation of the forces opposing them. The escalation of Saudi–Emirati competition and the Southern Transitional Council’s moves in Hadramout and Al-Mahra create space for the Houthis to reposition themselves.

4. The economy is not a secondary file

Discussions of the blue economy, ports, fisheries, submarine cables, and maritime energy show that rebuilding Yemen cannot be limited to a political settlement. It requires a long-term maritime economic vision.

5. Yemen has become part of international competition

A narrow Yemeni reading is no longer sufficient. China, Russia, Iran, Israel, the United States, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE are all present in the scene, and each actor views Yemen through the lens of its own strategic interests.

Final Conclusion

The annual review of international think tank coverage of Yemen in 2025 shows that Yemen has entered a new stage in international perception. It is no longer a forgotten country in a long war, but a central arena where four major files intersect: Red Sea security, the rise of the Houthis as a regional actor, the restructuring of Iran’s axis, and the internal fragmentation of the Yemeni state.

The year showed that the Houthis, despite pressure and strikes, remain capable of survival and adaptation. At the same time, they face increasing fragility as a result of military strikes, internal repression, and the declining strength of Iran. The year also revealed that the greatest danger to Yemen’s future does not come from the Houthis alone, but from the convergence of the Houthi threat with the division of their opponents and the rivalry among their allies.

For research centers and decision-makers, the most important lesson from 2025 is that Yemen must be read through three overlapping maps: the map of the divided Yemeni state, the map of the Red Sea and maritime corridors, and the map of regional and international conflict. Any policy that fails to bring these maps together will remain unable to understand the crisis, let alone address it.